Edwina, List,
I'll make one last attempt at clarifying what my position is in the matters
we've been discussing. But since we seem not to be making much, if any,
progress in such matters as the terminology best suited to particular
sciences, in particular, *logic as semeiotic*, as well as the character and
value of that one, distinct science, I'll make a few inter-paragraphical
remarks and leave it at that. Please do have the last word as I'd be quite
interested in it if you do care to respond. [I have inserted numbers in
places in Edwina's comments so I can refer to specific remarks she made in
my own comments below each of her paragraphs. I have also put *logic as
semeiotic* in boldface throughout to make a point which I hope will be
apparent by the conclusion of this post] Edwina wrote:
ET: 1.To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
2.confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of
specialists. 3.No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped
on for 'misuse of terms'. 4.And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes
confined and owned by almost an elite set of people who reject open
exploration of Peircean semiosic research unless and until the discussants
'use the correct words'. 5.It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one
focuses on which term to use, the year it was introduced, the exact
references and so on. 6.That's not what I like to see. And I don't think
you want to see that either.
1. as far as I can tell, no one here is rejecting "natural language in the
study and use of Peirce," and quite the contrary; but you appear to be
rejecting a technical terminology within that seminal semiotic science, *logic
as semeiotic*.
2. suggesting that those who are working in--and have stated that they are
working--in *one specific science, *as "essentially an isolate cult of
specialists" is just name calling and hardly appropriate to the culture of
this forum.
3. to find it of the utmost importance that terminology in a given
science--in the present case, the second normative science of cenoscopic,
namely, the three branches of *logic as semeiotic*--that the terminology of
that particular science ought be well considered, precise, and as well
defined as it can be to facilitate discussions *within that given science*,
seems to me to be at the heart of Peirce's ethics of terminology, something
he spent considerable time arguing for (and working on).
4. one would expect that someone working in *logic as semeiotic* as Peirce
conceived it would use the terminology which he worked so hard to develop,
pioneering the field ("backwoodsman" in it as he once said, but clearing
the way for future research). Not to do so denies the value of the precise
technical terminology he found especially necessary for further research
into this science and would seem to deny the terminological ethics Peirce
thought essential to each and every distinct science.
5. to suggest that the result of exactly following Peirce in employing
terminology specific to the normative science of *logic as semeiotic*
results in Peircean thought being "confined and owned by. . .an elite set
of people who reject exploration of Peircean semiosic research" in other
arts and sciences is total nonsense; to speak of those following Peirce's
terminological lead in attempting to establish a very precise technical
language for discussions within that one, unique science as a "cult" is,
frankly, in my opinion, beneath the communication practice of most all
scientists whom I know or know of.
6. what I'd like to see is greater respect for those here who, at least at
the moment, are doing work in one specific science, the pure theory of *logic
as semeiotic*, developing and employing its own terminology, something
Peirce thought of as essential for optimal communication within that
science. An important part of this work involves paying close attention to
how Peirce used terminology within that science, how that terminology
developed over time, how and where it is vague or contradictory, etc. So,
you are quite wrong: in that one science which I keep referring to, this
seems to me to be essential work within that science. So opposed to what
you may think, I *do* want to see that terminological inquiry done there.
For there it seems to me most appropriate, nay, necessary (whereas in other
arts and sciences it probably is less so or not at all).
ET: 1.There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn
within Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic action [DO, IO, R, II,
DI, FI]…..2.But to insist that the words we use in basic common natural
language cannot be used - because in Peirce, they have strictly singular
meanings, is, in my view, not merely isolationist but 3. inhibits the study
and use of Peirce.
1. there more certainly are "specific technical terms" one working
within *logic
as semeiotic* uses, but one is most certainly free to use other terminology
when working in other arts and sciences. No one here arguing for precision
in the use of the terminology of the cenoscopic science of *logic as
semeiotic* has suggested otherwise.
2. no one here is "insisting" that all the terminology of the *germinal*
science of *logic as semeiotic* be employed in other disciplines (although
certain key terms are so being used), nor arguing against using "basic
common natural language" in discussions within those other disciplines.
3. what in my view "inhibits the study and use of Peirce" is the insistence
on employing natural and idiosyncratic language in a discipline which is
working hard to establish a technical terminology suited to continued
research in that particular science, again in this case, *logic as
semeiotic*.
ET: After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is
exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It denies
the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic 'something going on'
IS an action! A particular action within the format of Thirdness. JAS
informed us that 'what is going on in Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But,
in natural language, a manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told
that we cannot use the term.
The theory of the universal categories is first developed in Peirce's
phenomenology and later applied to several other sciences in which Peirce
did extensive work, including *logic as semeiotic* and metaphysics. It is
employed somewhat differently in each of the disciplines tricategorial
analysis is employed. But in consideration of phenomenology itself, Peirce
went out of his way to repeatedly define 2ns as essentially the category of
action-reaction, and to bring the language of action (reaction,
interaction, etc.) into 3ns tends to conflate 2ns and 3ns in a way which,
in my opinion, can only tend to confuse the nature of the categories,
really diminishing their potential use in tricategorial analysis in any and
every domain.
