Written language has only been invented a handful of times in world history. It was never invented for English, for example, but adapted from a pre-existing system invented by others.
It was invented separately by Sequoia, for his language - Cheokee. Not a large civilization. Sequoia’s syllabary was an intellectual breakthrough of the first rank. Dan Sent from my iPhone > On Aug 13, 2018, at 21:27, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > List > > I certainly don't want to promote or support Derrida, - I could never stand > him, and much preferred Mikhail Bakhtin's focus on language - back when I was > myself studying language and the nature of oral and literate cultures. BUT - > I think it's a huge misunderstanding to think that Derrida's promoting of > Writing meant that he placed writing as emerging prior to the spoken > language! > > Even if one were not referring to a phonetic language but instead to a > non-phonetic one, such as Chinese - even then, It is illogical to suppose > that the written form preceded the spoken form. Even if one refers to the > written form for the numbers of one, two, three in Chinese [one horizontal > line, two lines, three lines]. > > At any rate, written language, to my understanding, only emerges in large > settled populations, i.e., ones that use some form of agriculture and require > some kind of mnemonic device. And that -, i.e., large agricultural > populations - only emerged about 10,000 years ago. > > What I think Derrida is referring to - in his dense, mystical writings - is > that writing represents the structure of the Sign in its orignary, > essentialist nature - in its most Truthful nature [akin to the Final > Interpretant?] and that the articulated Sign [Saussurian: signifier and > signified] 'fight' with each other in Writing; they have a relationship of > difference,[ Though he does reference Peirce ] But that Writing sets up a > conflict between the signifier and signified [Object and Interpretant] such > that they cannot reconcile. How does one arrive at Truth - only be > deconstructing this 'differerance'... > > And that's as far as I'll go since I could never stand him....My only point > here is that it's a misunderstanding to think that he thought that writing > preceded speech! > > Edwina > > > > On Mon 13/08/18 3:46 PM , Eugene Halton [email protected] sent: > > I also agree. To twist Ernst Haeckel's saying: ontology does not recapitulate > philology, contra Derrida. > Gene H > >> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018, 3:20 PM Mary Libertin <[email protected]> wrote: >> I agree. With you, and with my interpretation of Sternfeldt. >> >> >>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:18 PM Daniel L Everett <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> Derrida is completely wrong. Both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. >>> Besides doing field research on Amazonian languages that lack any form of >>> writing, I have written extensively on language evolution. I have heard >>> Derrida’s unfortunate claim before. >>> https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0307386120/ref=dbs_a_w_dp_0307386120 >>> >>> https://www.amazon.com/How-Language-Began-Humanitys-Invention/dp/0871407957 >>> >>> Dan Everett >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>> On Aug 13, 2018, at 16:40, Mary Libertin <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon A S and list, >>>> >>>> I find this discussion interesting. I have no thesis, instead just some >>>> observations for possible discussion. >>>> >>>> Peirce in EP 2:488, as previously quoted, writes that the tinge/tone/mark >>>> precedes the token/type. Are three senses possibly being alluded to: >>>> sight, sound, and touch? >>>> >>>> In regard to the sound and touch, I recall Peirce’s use of the utterer >>>> and the graphist. >>>> >>>> The latter two suggest more agency. Saussure discussed the >>>> signifier/signified relation in terms of the phoneme and speech, and >>>> rarely the grapheme and writing. Speech can not be removed or erased, and >>>> it assumes permanence with quote marks. >>>> >>>> Derrida argued the grapheme preceded the phoneme, the written vs the >>>> spoken. How relevant that is remains to be seen. Frederick Sternfelt in >>>> the title of his insightful book _Diagrammatology_ makes implicit >>>> reference to Derrida’s _Grammatology_, whose work is given short shrift. >>>> It may be that preceed-ence is not an issue with the decisign, or not >>>> relevant. >>>> >>>> I do recall Peirce using tinge with regard to existential graphs, and >>>> tinges perhaps served a purpose, perhaps with reference to layering and >>>> juxtaposition in logic, that could not achieved with the spoken or written. >>>> >>>> It may be possible that Peirce ultimately chose mark rather than tinge or >>>> tone because it is more permanent. >>>> >>>> I apologize for lacking