John, Stephen, list,

John, you wrote:

"He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,

but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means

they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His

search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never

completely satisfied with any one of them."

I wonder, is that so, because graphs, as most mathematic symbol language too, does not symbolize time (continuity)? But: Might it not be possible to do that, by inventing symbols for time and its flow?

Stephen, you wrote:

"> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking

> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is

> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by

> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine

> a fallible but consequential truth."

> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is

> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by

> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine

> a fallible but consequential truth."

I wonder, is this superiority of language not based on its fallibility, but just on the fact, that it, other than the mathematical language, has terms ready for temporality?

If the answers to both my wonderings are "yes", then it would be so, that both word language and mathematical symbols language don´t have to be different regarding their viability in principle, they are just different existing languages.

What is the "natural language"? Chomsky´s "universal grammar"? Is it the same as logic?

Best, Helmut

**Gesendet:**Samstag, 14. April 2018 um 22:19 Uhr

**Von:**"John F Sowa" <s...@bestweb.net>

**An:**Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>

**Betreff:**Re: [PEIRCE-L] Articles on existential graphs and related systems

On 4/14/2018 12:57 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking

> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is

> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by

> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine

> a fallible but consequential truth.

I very strongly agree.

The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic. Instead,

every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations

of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on

a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.

For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."

The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.

> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even

> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may

> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs

> that made them interchangeable

See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce

and Wittgenstein:

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM

Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting

Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something

that was much closer to Peirce. Following is a paper I wrote

after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime

was also an invited speaker: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position

> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of

> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.

He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,

but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means

they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His

search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never

completely satisfied with any one of them.

That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including

arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area

of an EG. Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that

an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing

finger or a name) could state a proposition. If so, such a

combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of

inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

John

-----------------------------

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> If logic is actually universal its universality is not served by locking

> its meanings in mathematical symbols and abbreviations. Universality is

> achieved fallibly by the use of words to form hypotheses and then by

> scientific parsing of the truth or falsity of a hypothesis, to determine

> a fallible but consequential truth.

I very strongly agree.

The point I make is that language is *not* based on logic. Instead,

every artificial language, which includes all the artificial notations

of mathematics, logic, chemistry, computer programming... is based on

a disciplined special-purpose subset of natural language.

For example, "2 + 2 = 4" is an abbreviation for "Two and two is four."

The symbol '+' is a simplified '&', which is a way of writing 'et'.

> the notions I have built somewhat on Wittgenstein and even

> Nietzsche are hardly Peircean because my impression is that he may

> have felt there was a correspondence between words and his graphs

> that made them interchangeable

See the article by Jaime Nubiola on the relationships between Peirce

and Wittgenstein:

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/nubiola/SCHOLAR.HTM

Frank Ramsey had read Peirce and was instrumental in shifting

Wittgenstein's position from a Frege-Russell basis to something

that was much closer to Peirce. Following is a paper I wrote

after presenting an earlier version at a conference where Jaime

was also an invited speaker: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

> If he elevated graphs of his or any other sort to the exalted position

> of qualifying as a viable conclusion to any practical iteration of

> the pragmatic maxim, I think he is possibly wrong.

He considered graphs as more diagrammatic than any linear notation,

but graphs consist of discrete sets of nodes and arcs. That means

they can never be a perfect way of representing continuity. His

search for many variations of graphs indicates that he was never

completely satisfied with any one of them.

That's a reason why I have been developing a method of including

arbitrary icons -- including continuous images -- inside any area

of an EG. Although Peirce never did so, he explicitly said that

an icon plus an index (for example, a portrait with a pointing

finger or a name) could state a proposition. If so, such a

combination could be included in an EG -- and the EG rules of

inference could be applied to it: http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

John

-----------------------------

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