ET: 1.I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely
intellectual discussions of logic and metaphysica - 2.The field of
semiosis in my view 3.INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its
functionality in economics, biology, physics, societal. 4.I disagree that
if one uses the term 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is confined
to the purely intellectual and not its pragmatic functionality.
1.Who here would constrain the discussion of semiotics "to purely
intellectual discussions of logic and metaphysics"? That certain members of
this forum have being doing that has been claimed here, but I don't see
anyone doing it--those claims are false. Working within a specific
discipline does not at all deny the value of working in another or others.
2. Semiosis is not a field while semiotics is. It's a minor point, but in
the context of the present discussion it suggests to me a kind of slackness
in the use of terminology.
3. There are folks employing semiotics in all the fields you mentioned and
more. I've remarked, and quite recently, that this is something greatly to
be desired, and I fervently wish that certain forum members involved in
those and other fields who are employing trichotomic semiotic (on this
list some other such fields include linguistics, literary analysis, music
analysis, engineering, etc.) would initiate threads in this forum.
4. No one here that I know of has argued for confining semiotic analysis in
any way. As argued above, desiring a suitable technical language for the
seminal theoretical science of *logic as semeiotic* in no way suggests any
constraint or limitation of its use in any and every field where it might
find "pragmatic functionality," to employ your expression. But when doing
inquiry into a pure theoretical science here and elsewhere, to thrust such
natural and idiosyncratic language into the discussion which contradicts
the terminology developed within the field, in my opinion that muddies its
waters. And to insist on doing so, or to reject work towards establishing
the optimal terminology for use within that discipline disregards the
unique character and purpose of that science.
ET: My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research focus
on terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one cannot use
natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead move natural
language out of its meaning and into 'Peircean-only' usage inhibits and
prevents the use of Peirce in the broader study of what is going on in the
world. I repeat - I consider the Peircean semiosic framework a powerful
analytic tool for examining what is going on - in the real world - and I
think that a 'cultlike hold on language' prevents many people from using
that framework.
To suggest that this is happening is, in my opinion, merely setting up a
straw dog argument.
And I think that it would behoove all of us in these kinds of
meta-discussions to avoid the inflamatory use of such language as 'cult',
'cultlike', 'elite', 'isolationist', 'confined and owned', 'silly', etc.
Best,
Gary
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*
On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 9:14 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Gary R, list
>
> To reject the use of natural language in the study and use of Peirce
> confines this study and use to essentially an isolate cult of specialists.
> No-one else can explore Peirce because they will be jumped on for 'misuse
> of terms'. And so- we see how Peircean analysis becomes confined and owned
> by almost an elite set of people who reject open exploration of Peircean
> semiosic research unless and until the discussants 'use the correct words'.
> It becomes almost an insider's cult, where one focuses on which term to
> use, the year it was introduced, the exact references and so on. That's not
> what I like to see. And I don't think you want to see that either.
>
> There ARE indeed specific technical terms that one has to learn within
> Peircean research - such as the categories [Firstness, Secondness,
> Thirdness and the terms of the parts of the semiosic action [DO, IO, R, II,
> DI, FI]…..But to insist that the words we use in basic common natural
> language cannot be used - because in Peirce, they have strictly singular
> meanings, is, in my view, not merely isolationist but inhibits the study
> and use of Peirce.
>
> After all - to say that the word 'action' cannot be used when one is
> exploring the pragmatics of Thirdness is, I think, unreasonable. It denies
> the FACT that 'something is going on' - and the basic 'something going on'
> IS an action! A particular action within the format of Thirdness. JAS
> informed us that 'what is going on in Thirdness' is a 'manifestation'. But,
> in natural language, a manifestation is AN ACTION!. And yet, we are told
> that we cannot use the term.
>
> I also reject the isolation of the term 'semiotics' to purely intellectual
> discussions of logic and metaphysica - The field of semiosis in my view
> INCLUDES all the pragmatic examination of its functionality in economics,
> biology, physics, societal. I disagree that if one uses the term
> 'semiotics', then, examples and analysis is confined to the purely
> intellectual and not its pragmatic functionality.
>
> My view is that if someone has a particular personal and research focus on
> terminology - fine, that's his focus. But to insist that one cannot use
> natural language in the study of Peirce and must instead move natural
> language out of its meaning and into 'Peircean-only' usage inhibits and
> prevents the use of Peirce in the broader study of what is going on in the
> world. I repeat - I consider the Peircean semiosic framework a powerful
> analytic tool for examining what is going on - in the real world - and I
> think that a 'cultlike hold on language' prevents many people from using
> that framework.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu 09/08/18 11:30 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Mike, Jon, Edwina, List,
>
> Mike wrote: "Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both
> Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural
> language, including what is meant by the word 'action'."
