List, Just a reminder, for those of you who read French, of the existence of the following book by Robert Marty: L'Algèbre des signes: Essai de sémiotique scientifique d'après C.S. Peirce. John Benjamins, 1990 – giving a mathematical approach to Peirce’s theory of signs. Apparently Amazon has one copy left “with more on the way”: https://www.amazon.com/LAlg%C3%A8bre-signes-s%C3%A9miotique-scientifique-Foundations/dp/9027232962/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1538140635&sr=1-1&keywords=Robert+Marty+alg%C3%A8bre&dpID=41Wh2gVYRDL&preST=_SY291_BO1,204,203,200_QL40_&dpSrc=srch Disclaimer: I have no financial ties to Amazon – but I have worked with Robert!! James Crombie Philosophie/Sciences humaines Université Sainte-Anne, Canada
De : [email protected] <[email protected]> Envoyé : 28 septembre 2018 10:08 À : Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>; List <[email protected]> Objet : Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification Jon Alan, list, To come back to the classification of the signs, I would like to point out that whatever the terms used to designate the components of the sign, whatever their number, we will ultimately obtain a sequence of indexed letters: one or two objects of first, following the sign and interpretants (1 at least then 3 up to 7). Consequently, it is of little importance that definitions and Byzantine discussions can be made about them (they have lasted for decades and are recurrent). Consequently, it is of little importance that Byzantine definitions and discussions can be made about them (they have lasted for decades and are recurrent). Whatever the number of objects and interpretations selected there will be according to successive determinations and categorial assignments. That these are "modes of being" or "mode of apprehension" or "nature" or "purpose", they will be numbers 3 or 2 or 1 with the rules of logical presupposition that we know. Moreover, we can be absolutely certain that this was in the mind of Peirce, otherwise he could never have mentioned the 28 classes for the 6 trichotomies or the 66 classes for the 10. There is no other ways to get them. I think that we cannot go beyond if we want to produce a scientific knowledge and which only the actual use for the concrete understanding of the meanings and the communication in social life has to allow the scientific community to choose. That's why I like this quote : "The result of this rule will necessarily be that the new concept of a "sign" will be defined exclusively by the forms of its logical relationships; and the utmost pains must be taken to understant those relations in a purely formal, or, as we may say, in a purely mathematical way." C.S. PEIRCE, MS 283 (v.1905) Best regards, Robert Marty De : "Jon Alan Schmidt" A : [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Envoyé: jeudi 27 septembre 2018 20:46 Objet : ***SPAM*** Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification Mats, Jeff, List: Thank you for this clarification. I am sure that we would all welcome and benefit from more frequent participation in our List discussions by scholars such as yourself, Francesco, and Robert. Peirce's comment about Immediate vs. Real Objects makes sense, because every Sign must at least purport to represent something in order to be a Sign at all. The non-Reality of the Dynamic (or General?) Objects of some Signs would be known in the ultimate opinion, presumably as part of their Final Interpretants. Such terms as "unicorn" and "phoenix" have Essential Breadth and Depth in accordance with their definitions, but no Substantial Breadth or Depth since there are no Real Objects that they denote or concrete Forms that they signify; just whatever is attributed to them by their fictional representations. As for the Interpretants, although Peirce did seem to equate Immediate and Emotional in the second quote, he also said that "a piece of concerted music" only has an Emotional Interpretant. He wrote more about the same example at roughly the same time, in two different drafts of "Pragmatism." CSP: The first proper significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight. This "emotional interpretant," as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings. (CP 5.475; 1907) CSP: It is easy to see that there are three kinds of interpretants of signs. Our categories suggest this; and we have only to run over in our minds a sufficient variety of remembered signs, with a slight examination of each, to gain ample confirmation of the division. Namely, the interpretant may be a feeling. Thus, an air for a guitar, if considered as meant to convey the genuine or feigned musical emotions of its composer, can only fulfill this function by exciting responsive feelings in the listener. (EP 2:430; 1907) I suggest that the mere "feeling of recognition" associated with any Replica of a Sign pertains to its Immediate Interpretant, its possible signification within the Sign System to which it belongs and with which the Interpreter must be acquainted; while the "series of feelings" beyond this that a musical performance "produces" as its "proper significate effect" is its Dynamic Interpretant, its actual signification to someone in a particular Instance of it. The Final Interpretant is then the set of "responsive feelings" that the piece would excite in an ideal Interpreter, which might come about by hearing it performed, playing it oneself, or reading the score and imagining how it should sound--three very different Replicas and corresponding Instances of the same Sign. