Jon, You appear to be arguing that in 1904, or whenever he wrote “New Elements,” Peirce decided that only Types (or Legisigns) were properly called “signs,” i.e. Replicas (or Sinsigns) should not be called “signs.” But several of the classes of signs he named in 1906-08 are not Types or Legisigns; so Peirce must have changed his mind about that, if he really meant in 1904 that only Types are signs. This brings up two questions:
When and why do you think Peirce changed his mind about only Types being signs? Why should we take Peirce’s usage in “New Elements” as governing his entire semiotic theory from then on, rather than taking it as a peculiarity of that particular moment of his thinking? Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: 7-Aug-18 18:13 To: [email protected] Subject: Re: Determination in Logic as Semeiotic vs Biosemiotic, was, [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Interpretants Jeff, List: I understand the reasoning behind that interpretation, but I have argued against it previously on the basis that Peirce went on to discuss Icons and Indices as Signs at EP 2:306-307, not just Symbols. A degenerate Sign is still a Sign, and later in the same paragraph where he said that "a sign is not a real thing," he talked about "Giving to the word sign the full scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes ..." (although I acknowledge that his subsequent examples were all Symbols). As I have said before, somewhat controversially, I currently view every Sign as a Type--such that what Peirce called a Sinsign in 1903 is always an Instance or Replica of a Sign (i.e., a Token of a Type), and what he called a Qualisign in 1903 is a significant character that is embodied in such an Instance or Replica (i.e., a Tone of a Token). The ripples on a lake (or the orientation of a weathercock) are an Index of the direction of the wind here and now only because there is a general law of nature that governs them, which makes them capable of being interpreted as such no matter where they are located or when they are observed. Again as Peirce put it, "A real thing does not so exist in replica" (EP 2:303; 1904). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Tue, Aug 7, 2018 at 4:14 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Jon S., Edwina, Gary R, List, There are a number of ways of interpreting the claim that: "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904) Jon suggests that the emphasis should be placed on "thing," rather than on "real," which seems like a reasonable suggestion. Another option, compatible with this, would be to interpret Peirce as using the more general term "sign" in a manner that implied something more restricted like "legisign" or "symbolic sign." The interpretative suggestion I am making may seem strained, but I find that Peirce at times is using a more general term (e.g., genuine triad) when it is clear that he really means to restrict what is being claimed (e.g., to thoroughly genuine triads). As far as I can tell, he seems to think the context is sufficient to indicate that the more restricted class is meant--although I admit that this could be a misinterpretation of the plain meaning of what is said in the texts. One reason I am drawn to this interpretation is that Peirce says (somewhere, I can't put my finger on it) that every individual object that stands in an existential relation to another individual object can serve as an index. If we take the interpretative approach that I'm suggesting, then it makes perfect sense to say that a symbolic legisign is not a real individual thing. Having said that, a genuine indexical sinsign is an existing individual thing. What is more, some indexical sinsigns may stand in existential and dynamical relations (i.e., dyadic relations) to their objects. That, at least, is how I tend to interpret Peirce's claims about indexical sinsigns that have the capacity to be interpreted in a mind (e.g., the ripples on the lake as an index of the direction of the wind)--but have not, at least not yet. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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