List, Robert Marty addressed this post to me and to the list, but apparently didn’t send it to the list address, so I’m forwarding it here. It contains some important comments on Peirce’s use of the term “replica.” Thank you, Robert!
Gary f. From: marty.rob...@neuf.fr <mailto:marty.rob...@neuf.fr> <marty.rob...@neuf.fr <mailto:marty.rob...@neuf.fr> > Sent: 20-Sep-18 09:28 Gary, list, with your indulgence for my very bad English, In the dated text 1903 (CP 2.254 - 2.263) Peirce uses exactly 15 times the term "replica" , 9 times in the only one 2.261. The first appearance is in 2.258, the iconic legisign ; consequently all 15 "replicas" appear exclusively in the classes which are legisigns or symbols ; but all the symbols are necessarily legisigns and we can say that replicas are consubstantially related with the legisigns . The nature of the relationship is specifed immediately in 2.258 : " Being a Legisign, its mode of being is that of governing single Replicas, each of which will be an Iconic Sinsign of a peculiar kind". As a result we have that the mode of being of the replicas is to be governed by the legisigns ; and we must remember that they are sinsigns "of a peculiar kind" which means that all the sinsigns are not replicas. This is very important ; I explain the reasons further. Previously I examine the others appearances. Within 2.259 and 2.260 it's exactly the same with again the "peculiar kind". Examining 2.261(the rhematic symbol) with its 9 appearances, we have the guess of the riddle in the first sentence: "A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [e.g., a common noun] is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept." Clearly since a symbol is necessarily a legisign the relationship is again the same BUT here Peirce says that these replica (eg a common noun) is an instance of a concept. When I write the word "freedom", I write one instance of the concept which produces the idea of freedom in the mind of every one which know english and perceive the graphism. It's the same that to say that the word "freedom" written anywhere of any way is a member of the extension of the concept, himself regarded as an intension. Frege says that the noun written "fall" under the concept; Clearly a replica is an instance and personally I always considered this an obvious fact. Continuing with 2.261 there is nothing new except that Peirce "cascades" the assertions concerning the classes of signs described previously. And he specify everytime "peculiar kind", thus showing that all the set of the sinsigns is cut out in instances of various kinds according to the legisigns which governs them. 2.262 and 2.263 only consolidate my conclusions. There is a simple manner of considerer this question by using the lattice of the classes of signs ; it's one true diagrammatisation of the Peirce's text. I develop this point of view in an article to appear.
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