In reply, see below
On Fri 20/04/18 10:29 PM , [email protected] sent:
Frances to Edwina and listers---
My search goes on for a Peircean approach to at least metaphysical
being. In response to your kind reply, consider some of my rambling
tentative guesses, but without any specific Peircean references. (The
new lettered paras directly below roughly refer to the earlier
numbered paras further below.)
A. Peircean philosophy overall is a brand of realism called idealist
realism. His idealism posits a world of infinite continuity. His
realism posits a world of continuing activity. Under his realism
falls naturalist pragmatism, which posits respectively a cause to
action and a purpose to action. The fated destiny of the world is
disposed tendencies, so that the agent of such telic design is simply
a trait determined by the habit of law. Further theories in support of
these theories include objective relativism and fallibilism.
EDWINA: Idealist realism sounds, to me, a rather Platonic. Peirce's
thought is more objective idealism, which insists that the 'ideal' or
Mind-Form has to be 'articulated, so to speak, in matter.
The 'disposed tendencies' are generated by mind articulating itself
as matter. Therefore, there is no a priori or telic design.
I don't know what 'objective relativism' means...
B. Phenomena are needed by say enabled phanerisms to get at
accessible or inaccessible being or stuff or things or objects or
whatever, and then only by way of representamen as nonsigns or signs
that stand for it. For the rest of the phenomenal universe that yet
lacks emergent representamen, it would likely remain unrepresented
and of course inaccessible.
EDWINA: I don't understand the above. What is an 'enabled
phanerism'? I don't see a represenamen as a 'nonsign'. And to suggest
that the phenomenal universe lacks emergent representamen - this seems
to suggest a prior ideal Forms...and I reject that.
C. To speculate, the whole wide world of galactic universes might
be held as sented mena that seemingly grows into presented nomena and
represented phenomena and derepresented epiphenomena; but only
phanerisms can feel they feel or sense or know such mena, and then
only by way of phenomena that are representamen. This built menal
scheme suggests that the world of phenomena is of menal secondness
and is thus a dyadic or dual structure.
EDWINA: Again, sounds like Platonism with pure Ideal Forms..
D. The feeling and being and minding of say extra menal phenomena
continues infinitely to act independent of phenomena and
representamen, and also of phenomenal matter and life, but can be
guessed by phanerisms to be in the distant evolving world by way of
phenomenal representamen; which phenomenal stuff as matter or life
can be of continuent things, or of existent objects that are also
signs of other objects.
EDWINA: No- again, this seems to invoke an a priori teleological
Design..
E. The phenomenal terness or menal dyad of manythingness and
somethingness initially emerges from the medadic chaos of nomenal
nothingness or empty zeroness as a class holder ready to be filled
with phenomenal thingness. The tendential evolution of what is felt
by enabled phanerisms to be represented as phenomenal matter is of
sporting monadic firstness alone, seeking to conform together with
some dyadic secondness, and even finding to be controlled by the
lawful habits of triadic thirdness to assure the phenomenal matter of
natural normality.
EDWINA: Not sure of the above - sounds to be a mixture of Peirce's
outline plus some mystical design.
F. Overall menal mind or minding is the law of feeling and being and
minding that emerges from the constant trait and habit of action.
Phanerisms use representative phenomena to realize this menal bent as
a natural fact of matter and life. There may be many original continua
that are felt to continue in the menal world, but there will be at
least one such continuum after all others are eliminated, be it
eternal time or infinite space or perpetual mind or whatever.
EDWINA: You seem to be saying that the three categories require
action. Agree. I'm not sure about the 'one such continuum'...
G. One pressing thorn here is how evolving phenomena generates
nonsign representamen in the first place, and for this representation
to then be felt as nonsign representamen by enabled phanerisms, even
well before the emergence of representational signs. It may be that
signs are felt by phanerisms like thinkers to offer a metaphysical
account of being or of the whole wide world of universes, but it is
not likely that only signs generate such a world or fully permeate
it. The task of offering such an account and especially to empirical
science probably falls to philosophy at its broadest, and the more
realist the better.
EDWINA: I don't know what a 'nonsign repesentamen' means.
Frances and Edwina earlier wrote---
1. Allow me to musingly guess, it perhaps may be the representamen
of phenomena that fully fills the whole cosmic universe, allowing
that there may also be some primal phenomena that are not
representamen, and that objects as signs only fills a part of the
cosmic universe.
EDWINA: The Representamen, in my view, is only one part of the
semiosic triad and could never stand on its own. You might be
suggesting that Mind [which is functioning in the Representamen,
might finally fill the whole universe. I don't see this, as I don't
think Mind can exist except as instantiated within Matter.
2. The representamen of phenomena might thus be found as a dyad of
ideal continuent things, and real existent objects of which just some
objects are signs. Such a secondary or subsequent existentia would
hold evolving synechastic objects that are not signs, and evolving
semiosic objects that are signs; although all of continua and
existentia would nonetheless be representamen and phenomena.
EDWINA: Not sure what you mean by this. I think you are saying that
some 'things' are ideas and some things are material objects'. I
don't agree with this Platonic scenario.
3. The phenomenal universe could of course synechastically evolve to
become phantasmal or mystical, and physical or material, and
psychical or mental, or a variable combinatory mix of them all. It is
likely however that a universe of existent semiosic signs would be the
most viable representamen to continue and advance, and for signers as
matter and life to use in dealing with it all.
EDWINA: I see your point.
4. A universe of phenomena without representamen would bear or have
at least feeling throughout its vastness, and then as the pseudo
prematter of representamen it would emerge or grow by exploratory
sporting into selected forms of being followed by minding them. All
phenomenal matter and life would hence feel itself to be effete or
weak mind to some representational extent.
EDWINA: Are you saying a universe with mediation, i.e., without the
triadic format of O-R-I?? You are describing Peirce's origin of the
Universe...which he outlines, as you write....See 1.412 - and his
outline of the emergence of particulars and of habits.
5. Just exactly how representamen would originally emerge from
primordial phenomena seems a mystery, but perhaps a synechastic
theory of automatic generative representation by phenomena alone
would hold a clue. The fact that synechastics as a study of evolution
comes before categorics as a study of phenomena should not pose a
problem here, because it seems likely that qualitative firstness
could feel by itself solely alone, until it conformed with some brute
factual secondness, and then came under the control of a lawful
thirdness or mind that might assure representative normality to say
phenomenal phanerisms.
EDWINA: Yes, I agree - the emergence of Mind is indeed a mystery. I
can only conclude that Matter without Mind couldn't exist; matter
would be chaotic and would reduce to pure low energy.
6. Also note that information is seemingly held to be what a sign
comes to bear in acts of semiosis, so that the information does not
seemingly exist prior to or apart from the sign that bears it.
Information is therefore likely not a part of representamen or
objects that are not signs. It is representation however that
phenomena might bear throughout the universe.
EDWINA: Agree.
7. Furthermore, semiosis and semiotics is seemingly not intended to
be a metaphysical account of being or of the whole wide universe. It
is seemingly representamen that are not signs along with synechastics
and categorics that endures such a task.
EDWINA: THis is interesting - but I'm not sure what you mean.
Edwina originally but partly wrote in effect---
1. Semiosis defines the basic process of mind as matter in the
universe.
2. The sign is a relational dynamic process of interactive existent
instantiations.
3. The representamen as a sign is an action of mediation.
4. The relations of signs function within the modal categories or
modes of being and organizations of mind as matter.
5. Pure or genuine thirdness is an action of the mind only, and such
mind is alienated from physical reality and feelings.
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