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Francesco, list
Thanks for the clear and logical analysis.
I would simply say that a rheme is in a mode of Firstness and as
such, is a STATE and not an act of cognition or interpretation. As a
state [a feeling], it has no component parts and thus, has no
IO....or II or DI..etc..
Edwina
On Wed 12/09/18 1:31 AM , Francesco Bellucci
[email protected] sent:
Jon, List
Thanks for the summary.
To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of
propositions is to say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a
proposition, i.e. that only propositions are either p, s, or g. Now
Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are
either p, s, or u. This means that only that which is either p, s, or
u is divisible according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should have
said: some signs are divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and
some other signs are divisible according to the IO into x, y, z).
Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g and since that
which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO, it
follows that only propositions are divisible according to the IO.
Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO
ceratinly means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude
that non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if
one wonders what on earth the IO of a proposition is, that
non-propositional signs have no IO becomes evident.
For since propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s,
and g, that which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows
such division. I see no warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in
a proposition is "part" of the IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case
Peirce should have made it clear that propositions are divisible
according to a part (= the quantificational part) of the IO into p,
s, and g. He should have made it clear that the IO does not exhaust
the quantificational dimension of propositions, and, I surmise, he
should have made it clear that propositions are divisible according
to one part of the IO into p, s, and g, and according to another part
of the IO into, say, x, y, and z. As far as I know, Peirce never speak
of "parts" of the IO, one of which would be the quantificational
dimension. I think it is safe to conclude that that which constitutes
the IO in a proposition is that which allows the division into p, s,
and g.
That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and g is
what Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are
mortal", the Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate
is "x is either not a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the
Peircean subject is "For some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a
man and mortal"; in "Socrates is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and
the predicate "x is mortal". The predicates in these sentences are
rhemes. Rhemes do not have "subjects", they are not quantified. Since
that which allows the division into p, s, and g is the IO, and since
the IO is – in the case of those signs for which it is
comprehensible what on earth the IO is – the subject, it follows
that lack of a subject involves lack of an IO.
In sum:
In order for a sign to have an IO, it should be divisible into p, s,
and g (this I think is evident from Peirce's claim taht "signs are
divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g.)Rhemes are not
divisible into p, s, and gTherefore, rhemes do not have an IO
Francesco
Rhemes do not have Immediate Objects.
On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Francesco, List:
To clarify, I do not dispute any of the following.
*Only Dicisigns and Arguments distinctly/separately/specially
indicate their Objects.
*Only Arguments distinctly/separately/specially express their
Interpretants.
*The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the
Sign to be the Sign's Object.
*Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less
complete Signs than Arguments.
*Rhemes cannot be true or false.
*Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
*Quantification is an aspect of a proposition's Immediate Object.
However, I continue to to find the following inferences exegetically
unwarranted and systematically problematic.
*Rhemes do not have Immediate Objects.
*Rhemes and Dicisigns do not have Immediate Interpretants.
*Despite being Types and Symbols, propositions can have Immediate
Objects that are Possibles (vague) or Existents (singular).
*Quantification is required for any Sign to have an Immediate
Object.
It still seems to me that #1 would mean that Rhemes cannot denote
their Objects at all, while #2 would mean that Rhemes and Dicisigns
cannot signify their Interpretants at all; yet it was already
well-established in logic, and explicitly affirmed by Peirce--both
early and late--that terms (Rhematic Symbols) have Breadth and Depth.
#3 would mean that in his late taxonomy, the trichotomy according to
the Immediate Object comes after the one according to the relation
between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the order of determination.
#4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce himself, as far as I know,
never imposed.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
Jon, List
JAS: If one holds that only Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately
representing their Objects have Immediate Objects, then one must also
hold that only Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing their
Interpretants have Immediate Interpretants. If a Rheme does not have
an Immediate Object, then a Rheme or Dicisign does not have an
Immediate Interpretant; but Peirce never said or implied this.
