Helmut, list

        No, there are two DOs. The wind and the water, interacting with each
other, to produce a DI in the wind of lower velocity and a DI in the
water of ripples.

        Semiosis is dialogic, its whole nature is interaction, mediation and
production of new 'instantiations' ...

        Edwina
 On Fri 13/04/18 12:09 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, list, I find your dialogue between DOs very interesting,
like in your examples some days ago, with the wind, water, and waves.
Then I thought, maybe when there is such an interaction, the sign
grows spatially: The DOs merge to one DO. Like, first, when there is
only the wind but no waves, there is a one way causation: The wind
causes the waves. But later, when there are waves, they have a
back-effect on the wind, giving it resistance. So later it is an
interaction in which each component has an influence on each other.
So maybe first the wind  and the waves are two different DOs, and
later they are one? With two masses attracting each other in space,
it is different, there is no delay at the beginning, so the two
masses are one DO from the start? Best, Helmut    13. April 2018 um
17:35 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 Helmut, list 

        Interesting. I continue to differentiate between the internal and
external - and also, between the local stimuli and non-local laws. 

        I agree that the Sign is a functional composition - but I consider
that it is also a spatial and temporal one. It exists and function in
time and space. 

        I don't exclude the DO, DI or FI from the Sign; I just differentiate
them in space and time. 

        After all - an interaction begins, so to speak, from a DO in
dialogue with another DO. Two people interacting; or a bird and an
insect. Both are, as interactive agents, operationally DOs. 

        Edwina 
 On Fri 13/04/18 11:29 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:  
 Mike, Edwina, list, I have worked out a different model. it is based
on the three Peircean categories, and Stanley N. SaltheĀ“s
distinction between subsumption (which is the same or something
closely related to classification), and composition. The result of it
regarding the sign is, that the sign is a functional composition, not
a spatial one, and in a functional composition there is no
"external", so in my model the DO, DI, and FI are not excluded from
the sign. See:  www.signs-in-time.de [1]  . What I wrote there seems
very convoluted first, but I believe it is very systematic. Maybe it
is not totally Peircean in the end, but Peirce too changed his mind
about many things he had written before, so I thought it was probably
ok to adapt a little here and there, so it fits into my model? Not
good? Best, Helmut     12. April 2018 um 06:40 Uhr
  "Mike Bergman"
 wrote:   

        Hi Edwina, List, 

        Thank you; I knew you would respond in a complete and thoughtful
manner. (I also apologize to Frances for responding earlier in the
thread and hijacking her more recent comment, since I first asked the
question and had been formulating a response directly to Edwina.) So,
Edwina, there is much I agree wholeheartedly with in your response,
which should not be met with indifference or sneers because what we
are really probing here is whether Peirce captured some fundamental
essences of reality or not.  General Agreement
 -----------------
 I agree with all of these interpretations:
    *"there is nothing in my [Edwina's] view that counters or cannot
be sustained within a Peircean analysis" 
    *"don't confine semiosis to the conceptual or human realm";
"include the physical-chemical and biological realms" 
    *"the Sign is . . . a relational dynamic process" 
    *I like the use of 'instantiations' to discuss Secondness 
    *I concur with the "DO-[IO-R-II]-DI" expansion of the Sign,
though once stated, continuing to drag along the DO and DI just seems
to complicate things a bit. In real simple terms, DO and DI just
affirm Peirce's standard mantra that truth is a limit function, so
our signs can only incompletely represent the object and can only be
incompletely understood 
    *I concur it is better practice to use "the term R or
Representamen to differentiate it from the Sign" 
    *I concur the Sign is "the triad set of Three Relations
[IO-R-II]" 
    *"semiosis is Relational; it is necessarily interactive and
dynamic" 
    *Your CP 8.328, 8.330 quotes of Peirce go without saying. 
 My Real Question
 ----------------
 My real question relates to your earlier assertion that all three
universal categories need not be involved in a relationship with
Thirdness, for which you used the term "quasi-necessarily" and also
presented your two examples of '3-2' and '3-1'.
 For example, your '3-2' example of bird beaks evolving for new seed
types can not occur without Firstness, the source of chance or
variation. I really have no idea what you mean as an "example of 3-1,
in the biological realm, would be where organisms reproduce according
to the dominant model [iconicity]." Is not an organism a Secondness?
 By virtue of describing the Sign as 'dynamical' and a 'process' I
think you already concede that the Sign, any Sign, is triadic. Thus,
while I see certain aspects of the universal categories as being more
dominant in a given circumstance, which Peirce also clearly
acknowledges in his ten-classification scheme, I do not believe any
sign can be monadic or dyadic. A Sign is not synonymous with a
relation, even though a "Sign is relational".
 Some Ancillary Items
 ----------------------
 I'm not sure I agree with these characterizations, because they do
not feel general enough, but are points I really don't want to
dispute or get bogged down with:
    *"My view of semiosis is that it defines the basic process of
Mind-as-Matter in our universe." Yeah, I can see that, and Peirce's
use of mind and quasi-mind attempts to define a realm for thought or
the symbolic, but I think this is not the metaphor I want to lead
with, since there is such a broad range of interpretation about
'mind' and I personally think it is too easily anthropomorphized 
    *"I understand the Representamen as an action of mediation."
Hmmm, I really don't like this statement. To use your notation, here
is how I see it. O is a 2ns, I is a 3ns, and R is a 1ns. We know that
Thirdness is often characterized as mediation. Are you really trying
to say that the Representamen is in Thirdness?? 
    *I don't really have a problem calling the 'universal
categories', the phrase most used I think by Peirce, 'modal
categories', but I'm not sure Peirce ever used this phrasing.
Further, in your own emphasis on the total of six modes, note that O
has two options, I has three options, and R stands alone. 
 So, in summary, I question whether 'dynamic processes' can ever be
characterized as anything less than triadic. I guess I remain
unconvinced that there are classes of interactions involving
Thirdness that can be expressed solely as dyadic relations ('3-1',
'3-2'). I can see the argument for a dominant mode (1ns or 2ns), but
ones that still require participation by all three of the universal
categories.
 Mike 
   On 4/11/2018 3:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:   
        Mike - I sent a long response but it seems to have disappeared. I'll
try again. 

