Gary R., List: Your concern about Peirce's neologisms, which John Sowa has also expressed in the past, is understandable. If we were *only *discussing Symbols, the more venerable and familiar terminology would definitely be appropriate. However, we are discussing *all *Signs, including Icons and Indices, which are technically excluded from term/proposition/argument; so I will continue to prefer Seme/Pheme/Delome accordingly, as more general. Again, Argument *could *be substituted for Delome, since all Delomes are Symbols; but I worry that its specific association with human reasoning could hinder or obscure broader potential applications that I wish to preserve.
Thanks, Jon S. On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 2:53 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Jerry C., list, > > Jon wrote: > > > My only quibble with your remarks is that I do not believe that Peirce > would have limited term/proposition/argument to discussions involving > Instances/Tokens; they are simply *alternative names for > Seme/Pheme/Delome when those Signs are Symbols**." *[emphasis added] > > > Looking again at the quotations which Jerry offered, I'd say that seems > quite right, and I stand corrected. > > But I would now question the need for additional Peircean neologisms > (there are already so many) when the same point could be made without > employing these *alternative* terms in any discussion in which one might > be discussing signs which are symbols. While I imagine that the language of > seme/pheme/delome, while it is clearly useful in some of the theoretical > matters you've been tackling, it might prove to be an obstacle to many, > especially students and Peirce novices. To say it another way, for most > purposes term/proposition/argument would seem sufficient. But maybe I'm > missing something here. > > Best, > > Gary > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690* > > On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 3:21 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> My only quibble with your remarks is that I do not believe that Peirce >> would have limited term/proposition/argument to discussions involving >> Instances/Tokens; they are simply alternative names for Seme/Pheme/Delome >> when those Signs are Symbols. In my example below, I could have freely >> substituted the former for the latter, but in this context I prefer the >> more general (and less familiar) alternatives. As Peirce recognized and >> Jerry C. acknowledged, argument and Delome are effectively synonymous, >> since all Delomes are Symbols; but a Seme can also be an Icon or an >> Index, and a Pheme can also be an Index. >> >> As I noted previously, just as there are two different senses of the >> word "word" (CP 4.537; 1906), there are two different senses of the word >> "sign"--and the same is true of the words "term," "proposition," and >> "argument"; as well as the words "Seme," "Pheme," and "Delome." My >> concern remains to distinguish carefully between Signs as continuous >> Types and their Instances as discrete Tokens--even though Peirce often >> referred to the latter as "signs," and we routinely do likewise. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 10:54 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Jerry C, list. >>> >>> I think that the continuing and, perhaps, principal communicational >>> problem here--which perhaps *will* need more explication--may be >>> connected to the notion that* a sign is not a real thing* (you've >>> previously discussed this at some length on the list, and it is clearly >>> Peirce's view, unless one chooses to ignore what he explicitly argued). In >>> this context Peirce mean that a sign is not an actual/existential thing), >>> that it *exists *only in instances/tokens. It's *reality* is other than >>> that. It is, for semiosis, rather, a *virtual reality*, not an *actual >>> existential thing* (its instantiations, on the other hand, *are* >>> *actual, *existential, hic et nunc, etc.) The word 'rose' is *not* a >>> rose but merely stands for the reality which is *some* rose, perhaps >>> even *all* roses. >>> >>> As soon as *that* is understood and accepted (which *may* be somewhat >>> easier to do in anthroposemiotic than in biosemiotic, while it ought to >>> apply to semiosis in any sphere), then confusion in this matter ought to >>> begin to clear up. If that were to happen, your imaginary geometrical >>> diagram of seme/pheme/delome, including the idea that "any isolated >>> Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete point where those >>> lines intersect," would seem completely logical. So it does now to me. >>> >>> Although I've had some difficulty following your logic in this matter >>> even recently, I now see that the language of seme/pheme/delome pertains to >>> discussions of the sign as such, while term/proposition/argument ought be >>> limited to discussions involving instances/tokens. >>> >>> If I'm mistaken in any of this, Jon, I'm certain you'll soon correct me. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>> *718 482-5690* >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 7:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Jerry C., List: >>>> >>>> JLRC: Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric >>>> terms, point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic >>>> conclusions? >>>> >>>> >>>> The subject matter here is broadly semiotic, rather than narrowly >>>> linguistic. Immediately after the statement of mine that prompted this >>>> request, I noted that a point is discrete rather than continuous, and then >>>> suggested accordingly the alternative of conceiving a Seme as a line, a >>>> Pheme as a plane, and a Delome as a space. In doing so, I was proposing an >>>> imaginative *diagram *representing the significant *relations *among >>>> each of these kinds of Signs as *Types*--at least two Semes are >>>> connected by a continuous predicate in a Pheme, and at least three Semes >>>> and three Phemes are connected by a logical leading principle in a Delome. >>>> Points are then discrete *Instances *(Tokens) of Signs--anywhere on >>>> the line for a Seme, at the intersection of Seme lines in the plane for a >>>> Pheme, and at the intersection of Seme lines and Pheme planes in the space >>>> for a Delome. >>>> >>>> As an example, consider the familiar Delome, "Every man is mortal; >>>> Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." In accordance with a >>>> logical leading principle, this Delome connects three Phemes--"every man is >>>> mortal," "Socrates is a man," and "Socrates is mortal." In accordance with >>>> a continuous predicate, each of those Phemes connects two of three >>>> Semes--"man," "mortal," and "Socrates." As a Sign (Type), each of these >>>> Semes is analogous to a continuous line, and any isolated Instance (Token) >>>> of each is analogous to a discrete point that we arbitrarily mark on the >>>> corresponding line. As a Sign (Type), each of the Phemes is analogous to a >>>> continuous plane defined by the two lines for the Semes that it involves, >>>> and any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete >>>> point where those lines intersect. As a Sign (Type), the Delome is >>>> analogous to a continuous space defined by the three planes for the Phemes >>>> that it involves and the three lines for the Semes that they involve, and >>>> any isolated Instance (Token) of it is analogous to the discrete point >>>> where those planes and lines intersect. >>>> >>>> Is that any more perspicuous? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 6:05 PM Jerry LR Chandler < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> List, Jon: >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 19, 2019, at 8:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> This initially suggests a Seme as a point, a Pheme as a line defined >>>>> by two points, and a Delome as a plane defined by three points that also >>>>> define three lines. >>>>> >>>>> It is of interest recall the CSP definitions of the terms Seme, Pheme, >>>>> and Delome. >>>>> From the Commens dictionary: >>>>> >>>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>>> >>>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>>> widened. By a *Seme*, I shall mean anything which serves for any >>>>> purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a >>>>> representative or Sign. The logical Term, which is a class-name, is a >>>>> Seme. Thus, the term “The mortality of man” is a Seme. >>>>> >>>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>>> >>>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>>> widened. [—] By a *Pheme* I mean a Sign which is equivalent to a >>>>> grammatical sentence, whether it be Interrogative, Imperative, or >>>>> Assertory. In any case, such a Sign is intended to have some sort of >>>>> compulsive effect on the Interpreter of it. >>>>> >>>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>>> >>>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>>> widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes use the word >>>>> Delome […], though *Argument* would answer well enough. It is a Sign >>>>> which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own >>>>> self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if >>>>> to induce this change in the Interpreter. >>>>> >>>>> From the Commens dictionary definitions, the challenge appears to be >>>>> to widen the meaning of the words, “term” and “proposition” and >>>>> concomitantly, assign a new word, Delome, as a synonym for argument. >>>>> >>>>> A principle constraint of meaning of these terms, as well as his >>>>> previously introduced terms, Rhema, and Dicisign, is to form a conclusion >>>>> from the argument. >>>>> >>>>> At first glance, one might consider the notions of point, line and >>>>> plane as predicates in the sense first order logic, but this is a very >>>>> thin >>>>> linkage. >>>>> >>>>> Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric terms, >>>>> point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic >>>>> conclusions? >>>>> >>>>> Cheers >>>>> Jerry >>>>> >>>>
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