>
> Please offer some context and some textual support for your notion that
> 'binding' and 'sense' are employed as expressions of action in any of
> Peirce's discussion of 3ns. I think that this is not only highly unlikely,
> but actually would contradict most everything he had to say about not only
> 3ns but also 2ns.
>
> Whatever you might mean by "natural language" in the present context, we
> are concerned here with technical scientific terminology, specifically
> Peirce's in consideration of his three universal categories.
> Action-Reaction and Interaction are concepts clearly connected in Peirce's
> phenomenology and semeiotic to 2ns, so that it seems peculiarly obdurate to
> suggest that they are not, that they may be associated in any integral way
> with 3ns. You will certainly have to offer more support for your comment
> than your mere assertion that it is so.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 718 482-5690
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 7:41 PM, Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon, Edwina, List,
>>
>> Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's words
>> for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural language, including
>> what is meant by the word 'action'.
>>
>> Mike
>>
>> On 8/9/2018 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, List:
>>
>> ET: And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action.
>> Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which
>> is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8
>>
>>
>> No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the cited passage. In fact,
>> this is a blatantly inaccurate paraphrase of it, so I will quote it in full.
>>
>> CSP: It seems, then, that the true categories of consciousness are:
>> first, feeling, the consciousness which can be included with an instant of
>> time, passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis;
>> second, consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness,
>> sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third,
>> synthetic consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought.
>>
>> If we accept these [as] the fundamental elementary modes of
>> consciousness, they afford a psychological explanation of the three logical
>> conceptions of quality, relation, and synthesis or mediation. The
>> conception of quality, which is absolutely simple in itself and yet viewed
>> in its relations is seen to be full of variety, would arise whenever
>> feeling or the singular consciousness becomes prominent. The conception of
>> relation comes from the dual consciousness or sense of action and reaction.
>> The conception of mediation springs out of the plural consciousness or
>> sense of learning. (CP 1.377-378; 1887-1888)
>>
>>
>> Peirce here did not characterize mediation as "active," or even directly
>> contrast "passive consciousness" (1ns) with "synthetic consciousness" (3ns)
>> so as to imply that the latter is active. On the contrary, he also
>> mentioned "consciousness of an interruption" (2ns), and then went on to
>> call it "dual consciousness or sense of action and reaction." In other
>> words, it is clearly the latter type of consciousness (2ns), rather than
>> synthetic consciousness (3ns), that is properly described as active.
>>
>> ET: Thirdness is in my understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which
>> is to say, an action.
>>
>>
>> No. For Peirce, anything "dynamic" is associated with 2ns, not 3ns.
>> This is intrinsic to his analysis of a Sign as having a Dynamic Object
>> and producing Dynamic Interpretants by means of its actual Instances.
>>
>> ET: As such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all
>> actions - powerful actions.
>>
>>
>> Again, no. For Peirce, mediating, synthesizing, and generalizing are
>> indeed powerful, but they are not actions. They are manifestations of
>> 3ns, while actions are always and only manifestations of 2ns. As Gary
>> R. already pointed out, in Peirce's terminology, molding reactions is not
>> an action; imparting a quality to reactions is not an action; and
>> bringing things into relation with each other is not an action.
>>
>> CSP: It is to be observed that a sign has its being in the power to
>> bring about a determination of a Matter to a Form, not in an act of
>> bringing it about. There are several good arguments to show that this is
>> the case. Perhaps none of them is more conclusive than the circumstance
>> that there is no such act. For an act has a Matter as its subject. It is
>> the union of Matter and Form. But a sign is not Matter. An act is
>> individual. The sign only exists in replicas. (NEM 4:300; 1904)
>>
>>
>> Finally, in my opinion--and, I believe, in Peirce's--someone who is not
>> interested in terminology is evidently not interested in making our
>> ideas clear. Carefully selecting and defining the terms that we use to
>> describe what is going on is not merely an academic exercise for the
>> seminar room, but pragmatically critical for understanding and
>> discussing what is actually happening in the real world.
>>
>> CSP: Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself ...
>> merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract
>> concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to
>> that statement. (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907)
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 3:17 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> JAS, list
>>>
>>> And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action.
>>> Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which
>>> is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8
>>>
>>> That is, semiosis as a process does not confine action to dyadic
>>> act-react kinesis between two existential things. Thirdness is in my
>>> understanding of Peirce a dynamic process, which is to say, an action. As
>>> such, it mediates, it synthesizes, it generalizes. These are all actions -
>>> powerful actions.
>>>
>>> "Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run mould
>>> reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being cosists.
>>> For this reason I call this element of the phenomenon or object of thought
>>> the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of
>>> imparting a quality to reactions in the future" 1.343.
>>>
>>> "The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it
>>> mediates and which it brings into relation to each other" 1.356
>>>
>>> This action, of bringing things into mutual relationships is a frequent
>>> description by Peirce, of Thirdness.
>>>
>>> Now - to me, such is an action... A plural interaction mediating and
>>> generating the commonalities among separate things
>>>
>>> I am not sure if we should continue this discussion, since we both hold
>>> to different views and are probably boring the list.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>
>
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