Mats, Jeff, List: Thank you for this clarification. I am sure that we would all welcome and benefit from more frequent participation in our List discussions by scholars such as yourself, Francesco, and Robert.
Peirce's comment about Immediate vs. Real Objects makes sense, because every Sign must at least *purport *to represent something in order to be a Sign at all. The non-Reality of the Dynamic (or General?) Objects of some Signs would be known in the ultimate opinion, presumably as part of their Final Interpretants. Such terms as "unicorn" and "phoenix" have Essential Breadth and Depth in accordance with their definitions, but no Substantial Breadth or Depth since there are no Real Objects that they denote or concrete Forms that they signify; just whatever is attributed to them by their fictional representations. As for the Interpretants, although Peirce did seem to equate Immediate and Emotional in the second quote, he also said that "a piece of concerted music" *only *has an Emotional Interpretant. He wrote more about the same example at roughly the same time, in two different drafts of "Pragmatism." CSP: The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight. This "emotional interpretant," as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings. (CP 5.475; 1907) CSP: It is easy to see that there are three kinds of interpretants of signs. Our categories suggest this; and we have only to run over in our minds a sufficient variety of remembered signs, with a slight examination of each, to gain ample confirmation of the division. Namely, the interpretant may be a feeling. Thus, an air for a guitar, if considered as meant to convey the genuine or feigned musical emotions of its composer, can only fulfill this function by exciting responsive feelings in the listener. (EP 2:430; 1907) I suggest that the mere "feeling of recognition" associated with *any *Replica of a Sign pertains to its *Immediate* Interpretant, its *possible *signification within the Sign System to which it belongs and with which the Interpreter must be acquainted; while the "series of feelings" *beyond *this that a musical performance "produces" as its "proper significate effect" is its *Dynamic *Interpretant, its *actual *signification to someone in a particular Instance of it. The Final Interpretant is then the set of "responsive feelings" that the piece *would *excite in an *ideal *Interpreter, which might come about by hearing it performed, playing it oneself, or reading the score and imagining how it *should *sound--three very *different *Replicas and corresponding Instances of the *same *Sign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 5:22 AM, MB <[email protected]> wrote: > Jeff & list, > > > > I happened to stumble across this when I checked the Peirce-list, which I > do intermittently although I do not generally participate in the > discussions. The “letter to Giovanni Vailati” was an embarrassing slip on > my part, which has not been corrected although I have requested the NDPR to > do so. The 1907 letter (MS L327) was addressed to Giovanni Papini, not > Giovanni Vailati. > > > > In the letter, Peirce states that just “as all signs necessarily have > Immediate Objects, but not all have Real Objects, so every sign has an > emotional interpretant; but a piece of concerted music, for example, has no > other”. He also asserts that “logicians distinguish the Immediate Object of > a sign from its Real Object. I look for an analogous distinction as to the > Interpretant; but I find there are not two, but three Interpretants; > namely, 1st, the immediate, or as I call it, the emotional interpretant, > involving (at least) in every case a sense of comprehending the sign, as > something familiar in some sense; 2nd, the Existential Interpretant, or the > actual events which the sign, as sign, may bring about, by however indirect > a process; and 3rd, the Logical Interpretant, which is imperfectly > represented in the definition of the sign.” This is of interest because of > the claim that “emotional interpretant” and “immediate interpretant” are > practically synonyms as well as the evident limitation to three > interpretants. I cannot recall another passage where Peirce would put > matters in exactly these terms. It is of course always difficult to say how > much weight one should place on a single letter; but in recent discussions > concerning semiotic matters, much has also been made of provisional remarks > and classifications found in Peirce’s notebooks. > > > > All best, > > Mats > > > > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 26 September 2018 20:13 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign > classification > > List, > > Mats Bergman has written a review of Franceco's monograph. Here is a link > in case you are interested: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/peir > ces-speculative-grammar-logic-as-semiotics/ > > Towards the end of the review, Bergman makes the following points: > > The final developments of speculative grammar (discussed in chapter eight) > constitute a colossal challenge for the interpreter. Peirce's semiotic > grows rapidly, but these changes emerge mainly in unfinished manuscripts, > experimental notebook entries, and fragmentary correspondence. Many > scholars have become captivated by this potentially fertile but problematic > phase -- and especially by the 66-class system that Peirce envisioned. In > these notoriously perilous terrains, Bellucci adopts a cautious stance, > stating that he is "not concerned with finishing what Peirce left > unfinished" (p. 352). This seems like a sensible approach, but it is not > always easy to sustain. As he documents minute changes in ideas and > terminology, Bellucci faces the challenges involved in trying to put > together a puzzle with many mismatched and missing pieces, and he ends up > streamlining certain aspects of Peirce's semiotic. To some extent, this is > inevitable; but there are instances where I believe that Bellucci does not > sufficiently consider contradictory evidence. For example, he confidently > asserts that only propositions and proposition-like signs have so-called > "immediate objects" (p. 294) -- that is, objects that are in some sense > internal to the representation afforded by the sign, in distinction from > the "dynamical" aspect of the object. This contention is backed up by > Peirce's tentative suggestion that signs can be classified as vague, > singular, and general according to the mode of the immediate object -- a > partition that bears more than passing resemblance to the traditional > division of propositions according to quantity. However, the existence of > such a lineage does not suffice to prove that Peirce would hold that terms > or "rhemas" lack immediate objects. Whatever analytical merits Bellucci's > reconstruction may possess, it is dubious from a strictly exegetical point > of view. When Peirce directly addresses the matter at hand -- e.g. in a > 1907 letter to Giovanni Vailati -- his position is that all signs > necessarily have immediate objects, while some lack real dynamical objects. > > I'm not able to find the 1907 letter of Vailati online or in > other sources. If anyone has a link or a copy they would be willing to > share, I'd appreciate it. > > For my part, I find the question of how we might interpret what Peirce > says about the immediate object to be of interest because of the light it > might help to shed on the division between possibles, existents and > necessitants that is guiding the classification of signs in the later works. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >
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