Dear list,
I do not think one realizes how *fatal* the following admission is for one who attempts to ultimately justify a correct interpretation of Peirce’s intention based only on his writings. “..when we are talking about Instances or Sign-Replicas. However, I acknowledge that Peirce himself was not always careful about this, which sometimes poses challenges for interpreting his writings.” Best, Jerry R On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 6:34 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, > > You appear to be arguing that in 1904, or whenever he wrote “New > Elements,” Peirce decided that only Types (or Legisigns) were properly > called “signs,” i.e. Replicas (or Sinsigns) should not be called “signs.” > But several of the classes *of signs* he named in 1906-08 are not Types > or Legisigns; so Peirce must have changed his mind about that, if he really > meant in 1904 that only Types are signs. This brings up two questions: > > When and why do you think Peirce changed his mind about only Types being > signs? > > Why should we take Peirce’s usage in “New Elements” as governing his > entire semiotic theory from then on, rather than taking it as a peculiarity > of that particular moment of his thinking? > > Gary f. > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 7-Aug-18 18:13 > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: Determination in Logic as Semeiotic vs Biosemiotic, was, > [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants > > > > Jeff, List: > > > > I understand the reasoning behind that interpretation, but I have argued > against it previously on the basis that Peirce went on to discuss Icons and > Indices as Signs at EP 2:306-307, not just Symbols. A degenerate Sign is > still a Sign, and later in the same paragraph where he said that "a sign is > not a real thing," he talked about "Giving to the word *sign *the full > scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes ..." (although I > acknowledge that his subsequent examples were all Symbols). > > > > As I have said before, somewhat controversially, I currently view *every *Sign > as a Type--such that what Peirce called a Sinsign in 1903 is always an > Instance or Replica of a Sign (i.e., a Token of a Type), and what he called > a Qualisign in 1903 is a significant character that is embodied in such an > Instance or Replica (i.e., a Tone of a Token). The ripples on a lake (or > the orientation of a weathercock) are an Index of the direction of the wind > *here > and now* only because there is a *general *law of nature that governs > them, which makes them capable of being interpreted as such *no matter > where they are located or when they are observed*. Again as Peirce put > it, "A real thing does not so exist in replica" (EP 2:303; 1904). > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > > Jon S., Edwina, Gary R, List, > > There are a number of ways of interpreting the claim that: "a sign is > not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904) > > Jon suggests that the emphasis should be placed on "thing," rather than on > "real," which seems like a reasonable suggestion. Another option, > compatible with this, would be to interpret Peirce as using the more > general term "sign" in a manner that implied something more restricted like > "legisign" or "symbolic sign." > > The interpretative suggestion I am making may seem strained, but I find > that Peirce at times is using a more general term (e.g., genuine triad) > when it is clear that he really means to restrict what is being claimed > (e.g., to thoroughly genuine triads). As far as I can tell, he seems to > think the context is sufficient to indicate that the more restricted class > is meant--although I admit that this could be a misinterpretation of the > plain meaning of what is said in the texts. > > One reason I am drawn to this interpretation is that Peirce says > (somewhere, I can't put my finger on it) that every individual object that > stands in an existential relation to another individual object *can* > serve as an index. If we take the interpretative approach that I'm > suggesting, then it makes perfect sense to say that a symbolic legisign is > not a real individual thing. Having said that, a genuine indexical sinsign > is an existing individual thing. What is more, some indexical sinsigns may > stand in existential and dynamical relations (i.e., dyadic relations) to > their objects. That, at least, is how I tend to interpret Peirce's claims > about indexical sinsigns that have the capacity to be interpreted in a mind > (e.g., the ripples on the lake as an index of the direction of the > wind)--but have not, at least not yet. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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