Gary F.: Which aspects of my reasoning are you unable to follow? Which questions in this context do you think that Peirce left open? In all honesty, I have never been able to make heads or tails of Peirce's example that you quoted, so I would be grateful if you and/or others could shed some light on it.
Edwina: Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants are internal to *Signs*, so talking about "the Immediate Object of Person A" and "the Immediate Interpretant of Person B" fosters confusion, rather than clarity--especially since Quasi-mind A and Quasi-mind B might be temporally successive versions of the *same *Quasi-mind (or Person). Nothing that I have said "nullifies the mediative role and function of the Representamen"; on the contrary, the whole point is that the Sign serves as "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906) from Quasi-mind A to Quasi-mind B. I do not know what you mean by "the individual closure of the triadic Sign itself" or "the existential nature of the Dynamic Object," but I suspect that those comments once again simply reflect the fact that our models of semiosis are very different. As for the "possibility of cognitive difference between Person A and B"--if they are two different Quasi-minds, then they are obviously different by virtue of having been determined by different previous Signs; and if they are temporally successive versions of the same Quasi-mind, then they are obviously different by virtue of adding Sign Z as the Dynamic Interpretant of Sign Y. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 7:02 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary R, > > Evidently I was wrong to think that I can follow your reasoning, so I’d > better leave this thread to those who can follow it, or those looking for > more definitive answers to questions that Peirce left open. What I can do > is provide here a more complete quotation from the letter to James (14 > March 1909) that Gary mentioned, which includes several examples, and may > be of some further use in the discussion: > > We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,—i.e., the Object as > represented in the sign,—and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is > altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather > the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign *cannot* > express, which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter to find > out by *collateral experience.* For instance, I point my finger to what I > mean, but I can't make my companion know what I mean, if he can't see it, > or if seeing it, it does not, to his mind, separate itself from the > surrounding objects in the field of vision. It is useless to attempt to > discuss the genuineness and possession of a personality beneath the > histrionic presentation of Theodore Roosevelt with a person who recently > has come from Mars and never heard of Theodore before. A similar > distinction must be made as to the Interpretant. But in respect to *that* > Interpretant, the dichotomy is not enough by any means. For instance, > suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards she > wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” *This* is a sign, > whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose > Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived from > peeping between the window-curtains.* Whose Interpretant, as expressed, > is the quality of the weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, is *my > answering her question.* But beyond that, there is a *third* > Interpretant. The *Immediate Interpretant* is what the Question > expresses, *all* that it immediately expresses, which I have imperfectly > restated above. The *Dynamical Interpretant* is the actual effect that it > has upon me, its interpreter. But the Significance of it, the *Ultimate,* > or *Final, Interpretant* is her *purpose* in asking it, what effect its > answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. I reply, let us > suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate > Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to > her mind and mine,—not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it. > The *Dynamical Object* is the *identity* of the actual and *Real* > meteorological conditions at the moment. The *Immediate Interpretant* is > the *schema* in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in > common to the different Images of a stormy day. The *Dynamical > Interpretant* is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once > has upon her. The *Final Interpretant* is the sum of the *Lessons* of the > reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. Now it is easy to see that my attempt to > draw this three-way, “trivialis,” distinction, relates to a real and > important three-way distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a > vast deal of study before it is rendered perfect. Lady Welby has got hold > of the same real distinction in her “Sense, Meaning, Significance,” but > conceives it as imperfectly as I do, but imperfectly in other ways. Her > *Sense* is the *Impression* made or normally to be made. Her *Meaning* is > what is intended, its purpose. Her *Significance* is the real upshot. > [EP2:498] > > > > Gary f. > On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 7:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon AS, list; > > I have a problem with the set up as you outline it - which > remains abstract rather than a concrete example. > > First - my problem is that I think the multiple terms for the three > Interpretants refer to their operation in a categorical mode - rather than > some unclear [to me at least] role in your argument. > > Second - I simply don't see how the Immediate Object of Person A becomes > the Immediate Interpretant of Person B. And vice versa - how the Immediate > Interpretant of one person becomes the Immediate Object of another person. > That nullifies the mediative role and function of the Representamen. And > denies the individual closure of the triadic Sign itself [IO-R-II] - and > denies the existential nature of the Dynamic Object. > > That is - with your outline, there is no possibility of cognitive > difference between Person A and B. > > What am I missing in your argument? > > Edwina >
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