Edwina, List:

1.  Please read more carefully--I stated that all concepts are Symbols, not
that all Signs are Symbols.  Obviously Icons and Indices are also Signs.

2.  Peirce explicitly distinguished three kinds of Interpretants, only one
of which is a Sign.  "I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an
Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the
Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling,
to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant" (CP
4.536; 1906).

3.  Peirce explicitly defined a Quasi-mind as a Sign that is a complex of
Signs.  "For any set of Signs which are so connected that a complex of two
of them can have one interpretant, must be Determinations of one Sign which
is a *Quasi-mind*" (CP 4.550; 1906).


Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> JAS, Gary R, List - and here is, as I view it, a problem.
> 1] Notice that JAS seems to be confining the definition [and function?] of
> a 'Sign' to a 'symbol', in other words, to Thirdness. But is this accurate?
> Or is this term of symbol applied only to 'concepts'; i.e.,to the
>  intellectual results of semiosis? [NOTE: I would agree with this last
> sentence since I view the symbol as confined to human semiosis] ]
>  [and I am assuming that JAS refers only to the mediate aspect of the
> triad of O-R-I, where he uses 'Sign' to refer to that mediate R].
> 2] The next point is that the Interpretant can be 'a Sign'...but need not
> be; it can also b a feeling or an exertion'. That is, it can also function
> within the mode of Firstness or Secondness. But aren't semiosic triads
> functioning in these other modes also Signs? Or does JAS hold the view that
> only an interaction in Thirdness qualifies as a 'Sign'?
> 3] I simply don't see how a quasi-mind is,  "a Quasi-mind is a Sign which
> is a complex of Signs". After all, one could say the same about Mind. I see
> the Quasi-Mind as a local and individual articulation of the more general
> non-individual and non-local Mind which underlies all semiosis.  I don't
> see how it can be a Sign - understanding Sign as DO-[IO-R-II]. Or even, as
> the mediate node in the triad of O-R-I.  I could see it as this mediate
> node If and Only If it is expressing an individual and local articulation
> of semiosic interactions - interactions and information which are specific
> to that local and individual agent.
> 4] And I agree with Gary R to be cautious of 'sharp distinctions' which, I
> feel, operate only in the abstract but go against the dynamic relational
> nature of Peircean semiosis - which requires, I think, constant networking
> and filiations with other nodes.
> Edwina
> On Fri 02/03/18 2:14 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
> Garys, List:
> Two quick clarifications.
> 1.  My point about concepts is that they are Signs, specifically Symbols,
> while Immediate Objects are parts or aspects of Signs.  Hence every
> concept has an Immediate Object, but no Immediate Object is (by itself) a
> concept.
> 2.  The Interpretant can be itself a Sign, but need not be; it can also be
> a feeling or an exertion.
> Regards,
> Jon S.
> On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>> Gary f, Jon S, list,
>> I haven't much more to offer beyond but what Jon has already written, so
>> I'll keep this brief. Gary f asked:
>> Q: Are we assuming here that the perfect Sign is an accretion of Signs in
>> a Quasi-mind?
>> I would make no such assumption. At the moment all I'm assuming is that
>> the perfect Sign (the nature of which I am not yet clear on) and a
>> Quasi-sign are not the same, and that whatever the perfect Sign turns
>> out to be that it does not mean that the Object can be completely 
>> represented.
>> I'd suggested that it may represent some kind of asymptotic Ideal of
>> representation, while Jon's quoting Peirce to the effect that a perfect
>> Sign is  "the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its
>> occurrence carries with it" makes me less certain of that initial
>> interpretation. I'd reiterate that what Jon and I do agree on is that a
>> Quasi-mind is a Sign which is a complex of Signs and, as I conjectured,
>> perhaps the prerequisite of all semiosis.
>> Q: Are we assuming that the Immediate Object includes (or can include)
>> attributes of the Dynamic Object? (Why?) If we do, then the Immediate
>> Object sounds like a concept— as, for example, your concept of a woman
>> includes attributes of the woman you are talking about right now. Do you
>> think of an Immediate Object as a concept or like a concept?
>> Jon and I agree, as he wrote, that "the Dynamic Object determines the
>> Sign with respect to  some, but not all, of its characters or qualities;
>> and that partial combination of attributes is the Immediate Object, the
>> Form that the Sign communicates."  I am less certain that I would
>> distinguish the IO from the R as completely as Jon seems to do in writing 
>> "Only
>> the Sign  itself--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol)
>> that unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its
>> Interpretant (determination)." This hard distinction of the IO from the R
>> and I seems to me to leave the "partial combination of attributes" floating
>> in some literally in-significate realm. Furthermore, the Interpretant is
>> itself a Sign, so too sharp a distinction in that direction is also, for
>> me, problematic. This discussion has gotten me rethinking just how
>> completely we ought distinguish IO-R-I except, perhaps, for the purposes of
>> certain rather abstract analyses since, at the moment, such hard
>> distinctions seem to me to break the continuity of semiosis. In short, the
>> Form which the Sign communicates seems to me not to be fully distinct from
>> it.
>> Q: By “Dynamic Object” do you mean an existing thing in reaction with
>> another existing thing? If so, why use a term that is defined only as a
>> correlate of a triadic relation?
>> I agree with Jon that "it would be better to substitute 'Thing' for
>> 'Dynamic Object' when discussing dyadic reaction."
>> I'm sure that both Jon and I would be interested in your response to our
>> answers to your questions, Gary. In particular I'm wondering what your
>> understanding of the nature of the Immediate Object is.
>> Best,
>> Gary R
>> Gary Richmond
>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>> Communication Studies
>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Reply via email to