On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:57 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

1] When scientists such as Julian Huxley, grandson of “Darwin’s bulldog” T.
> H. Huxley and noted for coining the term “the new synthesis” in mid-20th
> century genetics called for “the lower strata” to be denied “too easy
> access” to hospitals to reduce reproduction, and stated that “long
> unemployment should be a ground for sterilization,” it was the voice of
> actually existing science speaking, just as it was when noted ethologist
> and Nazi Konrad Lorenz made similar statements in 1941, after Nazi “medical
> murders” under the aegis of eugenics had begun. Admitting ways in which
> wrongheaded and potentially evil ideas can operate in the practices of
> science and technology is, to my way of thinking, a means of acknowledging
> the fallibility and potentials of these practices for self-correction.
>
> EDWINA: I consider that you making the critical thinking errors of
> generalization as well as 'post hoc ergo propter hoc'. Because SOME
> individuals involved in science had certain opinions about non-scientific
> topics, does not mean that ALL scientists feel that way nor does it mean
> that science CAUSES these beliefs. These beliefs remain individual and
> psychological; i.e., specific to the individual and have absolutely  nothing
> to do with science.
>
>

Eugene, Edwina, and list,

First, Hi to everyone! I've missed a lot of the conversations in the past
year or so, but the concept of 'perfect sign' in the other thread caught my
attention and pulled me in for the moment. Here are my thoughts on what is
an opinion of science and what isn't.

The state which a belief can, at any given moment, best be justified is
represented by its point on the parabola branch as the branch is
approaching its asymptote. The justification of a proclamation of science
is represented by its place on the parabola branch, and the truth is
represented by the asymptote. Perturbations that move an inquirer or group
of inquirers away from the truth are caused by three things, (1) purposeful
deception, (2) appeasement of a psychological state, and (3) pure bad luck.
I call errors that are due to (3) pure bad luck 'scientific errors',
whereas I don't call errors that are due to (1) and (2) 'errors of science'.

Is this not reasonable?

Here's my assessment and opinion of opinions on such overarching and
complex subjects as social order:

It's my opinion that Peirce's conservative social beliefs, which were
quoted earlier in this thread, were a perturbation, and were not due to bad
luck that can possibly come from random sampling or repeated honest errors
of observation. (By 'honest' I mean that due scientific rigor was
observed.) Peirce's social beliefs, at best (giving him the benefit of the
doubt), logically followed from weakly tested Major Premises which he
inherited from his father and/or got from his environment and/or got from
appeasing a psychological state. It's my opinion that his beliefs were
wrong; but I think I'm well justified in say he's guilty of the rationalism
that he so despised; so I don't believe he was luckily right even though
his methods were exceedingly weak.

It's extremely difficult, if not impossible, for one man or small group of
men (in our current or any past state of biological and social evolution)
to strongly test empirical premises (and assumptions) purportedly
supporting the validity of a given overarching social order. Never mind
'difficult'; it's practically impossible. So, my assessment of Peirce
having come to the wrong conclusions about these matters are also due to
despicable rationalism. And so are everyone else's—despicable rationalism
is all we have to go on.

I accuse Peirce of dismissing Plato's idea of 'second-best (political)
state' in favor of his (Peirce's) personal conception of 'best state'. And,
I'm sure, he'd accuse me of advocating a third-or-worse-best. C'est la vie;
it's all based on weakly tested hypotheses.

The following is the Major Premise supporting my belief in universal
democracy.

Just like a hive of bees has a collective intelligence, humans do too; and
this is the type of intelligence that will lead us toward the right social
order in the long run, that is, if the leveraging of elite individual will
from elite individual intelligence doesn't drive the human race into
extinction.

Matt
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to