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Thu, Sep 27, 2018 at 5:22 AM, MB <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jeff & list, I happened to stumble across this when I checked the Peirce-list, which I do intermittently although I do not generally participate in the discussions. The “letter to Giovanni Vailati” was an embarrassing slip on my part, which has not been corrected although I have requested the NDPR to do so. The 1907 letter (MS L327) was addressed to Giovanni Papini, not Giovanni Vailati. In the letter, Peirce states that just “as all signs necessarily have Immediate Objects, but not all have Real Objects, so every sign has an emotional interpretant; but a piece of concerted music, for example, has no other”. He also asserts that “logicians distinguish the Immediate Object of a sign from its Real Object. I look for an analogous distinction as to the Interpretant; but I find there are not two, but three Interpretants; namely, 1st, the immediate, or as I call it, the emotional interpretant, involving (at least) in every case a sense of comprehending the sign, as something familiar in some sense; 2nd, the Existential Interpretant, or the actual events which the sign, as sign, may bring about, by however indirect a process; and 3rd, the Logical Interpretant, which is imperfectly represented in the definition of the sign.” This is of interest because of the claim that “emotional interpretant” and “immediate interpretant” are practically synonyms as well as the evident limitation to three interpretants. I cannot recall another passage where Peirce would put matters in exactly these terms. It is of course always difficult to say how much weight one should place on a single letter; but in recent discussions concerning semiotic matters, much has also been made of provisional remarks and classifications found in Peirce’s notebooks. All best, Mats From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: 26 September 2018 20:13 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terminology of Peirce's final sign classification List, Mats Bergman has written a review of Franceco's monograph. Here is a link in case you are interested: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/peirces-speculative-grammar-logic-as-semiotics/ Towards the end of the review, Bergman makes the following points: The final developments of speculative grammar (discussed in chapter eight) constitute a colossal challenge for the interpreter. Peirce's semiotic grows rapidly, but these changes emerge mainly in unfinished manuscripts, experimental notebook entries, and fragmentary correspondence. Many scholars have become captivated by this potentially fertile but problematic phase -- and especially by the 66-class system that Peirce envisioned. In these notoriously perilous terrains, Bellucci adopts a cautious stance, stating that he is "not concerned with finishing what Peirce left unfinished" (p. 352). This seems like a sensible approach, but it is not always easy to sustain. As he documents minute changes in ideas and terminology, Bellucci faces the challenges involved in trying to put together a puzzle with many mismatched and missing pieces, and he ends up streamlining certain aspects of Peirce's semiotic. To some extent, this is inevitable; but there are instances where I believe that Bellucci does not sufficiently consider contradictory evidence. For example, he confidently asserts that only propositions and proposition-like signs have so-called "immediate objects" (p. 294) -- that is, objects that are in some sense internal to the representation afforded by the sign, in distinction from the "dynamical" aspect of the object. This contention is backed up by Peirce's tentative suggestion that signs can be classified as vague, singular, and general according to the mode of the immediate object -- a partition that bears more than passing resemblance to the traditional division of propositions according to quantity. However, the existence of such a lineage does not suffice to prove that Peirce would hold that terms or "rhemas" lack immediate objects. Whatever analytical merits Bellucci's reconstruction may possess, it is dubious from a strictly exegetical point of view. When Peirce directly addresses the matter at hand -- e.g. in a 1907 letter to Giovanni Vailati -- his position is that all signs necessarily have immediate objects, while some lack real dynamical objects. I'm not able to find the 1907 letter of Vailati online or in other sources. If anyone has a link or a copy they would be willing to share, I'd appreciate it. For my part, I find the question of how we might interpret what Peirce says about the immediate object to be of interest because of the light it might help to shed on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants that is guiding the classification of signs in the later works. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . 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