Edwina, List: ET: I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an action between two actualities, two existent 'things'.
Yes, and why is that? Because *Peirce* used the term "interact," as well as "act" and "react," to refer only to an action between two actualities, two existent "Things"; especially when he was being careful to *differentiate *the three Categories or Universes. Again, that has been my only point throughout this particular exchange. Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 1:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > JAS, list > > What is going on here, is a situation where two people are using the same > word - each with a different usage. So- we are talking past each other, and > that's hardly productive. > > I use the term 'interact' to mean that two or more forces act on and have > an effect on each other. But a key point: I do not confine the nature of > these forces to actualities and so, I include the effect that a law can > have on a particular object. > > I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an action > between two actualities, two existent 'things'. > > Again, Jon, your quotes that you provided do not, in my view, contradict > my use of the term 'interact'. I have always acknowledged that the > general, the law, has no separate actuality in itself but is 'embodied' in > an individual morphology. This is basic Peirce [and Aristotle]. BUT, I > consider that the general, the law, as embedded, does act as a genuine > informational force, and so it as itself, as its generality, acts, > interacts...with individual morphologies. And this is not simply an act of > constraint, but, in my view, of actual generative formation. That enables > the increase of complexity - a basic conclusion for Peirce. > > This is something about which we have a basic disagreement. > > Edwina > > On Thu 09/08/18 2:28 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > The point is that according to Peirce, as demonstrated by those > quotations, only existential particulars can interact, and only with > other existential particulars. A general cannot interact with anything as > a general, so it does not interact with existential particulars; instead, > it governs them. > > CSP: But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in" individuals, and > prescribes some of their qualities. (CP 2.293, EP 2:274; 1903) > > CSP: By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over and over > again, translated into another language, embodied in a logical graph or > algebraical formula, and still be one and the same proposition, we do not > mean any existing individual object but a type, a general, which does not > exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform. (CP 8.313; 1905) > > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> I'm not sure of the point of your post. I suggested that we'd simply have >> to agree-to-disagree. Providing lists of quotations, all of which I fully >> agree with, doesn't change my view [and none contradict my view] - which >> I'll repeat below: >> >> " I don't agree that it implies that the "Type exists apart from >> its Tokens'. My view is that both are informationally functional and >> interact informationally - and this doesn't imply a separate individual >> existence for each. Informational action between information encoded as a >> general and information encoded as a particular is, in my view, quite >> possible." >> >> That is - Reality, which functions as a generality, DOES, in my view, >> interact with the existential particular. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Thu 09/08/18 12:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> Any word with "act" as its root implies actuality, which is 2ns. >> >> CSP: Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just >> what it consists in. If I ask you what the actuality of an event >> consists in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening then >> and there. The specifications then and there involve all its >> relations to other existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie in >> its relations to the universe of existents ... We have a two-sided >> consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably >> near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a >> mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call >> that Secondness. (CP 1.24; 1903) >> >> >> CSP: That conception of Aristotle which is embodied for us in the >> cognate origin of the terms actuality and activity is one of the most >> deeply illuminating products of Greek thinking. Activity implies a >> generalization of effort; and effort is a two-sided idea, effort and >> resistance being inseparable, and therefore the idea of Actuality has also >> a dyadic form. (CP 4.542; 1906) >> >> CSP: The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and >> facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute >> forces ... (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908) >> >> CSP: Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in >> their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, >> qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last >> analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more >> unambiguously, Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts. (EP >> 2:479; 1908) >> >> >> Only Existents (2ns)--including Tokens--act, react, or interact; and >> they do so only on/with other Existents. For Peirce, this was literally >> the defining attribute of existence. >> >> CSP: The modern philosophers ... recognize but one mode of being, the >> being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the >> object’s crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and >> reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that >> Existence. (CP 1.21; 1903) >> >> CSP: The existent is that which reacts against other things. (CP 8.191; >> c. 1904) >> >> >> CSP: Whatever exists, ex-sists, that is, really acts upon other >> existents, so obtains a self-identity, and is definitely individual. (CP >> 5.429, EP 2:342; 1905) >> >> CSP: ... I myself always use exist in its strict philosophical sense of >> "react with the other like things in the environment." (CP 6.495; c. 1906) >> >> >> From such a standpoint, strictly speaking, Possibles (1ns) and >> Necessitants (3ns)--including Tones and Types, respectively--do not act, >> react, or interact on/with anything. That is why any Dynamic Interpretant >> (Experiential Information)--an actual feeling, effort, or further >> Sign-Replica--is always the result of a "then-and-there" Instance of the >> Sign (Token), while the Final Interpretant (Substantial Information) >> pertains to the non-temporal/non-spatial Sign itself (Type), and the >> Immediate >> Interpretant (Essential Information) pertains to the >> qualities/characters of its expression within a given system of Signs >> (Tone). Consequently, I do not see how anything except Tokens could >> "interact informationally" or engage in "informational action." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> JAS, list >>> >>> I wasn't referring at all to the difference between reality and >>> existence - and as I said in my post, I was indeed talking about Thirdness >>> as mediation in a Legisign role. Obviously, then, I agree that the >>> Representamen in a mode of Thirdness within the triadic semiosic process >>> does not 'exist but governs existents'....So- I'm unsure of the reason for >>> your comment. >>> >>> With reference to your problem with my use of the word 'interaction', >>> which you confine to a mode of Secondness - I guess we'll just have to each >>> agree to differ in our use of the word. I don't agree that it implies that >>> the "Type exists apart from its Tokens'. My view is that both are >>> informationally functional and interact informationally - and this doesn't >>> imply a separate individual existence for each. Informational action >>> between information encoded as a general and information encoded as a >>> particular is, in my view, quite possible. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Thu 09/08/18 9:11 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I suppose we can say that a Type depends on its Tokens for its existence, >>> but certainly not for its Reality, because the mode of Being of a Type >>> is not reaction (2ns) but mediation (3ns). Consequently, I still think we >>> should avoid saying that a Type "interacts" with its Tokens, because this >>> implies that the Type exists apart from its Tokens, such that it can react >>> with them. As the quote below from Peirce states, a Type "does not >>> exist but governs existents" (CP 8.313; 1905, emphasis added); the >>> Sign's unchanging ideal Final Interpretant logically/semiotically >>> determines (constrains) its various actual Dynamic Interpretants, not >>> the other way around. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 8:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary R, JAS, list >>>> >>>> 1] I question the claim that "The Type is not dependent on its >>>> Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond >>>> is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is the nature >>>> of a Real "would-be." >>>> >>>> My view is that the Type - which I understand as a general, as laws, is >>>> most certainly dependent on being articulated as a Token, for generals do >>>> not exist except as articulated within/as the particular. And it is the >>>> experiences of the particular instantiation that can affect the Types and >>>> enable adaptation and evolution of the general/laws.since, as we know, >>>> growth and increasing complexity is 'the rule' [can't remember section..] >>>> >>>> "I do not mean any existing individual object, but a type, a general, >>>> which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" >>>> 8.313. >>>> >>>> That is - I think the relation between the law/general and the >>>> instantiation is intimate and interactive [there's that terrible word >>>> again!]. >>>> >>>> 2] Symbols grow' - which to me, means that they become more complex in >>>> their laws and their networked connections with other Signs. But I will >>>> also suggest that symbols must have the capacity to implode as well! >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>
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