John: Thanks for posting these references.
The Table of Contents of the book is intriguing! A copy has been ordered. :-) I am particular anxious to compare his vision of logic to that of CSP, Whitehead, Tarski, Beziau, and others. Cheers Jerry > On Apr 8, 2018, at 10:05 AM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > > Philip Johnson-Laird, a psycholinguist, has written books and articles > about mental models and their relationship to language and reasoning. > In 2002, he wrote the following article about Peirce's existential > graphs as a promising direction for psychology and neuroscience: > > Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (2002) Peirce, logic diagrams, and the > elementary operations of reasoning, Thinking and Reasoning 8:2, 69-95. > http://mentalmodels.princeton.edu/papers/2002peirce.pdf > > Immediately after the abstract of that paper, he quotes CP 1.66: >> Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things >> asserted in the premisses, forms a diagram of that state of things, >> perceives in the parts of the diagram relations not explicitly mentioned >> in the premisses, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the >> diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least would >> do so in a certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, >> or probable, truth. > > In 2008, he published a book _How We Reason_, which has 24 references > to Peirce. See below for the table of contents and some excerpts > from a review of the book. > > John > _______________________________________________________________________ > > Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (2008) How We Reason, Oxford University Press. > > Chapter 1 Introduction > > Part I The World in Our Conscious Minds > Chapter 2 Icons and Images > Chapter 3 Models of Possibilities: From Conjuring Tricks to Disasters > > Part II The World in Our Unconscious Minds > Chapter 4 Mental Architecture and the Unconscious > Chapter 5 Intuitions and Unconscious Reasoning > Chapter 6 Emotions as Inferences > Chapter 7 Reasoning in Psychological Illnesses > > Part III How We Make Deductions > Chapter 8 Only Connections > Chapter 9 I'm my own Grandpa: Reasoning About Identities and Other Relations > Chapter 10 Syllogisms and Reasoning about Properties > Chapter 11 Isn't Everyone an Optimist? The Case of Complex Reasoning > > Part IV How We Make Inductions > Chapter 12 Modulation: A Step Towards Induction > Chapter 13 Knowledge and Inductions > Chapter 14 Sherlock Holmes's Method: Abduction > Chapter 15 The Balance of Probabilities > > Part V What Makes us Rational > Chapter 16 Counterexamples > Chapter 17 Truth, Lies, and the Higher Reasoning > > Part VI How We Develop Our Ability to Reason > Chapter 18 On Development > Chapter 19 Strategies and Cultures > Chapter 20 How We can Improve our Reasoning > > Part VII Knowledge, Beliefs, and Problems > Chapter 21 The Puzzles of If > Chapter 22 Causes and Obligations > Chapter 23 Beliefs, Heresies, and Changes in Mind > Chapter 24 How we Solve Problems > > Part VIII Expert Reasoning in Technology, Logic, and Science > Chapter 25 Flying Bicycles: How the Wright Brothers Invented the Airplane > Chapter 26 Unwrapping an Enigma > Chapter 27 On the Mode of the Communication of Cholera > Chapter 28 How we Reason > > From: > http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=5454&cn=396 > > Philip Johnson-Laird's How We Reason is a major contribution to the > contemporary debate on the nature of reasoning. The author, who is widely > known for his pioneering work in the experimental psychology of reasoning, in > this book presents the theoretical framework of a life-long research project, > which he labels a "model theory of mind"... > > when we reason we represent the set of possible state of affairs of how the > world could be. We do so by abstracting from the details of concrete pictures > to form iconic representations, i.e. mental models whose architecture > contains the common features of the different possible ways things can be > arranged and combined. Johnson-Laird suggests us to think of these mental > models as those an architect has in mind when he imagines the design of a > future building... > > Notwithstanding the efforts of constructing a logic of thought on the basis > of purely formal notation, the diagrammatic representation enables us to > represent the possible combinations at hand, and to clarify cases of > vagueness. Logical notation comes later, when we express those models as > propositions... > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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