Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

[Mike Bergman]

Jon, On 8/9/2018 7:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Mike, List: Natural language indeed exhibits a lot of flexibility--again, all general Signs are indeterminate to some degree.  That is precisely why I advocate carefully selecting and defining the technical terms that we use in collaborative inquiry; and on the Peirce List, it seems to me that we should strive to do so in accordance with his usage as much as possible.  He clearly did not consider "binding" and "sense" as descriptions of 3ns to be "expressions of action," since the latter would be descriptions of 2ns. Bingo, and this is the crux of it. The restriction that 'action' must be in 2ns is a dyadic view. Granted, most actions are kinesthetic or can be framed in a dyadic action-reaction mode, but the genius of Peirce's embracing of Thirdness is, in part, to acknowledge signs (which are triadic) and mediating actions, such as thought, generalization, continuity, or A gives B to C. I would think that viewing 'action' solely through a dyadic lens is likely to lead to difficulties in truly understanding semiosis (which is, by definition according to my understanding, a triadic action). In my humble view, thinking deeply about what I just said is the beginning of beginning to understand Peirce, an understanding I am not claiming to have achieved. Mike Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 6:41 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote: Jon, Edwina, List, Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural language, including what is meant by the word 'action'. Mike On 8/9/2018 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Edwina, List: ET:  And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action. Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8 No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the cited passage.  In fact, this is a blatantly inaccurate paraphrase of it, so I will quote it in full. CSP:  It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought. If we accept these [as] the fundamental elementary modes of consciousness, they afford a psychological explanation of the three logical conceptions of quality, relation, and synthesis or mediation. The conception of quality, which is absolutely simple in itself and yet viewed in its relations is seen to be full of variety, would arise whenever feeling or the singular consciousness becomes prominent. The conception of relation comes from the dual consciousness or sense of action and reaction. The conception of mediation springs out of the plural consciousness or sense of learning. (CP 1.377-378; 1887-1888) Peirce here did not characterize mediation as "active," or even directly contrast "passive consciousness" (1ns) with "synthetic consciousness" (3ns) so as to imply that the latter is active.  On the contrary, he also mentioned "consciousness of an interruption" (2ns), and then went on to call it "dual consciousness or sense of action and reaction."  In other words, it is clearly the latter type of consciousness (2ns), rather than synthetic consciousness (3ns), that is properly described as active. ET:  Thirdness is in my understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which is to say, an action. No.  For Peirce, anything "dynamic" is associated with 2ns, not 3ns.  This is intrinsic to his analysis of a Sign as having a Dynamic Object and producing Dynamic Interpretants by means of its actual Instances. ET:  As such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all actions - powerful actions. Again, no.  For Peirce, mediating, synthesizing, and generalizing are indeed powerful, but they are not actions.  They are manifestations of 3ns, while actions are always and only manifestations of 2ns.  As Gary R. already pointed out, in Peirce's terminology, molding reactions is not an action; imparting a quality to reactions is not an action; and bringing things into relation with each other is not an action. CSP:  It is to be observed that a sign has its being in the power to bring about a determination of a Matter to a Form, not in an act of bringing it about. There are several good arguments to show that this is the case. Perhaps none of them is more conclusive than the circumstance that there is no such act. For an act has a Matter as its subject. It is the union of Matter and Form. But a sign is not Matter. An act is individual. The sign only exists in replicas. (NEM 4:300; 1904) Finally, in my opinion--and, I believe, in Peirce's--someone who is not interested in terminology is evidently not interested in making our ideas clear.  Carefully selecting and defining the terms that we use to describe what is going on is not merely an academic exercise for the seminar room, but pragmatically critical for understanding and discussing what is actually happening in the real world. CSP:  Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself ... merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement. (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: JAS, list And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action. Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8 That is, semiosis as a process does not confine action to dyadic act-react kinesis between two existential things. Thirdness is in my understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which is to say, an action. As such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all actions - powerful actions. "Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run mould reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being cosists. For this reason I call this element of the phenomenon or object of thought the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future" 1.343. "The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other" 1.356 This action, of bringing things into mutual relationships is a frequent description by Peirce, of Thirdness. Now - to me, such is an action... A plural interaction mediating and generating the commonalities among separate things I am not sure if we should continue this discussion, since we both hold to different views and are probably boring the list. Edwina -- __________________________________________ Michael K. Bergman Cognonto Corporation 319.621.5225 skype:michaelkbergman http://cognonto.com http://mkbergman.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/mkbergman __________________________________________

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