Dear list,
A human being may well ask the animal: ‘Why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only stand and gaze at me.’ The animal would like to answer, and say: ‘The reason is I always forget what I was going to say’— but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent. It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions. Should I not have to be a cask of memory, if I also wanted to have my reasons with me? To make them as distinct as it is in their nature to be is, however, no small task. *From CP 5.402 to CP 5.189* With best wishes, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 12:44 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff, list, > > > > That’s an interesting question — for my part, I don’t see that Peirce's > explanations > of the alpha or beta parts of EG in the Lowell Lectures tell us much about > what’s necessary “to arrive at conclusions about what is *observable* > under different kinds of possible tests.” But maybe we’ll learn something > about that from the gamma graphs. Or John may have something to say about > this. > > > > When you say that those elements of experience are universal and necessary > “with respect to the requirements that cognitive agents must meet in order > to improve their understanding of the world by testing explanations against > observations,” that strikes me as a corollary to the proposition that those > elements are universal and necessary *for cognition*. In *Turning Signs* > I argue that the inquiry cycle which is finely articulated in scientific > method is already present in a less articulated form in even the most > primitive forms of cognition. I take this to be the Peircean view, and I > also quote Karl Popper, who sees the essence of scientific method as “trial > and error” (or to use the bigger words, “hypothesis and refutation.” Popper > says “The method of trial and error is applied not only by Einstein but, in > a more dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba also” (Popper 1968, 68). Any such > “method” is inconceivable without Thirdness, which necessarily involves > Secondness, which necessarily involves Firstness. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 18-Dec-17 20:59 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6 > > > > Gary F, John S, List, > > > > The passage cited earlier from the Carnegie application helps to clarify > what is unique about Peirce's phenomenological account of the elements of > experience. > > > > In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or > about 4000 words, upon a *New List of Categories*. It was the result of > full two years' intense and incessant application. It surprises me today > that in so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly > accurate, especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an > unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. For this list of > categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in > attempting much more than they. They merely took conceptions which they > found at hand, already worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting the > conceptions, slightly developing some of them, arranging them, and in > Hegel's case, separating one or two that had been confused with others. But > what I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of > whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds, and by examining it to > form clear conceptions of its radically different classes of elements, > without relying upon any previous philosophizing, at all. This was the most > difficult task I ever ventured to undertake. [Carnegie application (1902)] > > > > In what ways does the account of the formal elements of firstness, > secondness and thirdness "attempt much more" than is provided in the lists > and tables of categories developed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? My > understanding is that it attempts much more because it is meant to be an > account of the *formal* elements in any possible experience that are, in > some sense, *universal* and *necessary*? > > > > Let us ask: in what senses are the elemental relations of what is > monadic, dyadic or triadic in experience universal and necessary? My > interpretative hypothesis is that they are not taken to be universal and > necessary in themselves (i.e., simpliciter). Rather, they are universal and > necessary elements of experience with respect to the requirements that > cognitive agents must meet in order to improve their understanding of the > world by testing explanations against observations. > > > > As such, the idea is that Peirce is asking a question that Aristotle, Kant > and Hegel failed to adequately answer, which is: what are the formal > elements in experience that are necessary for (a) drawing on observations > of surprising phenomena for the sake of formulating explanatory hypotheses > by abduction, (b) deducing the testable consequences of what might possibly > be observed if a given hypothesis were to be true and (c), inducing from > given observations what explanations tend to be confirmed or disconfirmed > by the data. > > > > In abduction and induction, the observations that are actually made supply > us with the premisses of the arguments. In making deductions of the > testable consequences from purported hypotheses, we are asking what we > would expect to *observable* given an explanation as a supposition. If > this interpretative hypothesis is on the right track, then Peirce is > arguing that the formal elements of firstness, secondness and thirdness > that are universally part of any possible experience are necessary for the > purpose of drawing valid inferences by abduction or induction from > such observations--or for deducing the consequences of what could be > observed if a given hypothesis were to be true. > > > > Let's focus our attention on the last sort of case pertaining to > deduction, and let's ask: are these formal elements universally necessary > for deducing the consequences of what possibly could be observed if a given > hypothesis were to turn out to be true? If so, in what ways are the formal > elements necessary for drawing such inferences by deduction? > > > > There are two ways in which the elements are necessary, and I believe that > the EG help us clarify both of these ways. > > > > 1) In drawing such deductive inferences, we must be able to arrive at > conclusions about what is *observable* under different kinds of possible > tests. > > 2) Drawing such deductions requires that we observe the formal elements in > the sorts of logical diagrams that are necessary for us to see what follows > from a given set of premisses. > > > > For my part, I think that Peirce's explanations of the EG in the Lowell > Lectures does help us see what is necessary for (2). In what ways does it > help us see what is necessary with respect to (1)? > > > > > > --Jeff > > > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > > > > Continuing from Lowell Lecture 3.5, https://fromthepage.com/ > jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-464-465-1903-lowell-lecture-iii-3rd- > draught/display/13896 > > Those of you, ladies and gentlemen, who are interested in philosophy, as > most of us are, more or less, would do well to get as clear notions of the > three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as you can. > > [CP 1.521] Very wretched must be the notion of them that can be conveyed > in one lecture. They must grow up in the mind, under the hot sun-shine of > hard thought, daily, bright, well-focussed, and well aimed thought; and you > must have patience, for long time is required to ripen the fruit. They are > no inventions of mine. Were they so, that would be sufficient to condemn > them. Confused notions of these elements appear in the first infancy of > philosophy, and they have never entirely been forgotten. Their fundamental > importance is noticed in the beginning of Aristotle's *De Caelo,* where > it is said that the Pythagoreans knew of them. > > [522] In Kant they come out with an approach to lucidity. For Kant > possessed in a high degree all seven of the mental qualifications of a > philosopher, > 1st, the ability to discern what is before one's consciousness; > 2nd, Inventive originality; > 3rd, Generalizing power; > 4th, Subtlety; > 5th, Critical severity and sense of fact; > 6th, Systematic procedure; > 7th, Energy, diligence, persistency, and exclusive devotion to > philosophy. > > [523] But Kant had not the slightest suspicion of the inexhaustible > intricacy of the fabric of conceptions, which is such that I do not flatter > myself that I have ever analyzed a single idea into its constituent > elements. > > [524] Hegel, in some respects the greatest philosopher that ever lived, > had a somewhat juster notion of this complication, though an inadequate > notion, too. For if he had seen what the state of the case was, he would > not have attempted in one lifetime to cover the vast field that he > attempted to clear. But Hegel was lamentably deficient in that 5th > requisite of critical severity and sense of fact. He brought out the three > elements much more clearly. But the element of Secondness, of *hard fact,* > is not accorded its due place in his system; and in a lesser degree the > same is true of Firstness. After Hegel wrote, there came fifty years that > were remarkably fruitful in all the means for attaining that 5th > requisite. Yet Hegel's followers, instead of going to work to reform their > master's system, and to render his statement of it obsolete, as every true > philosopher must desire that his disciples should do, only proposed, at > best, some superficial changes without replacing at all the rotten material > with which the system was built up. > > [525] I shall not inflict upon you any account of my own labors. Suffice > it to say that my results have afforded me great aid in the study of logic. > > > http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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