a thesis and any mistakes, and I look forward to >>>> your responses. >>>> >>>> Mary Libertin >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 1:45 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> John S., List: >>>>> >>>>> JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >>>>> >>>>> It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of the >>>>> thread is to explicate it. >>>>> >>>>> JFS: Since mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or >>>>> tone. >>>>> >>>>> In the referenced passage, Peirce stated, "I dare say some of my former >>>>> names are better than those I now use" (EP 2:488; 1908). In fact, less >>>>> than two weeks earlier, he had asked Lady Welby specifically about Tone >>>>> vs. Mark (SS 83; 1908); and if I remember right--I do not have a copy of >>>>> her reply--she found Tone preferable because a tone of voice is a >>>>> paradigmatic example. Peirce also used Tone in what I think is one of >>>>> his clearest passages about this division of Signs ( CP 4.537; 1906). >>>>> >>>>> JFS: General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is always >>>>> a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or quasi-mind as a >>>>> token of some type. >>>>> >>>>> This may be a case of hair-splitting on my part, but I would suggest >>>>> instead that in any Instance of a Sign, the Tone is the character (or set >>>>> of characters) by which the interpreting Quasi-mind recognizes the >>>>> Sign-Replica to be an individual Token of the Type. Acquaintance with >>>>> the system of Signs (Essential Information) is necessary and sufficient >>>>> for this. It is analogous to the role of the Immediate Object as that by >>>>> which the interpreting Quasi-mind identifies the Dynamic Object of the >>>>> Sign, for which Collateral Experience (Experiential Information) is >>>>> necessary and sufficient (cf. CP 8.179, EP 2:494; 1909). >>>>> >>>>> As a Possible, the Tone can only have an Immediate Interpretant--"its >>>>> peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter." As an >>>>> Existent, the Token is what produces the Dynamic Interpretant--"that >>>>> which is experienced in each act of Interpretation." As a Necessitant, >>>>> only the Type has a Final Interpretant--"the one Interpretative result to >>>>> which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently >>>>> considered," which corresponds to the correct Habit of Interpretation >>>>> (Substantial Information). In other words, "The Immediate Interpretant >>>>> is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical >>>>> Interpretant is a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that >>>>> toward which the actual tends" (SS 111; 1909). >>>>> >>>>> JFS: In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real actualities. >>>>> >>>>> I agree, and would add that semiosis also governs Real actualities in >>>>> accordance with Real regularities. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Aug 10, 2018 at 1:15 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. >>>>>> >>>>>> In various writings over the years, Peirce wrote about >>>>>> real possibilities. He also wrote about laws as real. >>>>>> >>>>>> In writing about modality, he distinguished three universes: >>>>>> the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. Actual >>>>>> existence is just one of the three ways of being real. >>>>>> >>>>>> He also distinguished logical possibility and necessity >>>>>> from real possibility and necessity. A theory is logically >>>>>> possible if it's consistent by itself. It's a real possibility >>>>>> if it's also consistent with the laws of nature. >>>>>> >>>>>> Given the above, apply the principles to signs. For that, >>>>>> consider Peirce's Letters to Lady Welby in 1908, in which >>>>>> he wrote about signs and the three universes (EP 2:478-480). >>>>>> >>>>>> In EP 2:488, he wrote that the triad Potisign (possible sign) / >>>>>> actisign (sign in act) / and famisign (familiar or general sign) >>>>>> might be called (tinge or tone or mark) / token / type. Since >>>>>> mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or tone. >>>>>> >>>>>> General principle: In any occurrence of semiosis, there is >>>>>> always a perceptible mark that is interpreted by some mind or >>>>>> quasi-mind as a token of some type. >>>>>> >>>>>> Prior to semiosis, the perceptible thing exists in actuality. >>>>>> But it's only a possible mark. It doesn't become an actual mark >>>>>> until it is sensed by some mind or quasi-mind. Then as soon as >>>>>> it's recognized, the actual mark becomes an actual token of some type. >>>>>> >>>>>> In summary, semiosis turns real possibilities into real actualities. >>>>>> >>>>>> John >>>> -- >>>> null >>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>>> . >> -- >> null > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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