Jon, list,

I see you’ve been making some progress, Jon, in your inquiry, though I don’t 
have anything very interesting to say about it. My own time has been split 
between finishing up my transcription of the Lowell Lectures and revising the 
late chapters of my book Turning Signs (which is not primarily about Peirce but 
is becoming ever more Peircean in the revisions. 

My most recent work on that front is near the top of Chapter 15, “Context and 
content,” http://gnusystems.ca/TS/ntx.htm. It sort of fits with your subject 
line because it has something to say about signification, but may be of more 
use to those interested in the overlapping of semiotics with systems theory, 
biology and phenomenology. Part of the recent work has been to insert more 
links into the text which take the reader back to previous uses of some key 
terms (I provide these links instead of a glossary). Anyway it’s there for 
anyone who wants to take a look. As for the Lowells, I should be able to finish 
up the eighth and last lecture in the next week or two, making it possible to 
read the entire series of lectures, more or less as delivered, from beginning 
to end. I’m looking forward to that myself. 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> 
Sent: 29-Jul-18 18:47
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Logical Depth and Signification

 

Gary F., List:

 

When I call your approach "exegetical," what I mean is more or less what you 
described--reading and understanding the texts as written, without imposing any 
kind of external interpretative framework, or even one derived from the 
author's writings as a whole.  The latter is more or less what I mean by my own 
"systematic" approach, and rewording is sometimes part of the process, along 
with assembling quotes from various places and times to serve as "proof-texts" 
for a particular thesis.

 

Again, I would never claim that my method is "better," just more compatible 
with how my own mind works, especially when it comes to associating and 
organizing ideas.  In this specific case, I find it fascinating to consider and 
explore the possibility that one of the key developments in Peirce's late 
semeiotic--his recognition, beginning in 1904, of two Objects and three 
Interpretants--might have already been present in some of his earliest works, 
at least in embryonic form, nearly four decades previously.

 

So far, the only hint to this effect that I have found elsewhere is in chapter 
IV, "The Interpretants," of Jorgen Dines Johansen's 1993 book, Dialogic 
Semiosis:  An Essay on Signs and Meaning.  He identified nine different 
concepts of the Interpretant and arranged them along the spectrum of the 
corresponding states of information, from Essential (minimum) to Substantial 
(maximum).  He then classified the first four as different specifications of 
the Immediate Interpretant, the middle one as the Dynamic Interpretant, and the 
last four as different specifications of the Final Interpretant (pp. 172-174).  
He also offered a possible clue to reconciling the inconsistency that I posited 
in the initial post of this thread.

 

JDJ:  ... a precise definition of information, although considered to be the 
product of both extension and comprehension, is more closely connected with 
comprehension than with extension, since it is defined as the 'amount of 
comprehension a symbol has over and above what limits its extension' (W 1:287; 
1865). Information, then, is that part of the comprehension of a symbol which 
exceeds what is necessary to delimit its extension. (p. 147)

 

As Francesco Bellucci put it in Peirce's Speculative Grammar:  Logic as 
Semiotics, "... there is no symbol that merely connotes the character contained 
in its definition without also connoting further characters, and thus embodying 
information about its object" (p. 41).  In Peirce's own words ...

 

CSP:  Whatever symbol contains information contains more connotation than is 
necessary to limit its possible denotation to those things which it may denote. 
That is, every symbol contains more than is sufficient for a principle of 
selection. (W 1:282; 1865)

 

CSP:  ... every genuine symbol relates or purports to relate to some form 
embodied in its object. This is its connotation. It is, in fact, only by means 
of this reference to a form that a symbol acquires its applicability to the 
thing ... its denotation is created by its connotation. (W 1:287; 1865)

 

Perhaps the tension that I have been sensing (rightly or wrongly) could be 
resolved by associating a Sign's Immediate Object with only the portion of its 
Depth that demarcates its Breadth, and its Interpretant (or Signification) with 
the remaining Depth--i.e., "its superfluous comprehension" (W1:467; 1866).  
From the quotes above, at first it sounds like the former is the Sign's 
Essential Depth and the latter is the difference between that and its Informed 
Depth.  The problem is that Peirce explicitly linked a Sign's ground with its 
Informed Depth, not its Essential Depth, although what he said in the same 
passage about how the Sign's Interpretant corresponds to its information is not 
quite as straightforward.

 

CSP:  A symbol, in its reference to its object, has a triple reference ... 
Third, Its reference to its interpretant through its object, or all the facts 
known about its object ... What are thus referred to, so far as they are known, 
are ... Third, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is 
subject or predicate, or the information concerning the symbol. (CP 2:418; 1867)

 

In this context, "information" is clearly Experiential Information, while the 
sum of analytic propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate is its 
Essential Information.  Defined this way, Essential Information is distinct 
from Experiential Information, rather than included within it.  Since Informed 
Breadth and Depth are the two dimensions of Experiential Information, 
presumably they are likewise distinct from Essential Breadth and Depth; so the 
question then becomes whether and how we can allocate Informed Depth as the 
Sign's ground between its Immediate Object and its Dynamic Interpretant.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to