On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by lockingits meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality isachieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then byscientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determinea fallible but consequential truth.

I very strongly agree. The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic. Instead, every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language. For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four." The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.

the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs that made them interchangeable

See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce

`and Wittgenstein:`

`http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM`

Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something that was much closer to Peirce. Following is a paper I wrote after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime was also an invited speaker: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration ofthe pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.

He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation, but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never completely satisfied with any one of them. That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area of an EG. Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing finger or a name) could state a proposition. If so, such a combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf John

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