Thanks for posting these references.

The Table of Contents of the book is intriguing!

A copy has been ordered.  :-)

I am particular anxious to compare his vision of logic to that of CSP, 
Whitehead, Tarski, Beziau, and others.



> On Apr 8, 2018, at 10:05 AM, John F Sowa <> wrote:
> Philip Johnson-Laird, a psycholinguist, has written books and articles
> about mental models and their relationship to language and reasoning.
> In 2002, he wrote the following article about Peirce's existential
> graphs as a promising direction for psychology and neuroscience:
> Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (2002) Peirce, logic diagrams, and the
> elementary operations of reasoning, Thinking and Reasoning 8:2, 69-95.
> Immediately after the abstract of that paper, he quotes CP 1.66:
>> Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things
>> asserted in the premisses, forms a diagram of that state of things,
>> perceives in the parts of the diagram relations not explicitly mentioned
>> in the premisses, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the
>> diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least would
>> do so in a certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary,
>> or probable, truth.
> In 2008, he published a book _How We Reason_, which has 24 references
> to Peirce.  See below for the table of contents and some excerpts
> from a review of the book.
> John
> _______________________________________________________________________
> Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (2008) How We Reason, Oxford University Press.
> Chapter 1 Introduction
> Part I The World in Our Conscious Minds
> Chapter 2 Icons and Images
> Chapter 3 Models of Possibilities: From Conjuring Tricks to Disasters
> Part II The World in Our Unconscious Minds
> Chapter 4 Mental Architecture and the Unconscious
> Chapter 5 Intuitions and Unconscious Reasoning
> Chapter 6 Emotions as Inferences
> Chapter 7 Reasoning in Psychological Illnesses
> Part III How We Make Deductions
> Chapter 8 Only Connections
> Chapter 9 I'm my own Grandpa: Reasoning About Identities and Other Relations
> Chapter 10 Syllogisms and Reasoning about Properties
> Chapter 11 Isn't Everyone an Optimist? The Case of Complex Reasoning
> Part IV How We Make Inductions
> Chapter 12 Modulation: A Step Towards Induction
> Chapter 13 Knowledge and Inductions
> Chapter 14 Sherlock Holmes's Method: Abduction
> Chapter 15 The Balance of Probabilities
> Part V What Makes us Rational
> Chapter 16 Counterexamples
> Chapter 17 Truth, Lies, and the Higher Reasoning
> Part VI How We Develop Our Ability to Reason
> Chapter 18 On Development
> Chapter 19 Strategies and Cultures
> Chapter 20 How We can Improve our Reasoning
> Part VII Knowledge, Beliefs, and Problems
> Chapter 21 The Puzzles of If
> Chapter 22 Causes and Obligations
> Chapter 23 Beliefs, Heresies, and Changes in Mind
> Chapter 24 How we Solve Problems
> Part VIII Expert Reasoning in Technology, Logic, and Science
> Chapter 25 Flying Bicycles: How the Wright Brothers Invented the Airplane
> Chapter 26 Unwrapping an Enigma
> Chapter 27 On the Mode of the Communication of Cholera
> Chapter 28 How we Reason
> From: 
> Philip Johnson-Laird's How We Reason is a major contribution to the 
> contemporary debate on the nature of reasoning. The author, who is widely 
> known for his pioneering work in the experimental psychology of reasoning, in 
> this book presents the theoretical framework of a life-long research project, 
> which he labels a "model theory of mind"...
> when we reason we represent the set of possible state of affairs of how the 
> world could be. We do so by abstracting from the details of concrete pictures 
> to form iconic representations, i.e. mental models whose architecture 
> contains the common features of the different possible ways things can be 
> arranged and combined. Johnson-Laird suggests us to think of these mental 
> models as those an architect has in mind when he imagines the design of a 
> future building...
> Notwithstanding the efforts of constructing a logic of thought on the basis 
> of purely formal notation, the diagrammatic representation enables us to 
> represent the possible combinations at hand, and to clarify cases of 
> vagueness. Logical notation comes later, when we express those models as 
> propositions...
> -----------------------------
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