Robert, List:
My apologies to all for the accidental post when I first started drafting
this reply. I was doing some reformatting and clicked on the "Send" button
by mistake.
I agree that Peirce used "replica" only for Legisigns in his 1903 taxonomy,
such that his classification at that time included Sinsigns that were
*not *Replicas
of Legisigns. However, I remain unable to identify any clear-cut cases of
such Sinsigns. Nevertheless, the quote from CP 2.261 merits careful
consideration.
CSP: A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [e.g., a common noun] is a sign
connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way
that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to
certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general
concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an
instance of that concept.
How might we restate this in accordance with Peirce's later terminology of
multiple Objects and Interpretants? Perhaps it will be more
straightforward to analyze your example instead.
RM: When I write the word "freedom", I write one instance of the concept
...
According to the quote, you write a *Replica*, which is interpreted as a *Sign
*of "an instance of that concept," which is its *Object*. More
specifically, I suggest (tentatively) that this is the individual
*Dynamic *Object--the
instance of the concept that you, as the Utterer, have in mind upon writing
the Replica--while the concept itself, as the collection or continuum of
all such instances, is the *General* Object.
RM: ... which produces the idea of freedom in the mind of every one which
know english and perceive the graphism.
I suggest (more confidently) that this is the Immediate Interpretant, and
that anything of which "freedom" could be correctly predicated by someone
possessing only knowledge of written English and its definitions--i.e.,
Sign System Acquaintance, but no Collateral Experience--is a constituent of
the Immediate Object. The Dynamic Interpretant is the *actual *idea ("a
general concept") that the event of *reading* the word "freedom"--an *Instance
*of the Sign--produces in the mind of any *one *person, in accordance with
his/her (fallible) Interpretative Habits ("certain habits or dispositions
of that mind").
RM: Clearly a replica is an instance and personally I always considered
this an obvious fact.
It is *not *obvious to me that the two terms are equivalent. I would say
instead that the Replica is the enduring arrangement of ink on a page or
pixels on a screen, while the Instance is the occurrence that determines a
single interpreting Quasi-mind to a single Dynamic Interpretant. If we
project the word "freedom" on a wall where 100 different people read it,
there is only one Replica *initially*, but 100 Instances, resulting
*subsequently
*in 100 *additional *Replicas as the Dynamic Interpretants in the people's
minds.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 12:10 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
> List,
>
> Robert Marty addressed this post to me and to the list, but apparently
> didn’t send it to the list address, so I’m forwarding it here. It contains
> some important comments on Peirce’s use of the term “replica.” Thank you,
> Robert!
>
> Gary f.
>
> *From:* marty.rob...@neuf.fr <marty.rob...@neuf.fr>
>
> *Sent:* 20-Sep-18 09:28
>
> Gary, list, with your indulgence for my very bad English,
>
> In the dated text 1903 (CP 2.254 - 2.263) Peirce uses exactly 15 times the
> term "replica" , 9 times in the only one 2.261. The first appearance is in
> 2.258, the iconic legisign ; consequently all 15 "replicas" appear
> exclusively in the classes which are legisigns or symbols ; but all the
> symbols are necessarily legisigns and we can say that replicas are
> consubstantially related with the legisigns .
>
> The nature of the relationship is specifed immediately in 2.258 : "* Being a
> Legisign, its mode of being is that of governing single **Replicas**, each of
> which will be an Iconic Sinsign of a peculiar kind"*. As a result we have
> that the mode of being of the *replicas* is to be governed by the legisigns ;
> and we must remember that they are sinsigns "*of a peculiar kind"* which
> means that all the sinsigns are not replicas. This is very important ; I
> explain the reasons further.
>
> Previously I examine the others appearances. Within 2.259 and 2.260 it's
> exactly the same with again t*he "peculiar kind"*. Examining 2.261(the
> rhematic symbol) with its 9 appearances, we have the guess of the riddle in
> the first sentence: *"A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [**e.g., **a common
> noun] is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas
> in such a way that its **Replica** calls up an image in the mind which image,
> owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a
> general concept, and the **Replica** is interpreted as a Sign of an Object
> that is an instance of that concept." C*learly since a symbol is necessarily
> a legisign the relationship is again the same BUT here Peirce says that these
> replica (eg a common noun) is an instance of a concept. When I write the word
> "freedom", I write one instance of the concept which produces the idea of
> freedom in the mind of every one which know english and perceive the
> graphism. It's the same that to say that the word "freedom" written anywhere
> of any way is a member of the extension of the concept, himself regarded as
> an intension. Frege says that the noun written "fall" under the concept;
> Clearly a replica is an instance and personally I always considered this an
> obvious fact.
>
> Continuing with 2.261 there is nothing new except that Peirce "cascades" the
> assertions concerning the classes of signs described previously. And he
> specify everytime *"peculiar kind*", thus showing that all the set of the
> sinsigns is cut out in instances of various kinds according to the legisigns
> which governs them.
>
> 2.262 and 2.263 only consolidate my conclusions.
>
> There is a simple manner of considerer this question by using the lattice of
> the classes of signs ; it's one true diagrammatisation of the Peirce's text.
> I develop this point of view in an article to appear.
>
>
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