Jon,

In that 1909 letter to James, Peirce is using examples of signs to give James 
an idea of what he means by “sign”, “object,” “interpretant” and how he 
distinguishes between subtypes of them. I read it by applying those terms to 
those examples (and more generally to those types of signs). What more “light” 
is needed? I don’t know what you mean by “making heads or tails” of it. Maybe 
that’s why I can’t make heads or tails of your reasoning.

One of the questions Peirce left open is the one I asked you, whether the 
different trichotomies of interpretants differ in identity or in name only. (At 
least, I know there is disagreement among Peircean scholars on that point, and 
I don’t know of any text where Peirce directly answers that question.) As far 
as I can tell, you are proceeding on the assumption that there are only three 
interpretants despite the plethora of names for them, and trying to come up a 
meta-schema that will sort out the names by reducing them to three concepts. I 
see no need to do that, and I’m stymied by your hypotheses because I see no way 
to evaluate them inductively. Anyway, if I could follow your reasoning, I 
wouldn’t be getting its implications wrong, as you say I did.

Gary f.

} Only those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can 
go. [T.S. Eliot] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> 
Sent: 21-Mar-18 10:15
To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Three Interpretants

 

Gary F.:  Which aspects of my reasoning are you unable to follow?  Which 
questions in this context do you think that Peirce left open?  In all honesty, 
I have never been able to make heads or tails of Peirce's example that you 
quoted, so I would be grateful if you and/or others could shed some light on it.

Edwina:  Immediate Objects and Immediate Interpretants are internal to Signs, 
so talking about "the Immediate Object of Person A" and "the Immediate 
Interpretant of Person B" fosters confusion, rather than clarity--especially 
since Quasi-mind A and Quasi-mind B might be temporally successive versions of 
the same Quasi-mind (or Person).  Nothing that I have said "nullifies the 
mediative role and function of the Representamen"; on the contrary, the whole 
point is that the Sign serves as "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 
2:544n22; 1906) from Quasi-mind A to Quasi-mind B.  I do not know what you mean 
by "the individual closure of the triadic Sign itself" or "the existential 
nature of the Dynamic Object," but I suspect that those comments once again 
simply reflect the fact that our models of semiosis are very different.  As for 
the "possibility of cognitive difference between Person A and B"--if they are 
two different Quasi-minds, then they are obviously different by virtue of 
having been determined by different previous Signs; and if they are temporally 
successive versions of the same Quasi-mind, then they are obviously different 
by virtue of adding Sign Z as the Dynamic Interpretant of Sign Y.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 7:02 AM, <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

Jon, Gary R,

Evidently I was wrong to think that I can follow your reasoning, so I’d better 
leave this thread to those who can follow it, or those looking for more 
definitive answers to questions that Peirce left open. What I can do is provide 
here a more complete quotation from the letter to James (14 March 1909) that 
Gary mentioned, which includes several examples, and may be of some further use 
in the discussion:

We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,—i.e., the Object as 
represented in the sign,—and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is 
altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the 
Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, 
which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral 
experience. For instance, I point my finger to what I mean, but I can't make my 
companion know what I mean, if he can't see it, or if seeing it, it does not, 
to his mind, separate itself from the surrounding objects in the field of 
vision. It is useless to attempt to discuss the genuineness and possession of a 
personality beneath the histrionic presentation of Theodore Roosevelt with a 
person who recently has come from Mars and never heard of Theodore before. A 
similar distinction must be made as to the Interpretant. But in respect to that 
Interpretant, the dichotomy is not enough by any means. For instance, suppose I 
awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards she wakes up and 
inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” This is a sign, whose Object, as 
expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the 
impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the 
window-curtains. Whose Interpretant, as expressed, is the quality of the 
weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, is my answering her question. But 
beyond that, there is a third Interpretant. The Immediate Interpretant is what 
the Question expresses, all that it immediately expresses, which I have 
imperfectly restated above. The Dynamical Interpretant is the actual effect 
that it has upon me, its interpreter. But the Significance of it, the Ultimate, 
or Final, Interpretant is her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will 
have as to her plans for the ensuing day. I reply, let us suppose: “It is a 
stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its Immediate Object is the notion of the 
present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,—not the 
character of it, but the identity of it. The Dynamical Object is the identity 
of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment. The Immediate 
Interpretant is the schema in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what 
there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day. The Dynamical 
Interpretant is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once has 
upon her. The Final Interpretant is the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, 
Scientific, etc. Now it is easy to see that my attempt to draw this three-way, 
“trivialis,” distinction, relates to a real and important three-way 
distinction, and yet that it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of study 
before it is rendered perfect. Lady Welby has got hold of the same real 
distinction in her “Sense, Meaning, Significance,” but conceives it as 
imperfectly as I do, but imperfectly in other ways. Her Sense is the Impression 
made or normally to be made. Her Meaning is what is intended, its purpose. Her 
Significance is the real upshot. [EP2:498]

Gary f.

-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to