        First - I expect this response will be met with indifference or
sneers from the list but I maintain that there is nothing in my view
that counters or cannot be sustained within a Peircean analysis. 

        My view of semiosis is that it defines the basic process of
Mind-as-Matter in our universe. That is, I don't confine semiosis to
the conceptual or human realm. I include the physical-chemical and
biological realms. 

         Therefore, my view of the Sign is that it is a relational dynamic
process, where Mind becomes Matter, as 'instantiations' [which can
last anywhere from a nanosecond to centuries] within an ongoing
interactiional triadic process. So, the Sign is a crystal, a rock, a
bacterium, an insect...and a word, a sentence etc. AND - all of these
'instantiations' are interactive with other 'instants' or
Mind-as-Matter. 

         The basic Sign is a Set of Relations: DO-[IO-R-II]-DI... I add the
DO Relation to the basic triad because no Sign can exist as isolate.
I use the term R or Representamen to differentiate it from the Sign,
which I see as the triad set of Three Relations [IO-R-II]. As we
know, there need not be a DI, but, most existent instances do produce
a new form of matter/mind. [See 4,536, 8.314-]. I understand the
Representamen as an action of mediation. 

        I understand, therefore, that this semiosis is Relational; it is
necessarily interactive and dynamic. How do the Relations function?
Within the modal categories. These categories are modes of being, or
organizations of Mind-as-Matter. 

        So, as Peirce outlines, "Firstness is the mode of being of that
which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything
else. 

        Secondness is the mode of being..with respect to a second but
regardless of any third. 

        Thirdness is the mode of being ...bringing a second and third in
relation to each other'. 8.328. 

        But Peirce doesn't just use these three modes. He mixes them up to
create a total of six - and this mixture enables pragmatic or
'factual' adaptation. 

        So- genuine Secondness functions by setting up Relations that are
brute interactions; 'one thing acting upon another' 8.330. 1.380] But
there is a 'degenerate Secondness' where the Relational interaction
involves a shared quality between the two [8.330, 2.91]. 

        And pure or genuine Thirdness is an action of the Mind only -
aspatial and atemporal and alienated from physical reality and
feelings. But, if you add in Secondness to it, such that the relation
is 3-2, then, the mental interaction includes a physical contact with
existential reality. [2.92, 8.330] And if you insert Firstness into
the mental interaction, then, the relationship is one of similarity,
iconicity. 

        -------------------- 

        Examples include, in the biological realm, of 3-2,  where an
organism, operating within its habits of organization [3rdness] will
interact, informationally, via Secondness  with the external world -
to inform itself about these physical realities, such that a bird,
for example, will adapt its beak to better deal with novel seed
forms. A bacterium will adapt to antibiotics. 

        An example of 3-1, in the biological realm, would be where organisms
reproduce according to the dominant model [iconicity]. 

        ---------------- 

        You referred to word examples. I'm not sure if you refer to the
conceptual realm. I'd give as an example, in this realm, of 3-2 where
a belief system will relate to external existential reality -and so,
will adapt. An example of 3-1 is an iconic mindset [see Peirce's a
priori fixation of belief] where beliefs are held due to the dominant
population. 

        Now - I hope that this attempt gets through! 

        Edwina 
 On Wed 11/04/18 3:13 AM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:  

        Hi Edwina, 

        You stated in the 'General Agreement' thread: But Thirdness is
complex with three types [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables information
exchange with the environment [via 3-2] rather than simple repetition
of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation, and
Secondness is involved to enable direct contact with the local
environmental realities. The result - is an adapted insect. 
 I like the adaptive insect portion, but, honestly, I'd like you to
present word examples of what you mean by these complexes of types.
For example, please explain '3-1' or via '3-2'. Are these predicates?
That seems to be central to your argument. And, are predicates in
Thirdness?
 Best, Mike
        Edwina
        --  __________________________________________ Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation 319.621.5225 skype:michaelkbergman
http://cognonto.com http://mkbergman.com
http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman
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