Dear Helmut an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is extracted") of the proposition after the removal.
Best Francesco On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Francesco, list, > > For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can > you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works? > > Best, > Helmut > > 02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr > "Francesco Bellucci" <[email protected]> > wrote: > Dear All, > > I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is > Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in > Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic. > > Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (*Peirce's Speculative > Grammar*, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on > Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further > thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the > discussion. > > One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate > objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have > immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in > the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone > discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their > immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the > vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina > Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the > history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: > Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called > particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which > traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the > vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest > that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object > into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has > been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we > should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least > that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the > "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions. > > Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, > then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their > immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable > to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a > "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to > a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding > to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the > idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all > men" is a rheme. > > But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a > rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by > a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when > the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all > men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been > extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us > imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are > mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a > proper name, like "Hamlet", this does *not *yield again a proposition: > "all men Hamlet". From this I conclude that "all men" is not a rheme. And > since the only justification I can imagine for calling "all men" a rheme is > that this would allow us to extend the vague/singular/general distinction > to *all* signs, I conclude that this extension is unjustified. > > Let me also ask a question about the following observation made by Jon: > > "a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that > Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute > its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the > unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns)" > > If the Object's characters taken together constitute the Immediate Object > of the Sign, what does it mean that such Immediate Object can be vague, > singular, or general? Let's suppose the Sign mentioned here is the > proposition "Halmet is mad". According to Jon, the Sign denotes the Dynamic > Object (arguably, Hamlet), and signifies one of the Object's characters > (arguably, his madness). Is this character vague, general, or singular? Can > you provide examples of three propositions (which, arguably, are Signs) in > one of which the character/Immediate Object is vague, in another is > general, and in the third is singular? And can you provide an example of a > proposition in which the characters signified are, taken together, singular? > > Best, > Francesco > > > > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ > peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >
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