Dear list,
Ἰδέα is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for εἶδος, class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality that underlies any group of things classed together in virtue of possessing a common quality. An ἰδέα is perceptible only by the mind, but the word does not denote the content of a mental perception, as does the derivative 'idea' in ordinary English. Some words shall herein be capitalised when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but "Idea," nearer Plato’s idea of *ἰδέα*, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it. Best, Jerry Rhee On Mon, Dec 18, 2017 at 3:07 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > List, > > > > Aristotle’s remarks at the beginning of *De Caelo* go like this: “A > magnitude if divisible one way is a line, if two ways a surface, and if > three a body. Beyond these there is no other magnitude, because the three > dimensions are all that there are, and that which is divisible in three > directions is divisible in all. For, as the Pythagoreans say, the world and > all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and > middle and end give the number of an ‘all’, and the number they give is the > triad.” Peirce occasionally called this triad the “cenopythagorean > categories” — but for him, there is much more to them than we find in > Aristotle’s summary of the Pythagorean notions. Although these elements are > so fundamental that “confused notions” of them go back to the beginning of > philosophy, great patience and effort is required to clarify them as they > ought to be clarified by anyone interested in philosophy. > > > > Peirce’s comments on his predecessors Kant and Hegel help to situate > Peirce’s own efforts along these lines. His emphasis on “the > inexhaustible intricacy of the fabric of conceptions” — referring I think > to conceptions *in general*, not just the three in question here — is > remarkable, and his recognition of that (rather than modesty) compels him > to say “I do not flatter myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea > into its constituent elements.” In the drafts of this lecture and > elsewhere, Peirce did give some account of his labors, though he decided > not to “inflict” such an account on his audience at this time. I think we > can be sure that if Peirce never managed to “analyze a single idea into its > constituent elements,” it wasn’t for lack of effort or skill at logical > analysis. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 17-Dec-17 15:07 > *To:* 'Peirce-L' <[email protected]> > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6 > > > > Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/ > jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd- > draught/display/13896 > > > > Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as > most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the > three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can. > > > > [CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed > in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of > hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you > must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are > no inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn > them. Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of > philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental > importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's *De Caelo,* where > it is said that the Pythagoreans knew of them. > > > > [522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant > possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a > philosopher, > 1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness; > 2nd, Inventive originality; > 3rd, Generalizing power; > 4th, Subtlety; > 5th, Critical severity and sense of fact; > 6th, Systematic procedure; > 7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to > philosophy. > > > > [523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible > intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not flatter > myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent > elements. > > > > [524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived, > had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an inadequate > notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case was, he would > not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast field that he > attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient in that 5th > requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He brought out the three > elements much more clearly. But the element of Secondness, of *hard fact,* > is not accorded its due place in his system; and in a lesser degree the > same is true of Firstness. After Hegel wrote, there came fifty years that > were remarkably fruitful in all the means for attaining that 5th > requisite. Yet Hegel's followers, instead of going to work to reform their > master's system, and to render his statement of it obsolete, as every true > philosopher must desire that his disciples should do, only proposed, at > best, some superficial changes without replacing at all the rotten material > with which the system was built up. > > > > [525] I shall not inflict upon you any account of my own labors. Suffice > it to say that my results have afforded me great aid in the study of logic. > > > > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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