Peirce said something like this, but before the distinction between
different kinds of interpretants had emerged. He said that a
proposition does not separately represent its interpretant:
CSP: " A proposition is a symbol in which the representative
element, or reason [i.e. interpretant, FB], is left vague and
unexpressed, but in which the reactive element [i.e. the object, FB]
is distinctly [i.e. separately, FB] indicated. [...] An argument is a
bad name for a symbol in which the representative element [i.e.
interpretant, FB], or reason, is distinctly expressed.” (R 484:
7-8, 1898)
CSP: “[a] Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the
Object which it denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its
Interpretant to be what it may” (CP 2.95, 1902
CSP: "A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an
argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows what
interpretant it is intended to determine. A proposition is a
representamen which is not an argument [i.e. which separately shows
what interpretant it is intended to determine, FB], but which
separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A rhema
is a simple representation without such separate part" (EP 2: 204,
1903)
CSP “A term […] is any representamen which does not separately
indicate its object; […] A proposition is a representamen which
separately indicates its object, but does [not] specially show what
interpretant it is intended to determine […] An argument is a
symbol which especially shows what interpretant it is intended to
determine” (R 491: 9-10, 1903).
Now, the question is: in light of the later taxonomy of
interpretants, what is the interpretant that the proposition does
not, while the argument does, separately represent?
CSP: …every sign has two objects. It has that object which it
represents itself to have, its Immediate Object, which has no other
being than that of being represented to be, a mere Representative
Being, or as the Kantian logicians used to say a merely Objective
Being ... The Objective Object is the putative father. (R 499; c.
1906, bold added)
I beg you to notice what Peirce says: he says "has that object which
it represents itself to have", which, if my English sustains me, means
that the sign has that object which the sign represents itself to
have, not that it has the object that the sign represents in its
(i.e. the object's) qualities or characters. That is, the immediate
object is the object that is represented by the sign to be the sign's
object, not the object in the characters that the sign represents it
to have. CSP: Every sign must plainly have an immediate object,
however indefinite, in order to be a sign. (R 318:25; 1907, bold
added)
This indeed seems contrary to the claim that only propositions have
an immediate object. There is another occurrence of such a claim, in
another 1907 writing (a letter to Papini). Now I beg you to notice
that since the beginning of this discussion I was talking of the
classification of signs of 1904–1906, in which the notion of
immediate object first emerged. The two contrary statements are from
1907, and I suspect that after 1907 his notion of immediate object
changed. Perhaps the qualification " however indefinite" can help us
explain how it changed.
But in general, I repeat, I think that often "sign" has to be taken
to mean "complete sign" (i.e. "proposition"). If in such apparently
contrary statements we adopt this strategy, problems vanish. Peirce
says as much:
CSP: "a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they
are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more
complete sign" (R 7: 2).
A rheme, though it is a sign, may not possess all the essential
characters of a proposition. In particular, while a proposition
separately represent its own object (i.e. while it has an immediate
object), a rheme does not.
CSP: "a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to
a real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree
of definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false"
(R 7: 3–4).
Please note that R 7 was probably composed in 1903, i.e. before the
IO/DO distinction had emerged. The sufficiently complete sign must
specify, with some degree of definiteness (either singularly,
vaguely, or generally) the object, i.e. the DO in the later
terminology, this specification, this "hint" ("The Sign must indicate
it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate
Objec"), being the IO. He also says that "a sufficiently complete
sign may be false" (R 7, p. 4). Rhemes cannot be false, only
propositions can, precisely because they indicate an object of which
they are false.
CSP: The Immediate Interpretant consists in the Quality of the
Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction.
(CP 8.315; 1909, bold added)
CSP: My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each
Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any
Interpreter ... The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction,
consisting in a Possibility. (SS 110; 1909, bold added)
The second quote affirms that the Immediate Object can be
indefinite; i.e., it need not be be distinctly/separately
represented. There are various other passages like the third quote,
where Peirce discussed the Immediate Object and/or Immediate
Interpretant of "a Sign," implying no limitation whatsoever on the
classes that he had in mind. In short, I see no warrant at all for
claiming that he limited the Immediate Object to Dicisigns and
Arguments, or the Immediate Interpretant to Arguments alone.
The warrant is a fundamental exegetical claim, emphasized by John
Sowa few posts ago: Peirce was a logician, and everything he says
about "signs" has to have logical relevance. The 1904–1906
distinction into vague, singular, and general signs is a well-known
logical distinction (particular, singular, and universal
propositions), and since the immediate object is that which allows us
to draw this distinction, I infer that the immediate object is only
present where quantification is present. And rhemes are not
quantified.
bestFrancesco
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