Jon, Edwina, list, Jon wrote in his messaged posted just prior to this:
JAS: My concern has been and remains to be faithful to Peirce's usage of terminology as we proceed with such efforts. As difficult as being "faithful to Peirce's usage of terminology" is given his tendency to modify it over time, over the past few months I would say that Jon has done an admirable job, never claiming too much, offering reservations and qualifications in certain instances, questioning his very own notion when it seemed prudent to do so, and characteristically offering considerable textual support for his terminological points. I have no idea why Edwina finds especially the latter problematic as I personally always peruse the Peirce quotations he provides to support his view and find that in a number of cases which I've considered closely that they do indeed support Jon's view of how Peirce uses some terms. I do not always agree with Jon, and tend to agree with Gary f, that Jon's view that some late terminological variant or experiment in terminology ought to be accepted more generally, that is, out of the context of its use in the material in which it is found, is sound. In my view, even the very hypotheses of Peirce which might seem to require his novel, often neologistic terminology, need to be intensely examined rather that accepting the variant terminology out of some specific experimental contest. In other words, it is my sense that some of Peirce's late views represent experiments to be tested, not conclusions of validated hypotheses, and that the acceptance of the variant terminology is dependent upon the results of further inquiry into the matters he took up late in life. In the present question of the Peirce's use of "interaction," "action-reaction," etc. Jon has provided exemplary textual support. This seems to be one use of terminology from which Peirce never varied, at least in distinguishing the three categories: 2ns *is* the category of action-reaction. In such a specific context (e.g., distinguishing the categories), if one uses such unambiguous terminology in some other way than Peirce *consistently* did, it is my sense that such alternative use of these terms is not helpful and can be confusing, perhaps most especially to students of Peirce's semeiotics, notably those fairly new to Peirce studies. No one can stop one from doing so, but then others are within their rights to question one's usage. So, in a word, I think it is a service to the list for Jon to be trying to clarify the terminology that Peirce consistently uses in certain semeiotic contexts. Further, it is my considered opinion that it behooves us to use Peirce's terminology when it's clear enough and consistent enough, especially if we want to facilitate our joint inquiries, not only in semeiotic, but also in phenomenology and metaphysics. Of course some of Jon's other researches, such as his recent "interpretive hypothesis" formed in part in consideration of Peirce's comment that a sign is not "a Real thing," are a whole other matter and, in my opinion, ought to be challenged especially to the extent to which they appear 'novel'. And I find that certain members of the list are do just that. In the past I too have argued against certain of Jon's analyses and hypotheses, and have noted that he seems always to welcome such challenges and occasionally invites them. I expect that these comments will be taken in the spirit in which I hope they are clearly intended--to support his clear and consistent terminology in discussing Peirce's semeiotics (and his science more generally) when it is that: clear and consistent. Where it is not clear and consistent, there is an even great challenge. As I was completing this message Edwina sent another post which included this Peirce quote (I corrected two minor typos): "Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run mold reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being consists. For this reason I call this element of the phenomenon or object of thought the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future" 1.343. I will only say for now that for 3ns to "mold reactions to itself" is in no way to say that it 'interacts' with 2ns. Again, 2ns is that which acts/reacts, while 3ns is that which it is "by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future," a very different matter. Ignoring this one will tend to conflate the natures of 3ns and 2ns and, say, not distinguish between law (3ns, habit, etc.) and lawfulness (2ns, force, that "molding" of reactions within the existential world). 1904 [c.] | Draft of Nichols Review [C] | MS [R] 1476:10 …the essence of law consists in its being a conditional truth about the indefinite future, and never can become matter of actual fact. Or we may say it is such a truth that upon the knowledge of it a perpetual or indefinitely lasting conditional expectation may be founded. We say “indefinitely lasting” because as a general rule our laws are vaguely understood to endure only so long as “the present state of things” continues; but that state of things may endure forever, or if it ceases, may return some day. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 3:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > ET: I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an action > between two actualities, two existent 'things'. > > > Yes, and why is that? Because *Peirce* used the term "interact," as well > as "act" and "react," to refer only to an action between two actualities, > two existent "Things"; especially when he was being careful to *differentiate > *the three Categories or Universes. Again, that has been my only point > throughout this particular exchange. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 1:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> What is going on here, is a situation where two people are using the same >> word - each with a different usage. So- we are talking past each other, and >> that's hardly productive. >> >> I use the term 'interact' to mean that two or more forces act on and have >> an effect on each other. But a key point: I do not confine the nature of >> these forces to actualities and so, I include the effect that a law can >> have on a particular object. >> >> I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an action >> between two actualities, two existent 'things'. >> >> Again, Jon, your quotes that you provided do not, in my view, contradict >> my use of the term 'interact'. I have always acknowledged that the >> general, the law, has no separate actuality in itself but is 'embodied' in >> an individual morphology. This is basic Peirce [and Aristotle]. BUT, I >> consider that the general, the law, as embedded, does act as a genuine >> informational force, and so it as itself, as its generality, acts, >> interacts...with individual morphologies. And this is not simply an act of >> constraint, but, in my view, of actual generative formation. That enables >> the increase of complexity - a basic conclusion for Peirce. >> >> This is something about which we have a basic disagreement. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Thu 09/08/18 2:28 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> The point is that according to Peirce, as demonstrated by those >> quotations, only existential particulars can interact, and only with >> other existential particulars. A general cannot interact with anything as >> a general, so it does not interact with existential particulars; >> instead, it governs them. >> >> CSP: But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in" individuals, and >> prescribes some of their qualities. (CP 2.293, EP 2:274; 1903) >> >> CSP: By a proposition, as something which can be repeated over and over >> again, translated into another language, embodied in a logical graph or >> algebraical formula, and still be one and the same proposition, we do not >> mean any existing individual object but a type, a general, which does not >> exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform. (CP 8.313; 1905) >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> JAS, list >>> >>> I'm not sure of the point of your post. I suggested that we'd simply >>> have to agree-to-disagree. Providing lists of quotations, all of which I >>> fully agree with, doesn't change my view [and none contradict my view] - >>> which I'll repeat below: >>> >>> " I don't agree that it implies that the "Type exists apart from >>> its Tokens'. My view is that both are informationally functional and >>> interact informationally - and this doesn't imply a separate individual >>> existence for each. Informational action between information encoded as a >>> general and information encoded as a particular is, in my view, quite >>> possible." >>> >>> That is - Reality, which functions as a generality, DOES, in my view, >>> interact with the existential particular. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Thu 09/08/18 12:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> Any word with "act" as its root implies actuality, which is 2ns. >>> >>> CSP: Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out >>> just what it consists in. If I ask you what the actuality of an event >>> consists in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening then >>> and there. The specifications then and there involve all its >>> relations to other existents. The actuality of the event seems to lie in >>> its relations to the universe of existents ... We have a two-sided >>> consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably >>> near to a pure sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a >>> mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call >>> that Secondness. (CP 1.24; 1903) >>> >>> >>> CSP: That conception of Aristotle which is embodied for us in the >>> cognate origin of the terms actuality and activity is one of the most >>> deeply illuminating products of Greek thinking. Activity implies a >>> generalization of effort; and effort is a two-sided idea, effort and >>> resistance being inseparable, and therefore the idea of Actuality has also >>> a dyadic form. (CP 4.542; 1906) >>> >>> CSP: The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and >>> facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute >>> forces ... (CP 6.455, EP 2:435; 1908) >>> >>> CSP: Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists >>> in their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, >>> qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last >>> analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more >>> unambiguously, Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts. (EP >>> 2:479; 1908) >>> >>> >>> Only Existents (2ns)--including Tokens--act, react, or interact; and >>> they do so only on/with other Existents. For Peirce, this was >>> literally the defining attribute of existence. >>> >>> CSP: The modern philosophers ... recognize but one mode of being, the >>> being of an individual thing or fact, the being which consists in the >>> object’s crowding out a place for itself in the universe, so to speak, and >>> reacting by brute force of fact, against all other things. I call that >>> Existence. (CP 1.21; 1903) >>> >>> CSP: The existent is that which reacts against other things. (CP >>> 8.191; c. 1904) >>> >>> >>> CSP: Whatever exists, ex-sists, that is, really acts upon other >>> existents, so obtains a self-identity, and is definitely individual. (CP >>> 5.429, EP 2:342; 1905) >>> >>> CSP: ... I myself always use exist in its strict philosophical sense >>> of "react with the other like things in the environment." (CP 6.495; c. >>> 1906) >>> >>> >>> From such a standpoint, strictly speaking, Possibles (1ns) and >>> Necessitants (3ns)--including Tones and Types, respectively--do not >>> act, react, or interact on/with anything. That is why any Dynamic >>> Interpretant >>> (Experiential Information)--an actual feeling, effort, or further >>> Sign-Replica--is always the result of a "then-and-there" Instance of the >>> Sign (Token), while the Final Interpretant (Substantial Information) >>> pertains to the non-temporal/non-spatial Sign itself (Type), and the >>> Immediate >>> Interpretant (Essential Information) pertains to the >>> qualities/characters of its expression within a given system of Signs >>> (Tone). Consequently, I do not see how anything except Tokens could >>> "interact informationally" or engage in "informational action." >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon S. >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> JAS, list >>>> >>>> I wasn't referring at all to the difference between reality and >>>> existence - and as I said in my post, I was indeed talking about Thirdness >>>> as mediation in a Legisign role. Obviously, then, I agree that the >>>> Representamen in a mode of Thirdness within the triadic semiosic process >>>> does not 'exist but governs existents'....So- I'm unsure of the reason for >>>> your comment. >>>> >>>> With reference to your problem with my use of the word 'interaction', >>>> which you confine to a mode of Secondness - I guess we'll just have to each >>>> agree to differ in our use of the word. I don't agree that it implies that >>>> the "Type exists apart from its Tokens'. My view is that both are >>>> informationally functional and interact informationally - and this doesn't >>>> imply a separate individual existence for each. Informational action >>>> between information encoded as a general and information encoded as a >>>> particular is, in my view, quite possible. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Thu 09/08/18 9:11 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected] >>>> sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> I suppose we can say that a Type depends on its Tokens for its >>>> existence, but certainly not for its Reality, because the mode of >>>> Being of a Type is not reaction (2ns) but mediation (3ns). Consequently, I >>>> still think we should avoid saying that a Type "interacts" with its Tokens, >>>> because this implies that the Type exists apart from its Tokens, such >>>> that it can react with them. As the quote below from Peirce states, a >>>> Type "does not exist but governs existents" (CP 8.313; 1905, emphasis >>>> added); the Sign's unchanging ideal Final Interpretant >>>> logically/semiotically determines (constrains) its various actual >>>> Dynamic Interpretants, not the other way around. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Wed, Aug 8, 2018 at 8:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gary R, JAS, list >>>>> >>>>> 1] I question the claim that "The Type is not dependent on its >>>>> Tokens--past, present, or future--any more than the hardness of a diamond >>>>> is dependent on its ever actually being scratched. Such is the >>>>> nature of a Real "would-be." >>>>> >>>>> My view is that the Type - which I understand as a general, as laws, >>>>> is most certainly dependent on being articulated as a Token, for generals >>>>> do not exist except as articulated within/as the particular. And it is the >>>>> experiences of the particular instantiation that can affect the Types and >>>>> enable adaptation and evolution of the general/laws.since, as we know, >>>>> growth and increasing complexity is 'the rule' [can't remember section..] >>>>> >>>>> "I do not mean any existing individual object, but a type, a general, >>>>> which does not exist but governs existents, to which individuals conform" >>>>> 8.313. >>>>> >>>>> That is - I think the relation between the law/general and the >>>>> instantiation is intimate and interactive [there's that terrible word >>>>> again!]. >>>>> >>>>> 2] Symbols grow' - which to me, means that they become more complex in >>>>> their laws and their networked connections with other Signs. But I will >>>>> also suggest that symbols must have the capacity to implode as well! >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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