Gary F., List: GF: Jon, you’re asking: If the logical depth/signification of a Sign corresponds to its Interpretant … then where does the Sign's information fit into the picture? But you’ve already answered that yourself: “The information (breadth x depth) of a Sign then corresponds to the unity of the Object with its characters; i.e., the Sign's Interpretant.”
This is precisely what I see as contradictory. If breadth and depth are the two different *dimensions *of Peircean information, how could *both *depth *and *information somehow correspond to the Interpretant? Perhaps muddying the waters further, I just noticed that in NDTR (CP 2.257/260/262, EP 2:294-296; 1903), Peirce described each of the three types of Dicisigns as involving an Icon or Rheme to embody/signify/express its information and an Index to indicate/denote the Object/subject of that information. I would say instead that a Dicisign conveys its information by involving an Icon/Rheme to signify its depth and an Index to denote its breadth. GF: I’ve omitted “3ns/Entelechy” from the end of that sentence of yours because I think your use of those terms in that context is confusing--and may even be causing part of the problem you have with “reconciling” what you see as two completely different Peircean analyses. My objective over the last several months has been to map the process of semiosis and Peirce's terminology for its constituents to the Aristotelian concepts of Form/1ns, Matter/2ns, and Entelechy/3ns as he invoked them in "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" and "New Elements." As I recently acknowledged, this is a kind of hypostatic abstraction within logic as semeiotic, but it *might *subsequently have application to metaphysics. I currently view the Interpretant (information/Entelechy) as the *semiotic *union of the Object (breadth/Matter) with its characters (depth/Form); i.e., "the *attribution *of a predicate to a subject" (R 200, CP 6.341; 1908, emphasis added). GF: One is the *breadth/depth* (*extension/intension*, *extension/comprehension*) dichotomy, which is a very old analysis of the meanings of terms, but which Peirce extended to apply to propositions and arguments as well. Peirce stated on a couple of occasions that he was using "breadth" and "depth" in a way that did not *exactly *match that "very old analysis" (e.g., CP 4.407; 1867). In fact, the ellipsis at the beginning of my excerpt from R 200 replaced the following text, which comes immediately after CP 6:347 in the manuscript. CSP: In a paper which I printed in 1867 [CP 4.391-426], I gave the principal senses in which the terms "logical extension" and "logical comprehension" have been widely employed by logicians. They are more numerous than ordinary students of the chief treatises on logic are aware. For such books are not usually read with sufficient thought for the gathering of exact ideas. I shall now simply select one meaning of each of those two logical "quantities," shall employ that one, and shall neglect the others. With that understanding, and without attempting any precise statement which would here be worse than superfluous, I will say that ... (R 200:E85-E86; 1908) I omitted all of this because what I quoted was already rather lengthy, but I did include Peirce's statement that breadth and depth apply "not only to propositions and to arguments, but also to *icons*, *indices*, and all kinds of signs." This brings to mind his comments in "New Elements" (EP 2:307; 1904) to the effect that a pure Icon would signify without denoting (i.e., have depth but no breadth), while a pure Index would denote without signifying (i.e., have breadth but no depth). GF: Another is the *subject/predicate* dichotomy which applies to propositions. Right, and as Peirce stated in R 200, "it is the predicates which express depth, and the subjects which indicate breadth." Yet he also wrote elsewhere that we can reach the limit of analysis--one that is *not *arbitrary--by throwing everything into the subject except the *logical *form of connection among its constituents, leaving only an "ultimate" or "continuous" predicate (CP 4.438, c. 1903; SS 71-72, 1908; cf. CP 8.352, EP 2:485, 1908). With this in mind, I currently find it conceptually preferable to distinguish *predicates *as expressing depth, *subjects *as indicating breadth, and the *continuous copula* as representing information. Predicates, subjects, and the continuous copula are the *parts *of a Sign; depth, breadth, and information are the corresponding *properties *of a Sign. GF: I’m going to speculate that the discrepancy you see results from your attempt to map dichotomies (breadth/depth, subject/predicate) onto the triad sign/object/interpretant. The fundamental question that we are exploring here is whether such dichotomies are present *within *the Object of the Sign or *between *its Object and Interpretant. But the latter is not properly treated as a dichotomy at all--the Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant are the three Correlates of an irreducibly *triadic *relation. By contrast, dichotomies are *dyadic *relations; and on that basis, it seems appropriate to assign them entirely to the Object--breadth and subject (denotation of Matter) to the *Dynamic *Object, depth and predicate (signification of Form) to the *Immediate *Object. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Jul 21, 2018 at 5:46 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, you’re asking: If the logical depth/signification of a Sign > corresponds to its Interpretan … then where does the Sign's information fit > into the picture? > > But you’ve already answered that yourself: “The information (breadth x > depth) of a Sign then corresponds to the unity of the Object with its > characters; i.e., the Sign's Interpretant.” (I’ve omitted “3ns/Entelechy” > from the end of that sentence of yours because I think your use of those > terms in that context is confusing — and may even be causing part of the > problem you have with “reconciling” what you see as two completely > different Peircean analyses. > > Let me generalize from this a bit. We’re dealing with three analyses of > informational semiosis here. One is the *breadth/depth* (*extension/intension, > extension/comprehension*) dichotomy, which is a very old analysis of the > meanings of terms, but which Peirce extended to apply to propositions and > arguments as well. Another is the *subject/predicate* dichotomy which > applies to propositions. The third is the standard trichotomy of the > ‘elements’ or correlates in a triadic relation, namely > *sign/object/interpretant*. Now, all three of these are analyses of *the > same semiotic phenomenon*, when applied to the structure of propositions, > as they all are. But these analyses are made for different purposes and > they do not necessarily map onto each other cogently. Nor should they, when > we consider that the products of these analyses of semiosic processes are > not observable entities but *entia rationis.* As Peirce said in his > description of the “perfect sign,” “The only signs which are tolerably > fixed are non-existent abstractions.” And if a *sign* such as a > proposition is not *fixed*, the components into which it is analyzed are > even less *fixed*. Especially when you try to take their names and map > them onto *another* analysis. > > I’m going to speculate that the discrepancy you see results from your > attempt to map dichotomies (breadth/depth, subject/predicate) onto the > triad sign/object/interpretant. As you say, the mapping of denotation, > breadth and subject onto the *object* seems obvious. But then what do you > map the depth, predicate and signification onto? The sign? The > interpretant? Some blending of the two? Any of these choices can be made to > work in some contexts, and in fact IS made to work in various texts > embodying Peirce’s late semiotic. But none of these mappings give you an > exact fit. For instance, the subject of a proposition is usually regarded > as *part of it,* but the (dynamic) object of a proposition is *external* > to it; so the “correspondence” between subject and object is not exact. > That’s because analyses of continuous processes always have a degree of > arbitrariness to them. Peirce’s late semiotic emphasizes this in the case > of the subject/predicate analysis, but it applies to some degree to every > analysis of semiosis — including the taxonomy of sign types. > > I hope this makes some sense, though it may not cause the discrepancy you > see to disappear. > > Gary f. >
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