Jon, list, Thanks for this very helpful analysis of the three interpretants of Peirce's late semeiotic. My first impression is, from what I can grasp of it, that it seems correct and complete, a succinct and subtle analysis. But I'll want to study it further as there are some points which are still a bit unclear to me, for example:
JA: The essential ingredient of the utterer is the Dynamic Object, which determines the Sign; that of the interpreter is the Dynamic Interpretant, which the Sign determines; and that of the Commens is the Sign itself, which welds the utterer and interpreter into one Quasi-mind (cf. CP 4.551). When you say that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, what part does the Immediate Object play in that determination? I am for now assuming that it is the Form which the Sign *will *represent. Can one say that the Dynamic Object determines the Immediate Object which determines the Sign? That, at least, has been my understanding. In any event, your analysis should allow semioticians interested in this aspect of Peirce's late semiotic to get a handle on it sufficient to springboard into further analysis. This is, of course, not to suggest that it may not need some correction (or at least tweaking), but for me for now it makes more sense of the three interpretants than anything else I've read in years. And, again, that it does it succinctly is in my mind a definite virtue (esp. for the purposes of study). Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 1:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > In a draft letter to Victoria Lady Welby, Peirce asserted that "every sign > … must be a determination of a quasi-mind," which "is itself a sign, a > determinable sign" (SS 195; all citations 1906 unless noted otherwise). He > then defined a Sign as "any medium for the communication or extension of a > Form" (SS 196, EP 2:477), and went on to describe an instance of semiosis > as follows. > > > > CSP: There is the *Intentional *lnterpretant, which is a determination > of the mind of the utterer; the *Effectual *lnterpretant, which is a > determination of the mind of the interpreter; and the *Communicational > *lnterpretant, > or say the *Cominterpretant, *which is a determination of that mind into > which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that > any communication should take place. (SS 196-197, EP 2:478) > > > > The Effectual Interpretant is almost certainly the Dynamic Interpretant as > the feeling, exertion, or further Sign to which the Sign *actually* > determines the interpreting Quasi-mind (cf. CP 4.536). In the secondary > literature, there seems to be a general consensus that the Intentional and > Communicational Interpretants are the Immediate and Final Interpretants, > respectively. For example, the EP editors imply this in a note on the > quoted passage. > > > > PEP: In the Logic Notebook (MS 339:531, 533, 541-44), the Intentional > Interpretant is also called the Intended, Impressional, or Initial > Interpretant; the Effectual Interpretant is also called the Factual, > Middle, or Dynamic Interpretant; and the Communicational Interpretant is > also called the Normal, Habitual, or Eventual Interpretant. (EP 2:555n2) > > > > However, Peirce did not actually mention the Intentional, Effectual, or > Communicational Interpretants *at all* in that particular manuscript > (with pages numbered per the microfilm images [and by Peirce himself], R > 339:412[275r], 414[276r], 422-425[283r-286r]). Fortunately, he did make > some relevant remarks right after briefly defining the Normal, Dynamic, and > Immediate Interpretants. > > > > CSP: I have thus omitted the *intended* interpretant. So far as the > intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. > So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of *another* > sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that* sign. (R > 339:414[276r]) > > > > Peirce thus explained why he switched from Intended on one page (275r, > dated March 31) to Immediate on the next (276r, dated April 2). Only a > few weeks previously (March 9), he had defined the Intentional Interpretant > as "a determination of the mind of the utterer" (SS 196, EP 2:478). > Apparently > he realized that, as such, it obviously *cannot* be an Interpretant of > the Sign that the utterer is *currently* uttering; instead, it must be an > Interpretant of a *previous* Sign determined by the same Dynamic Object. > Hence > it is a *Final* Interpretant in the sense of being the *last* outcome of > semiosis *prior to* the instance being analyzed; i.e., the Intentional > Interpretant is the *antecedent* Sign whose own Dynamic Interpretant is > the Sign now being uttered. > > > > Moreover, a few months later (August 27), Peirce characterized two of the > ten divisions of Signs as being "according to the *Purpose* of the > Eventual Interpretant" and "according to the Nature of the Influence the > Sign is *intended* to exert" (R 339:424[285r]; emphases added). The > latter is the familiar trichotomy for the Relation of the Sign to its *Final > *Interpretant as Rheme/Dicisign/Argument, here crossed out and replaced > with Seme/Pheme/Delome. > > > > As for the Communicational Interpretant, it is important to pay careful > attention to how Peirce described the mind of which it is a determination. > > > > CSP: This mind may be called the *commens. *It consists of all that is, > and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the > outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function … > Thus the Form conveyed is always a determination of the dynamical object of > the *commind.* (SS 197, EP 2:478) > > > > The essential ingredient of the utterer is the Dynamic Object, which > determines the Sign; that of the interpreter is the Dynamic Interpretant, > which the Sign determines; and that of the Commens is the Sign itself, > which welds the utterer and interpreter into one Quasi-mind (cf. CP > 4.551). The Sign serves as a medium for the communication of a Form from > the Dynamic Object to the Dynamic Interpretant, both of which are > *external* to the Sign (cf. EP 2:389-391 & EP 2:544n22). > > > > However, any determination of the Commens must be something that is > *internal* to the Sign. Therefore, the Communicational Interpretant is > the Immediate Interpretant, rather than the Final Interpretant. It is > "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign > itself, and is ordinarily called the *meaning* of the sign" (CP 4.536); > i.e., "that which it conveys" (CP 1.339; no date), which is a Form. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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