There is nothing that is not real. Everything that exists is observed. Reality is all.
Peirce: CP 1.170 "Equally conclusive and direct reason for thinking that space and degrees of quality and other things are continuous is to be found as for believing time to be so. Yet, the reality of continuity once admitted, reasons are there, divers reasons, some positive, others only formal, yet not contemptible, for admitting the continuity of all things." amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S., Edwina, Gary R, List, > > > There are a number of ways of interpreting the claim that: "a sign is > not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904) > > > Jon suggests that the emphasis should be placed on "thing," rather than on > "real," which seems like a reasonable suggestion. Another option, > compatible with this, would be to interpret Peirce as using the more > general term "sign" in a manner that implied something more restricted like > "legisign" or "symbolic sign." > > > The interpretative suggestion I am making may seem strained, but I find > that Peirce at times is using a more general term (e.g., genuine triad) > when it is clear that he really means to restrict what is being claimed > (e.g., to thoroughly genuine triads). As far as I can tell, he seems to > think the context is sufficient to indicate that the more restricted class > is meant--although I admit that this could be a misinterpretation of the > plain meaning of what is said in the texts. > > > One reason I am drawn to this interpretation is that Peirce says > (somewhere, I can't put my finger on it) that every individual object that > stands in an existential relation to another individual object *can* > serve as an index. If we take the interpretative approach that I'm > suggesting, then it makes perfect sense to say that a symbolic legisign is > not a real individual thing. Having said that, a genuine indexical sinsign > is an existing individual thing. What is more, some indexical sinsigns may > stand in existential and dynamical relations (i.e., dyadic relations) to > their objects. That, at least, is how I tend to interpret Peirce's claims > about indexical sinsigns that have the capacity to be interpreted in a mind > (e.g., the ripples on the lake as an index of the direction of the > wind)--but have not, at least not yet. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 7, 2018 1:05:57 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: Determination in Logic as Semeiotic vs Biosemiotic, was, > [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants > > Edwina, List: > > ET: [NOTE: with 'the Sign' understood by me as another entity/thing > interacting semiosically with the DO] > > > Such a definition is problematic unless 'the Sign' in this context is > intended as shorthand for an *Instance *of the Sign, or a Sign-*Replica*. > According to Peirce, "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904); and as > discussed on the List recently, it is clear that he intended the emphasis > to be placed on "thing," rather than on "real." A Sign is *not *an > entity/thing that interacts *at all*; it does not *exist*, except in its > Replicas. > > ET: I consider that the first entity/thing functions as a DO only when it > is in semiosic interaction with another entity/thing. > > > As I understand Peirce's terminology, "semiosic interaction" is > self-contradictory. There is dyadic action/reaction/interaction, > exemplifying 2ns; and there is triadic semiosis, exemplifying 3ns. These > are two *different *phenomena, always distinguishable whenever we examine > the Phaneron, and neither is reducible to the other. > > ET: A bird - another Sign - interacts with this seed, which becomes > because of the interaction with the bird, a DO...and, when eaten, a > component of the bird/Sign. The DO, the seed, does not determine the bird! > The two are interactive. > > > In this example, what is the Sign that represents the seed as its DO? It > *cannot > *be the bird itself if the seed does not determine the bird or if the two > are interactive, because by definition the DO determines the Sign, while > the Sign has no effect at all on its DO. I would suggest that the Sign is > instead the bird's percept of the seed, which results in the bird's > instinctive (and retroductive) perceptual judgment that the seed is food, > which has as its Dynamic Interpretant the exertion of the bird eating the > seed. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 2:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R, list: >> >> I'm not saying that the DO on its own agency determines or causes the >> Sign in biosemiosis or any semiosis..... [NOTE: with 'the Sign' understood >> by me as another entity/thing interacting semiosically with the DO]. And >> to further clarify, I consider that the first entity/thing functions as a >> DO only when it is in semiosic interaction with another entity/thing. >> >> What is a semiosic interaction? It includes Mind - and the semiosic >> interaction can be in any of the three categorical modes. >> >> So- let's say a seed is a particular actuality. It is in my view, a DI, >> an actual Interpretant of various organic and inorganic matter, organized >> within the habits of formation of this particular species of a plant. But >> no DI exists 'per se' but as a part of a semiosic sign, the full triad. So, >> the seed is as a morphological unit, a triadic Sign in itself, in semiosic >> interactions with other forms of matter [water, soil, nutrients etc]. >> >> A bird - another Sign - interacts with this seed, which becomes because >> of the interaction with the bird, a DO...and, when eaten, a component of >> the bird/Sign. The DO, the seed, does not determine the bird! The two are >> interactive. >> >> I am aware that Gary R does not agree with my view that the two Signs are >> interactive in a semiosic act - but - I can't explain it any other way. >> >> Edwina >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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