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}Jerry, list
Here are some quotes:
4.536
"I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that
is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an
exertion or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. But
it remains to point out that there are usually two Objects, and more
than two Interpretants. Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate
Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and
whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the
Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some
means contrives to determines the Sign to its Repesentation".
See also 5.473, where he differentiates 'that thing which causes a
sign as such is called the object....but more accurately, the
existent object' [this is from the example of Ground arms]. Note -
Peirce changed the 'existent object to Dynamic Object...
And, the immediate object is the 'mental representation - NOT the
interpretation, but the mental representation..
8.314, 1909]
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object - ie the Object as
represented in the sign, and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object
is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore, )
say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things,
the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the
interpreter to find out by collateral experience"...and the example
is the weather and his wife's question about it..
"Its Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as
this is common to her mind and mind - not the character of it, but the
identity of it.."The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual or
Real meteorological conditions at the moment …
I don't know if the above is of any use to you.
Edwina.
On Fri 07/09/18 4:11 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear list,
I am not sure whether I am not heard or I am being ignored.
I suppose when I hear crickets, it could be either or both or
neither.
Yet, the question is posed where
if the distinction between internal and external objects are
important enough to matter so as not to be trifling; that it ought to
be saved when discussing general matters regarding triadic relations,
then
that rule should be remembered in any algorithm put forth regarding
relations of sign object interpretant or object sign interpretant.
But I don’t see how this can be done.
Will no one help me?
Where is the reference that decides the matter,
or is this distinction not important enough for a philosopher?
If the distinction is not important enough for a philosopher,
then Peirce, surely, would have ignored or not treated of the
matter.
With best wishes,
Jerry R
On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 3:03 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
I apologize. The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
mistake. I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of difficulties.
For example, I have been quoting Peirce's note to B. E. Smith
for years.
So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's
semiotic ideas on the background of logic: this I agree
wholeheartedly and I wrote a book based precisely on this idea.
Yes. I have read many of your writings and cited some of them.
I think they're very good.
But I want to emphasize that a very useful subset of any natural
language can indeed be mapped to FOL. The earliest example is
Ockham's theory of propositions, which is Part II of Summa Logicae.
In that book, which Peirce had lectured on at Harvard, Ockham
developed a model-theoretic semantics for a very useful subset
of Latin: simple sentences in Aristotle's four sentence types,
and Boolean connectives for AND, OR, NOT, and IF-THEN.
That version of Latin can express a large subset of FOL.
Furthermore, the discourse representation structures (DRS) by
Hans Kamp, which are widely used in computational linguistics,
are limited to FOL. In fact, they are isomorphic to Peirce's
Alpha + Beta EGs. For an overview, see slides 25 to 32 of
http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf [2]
John
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