Dear list,
‘A hypostatized attribute is one which is itself regarded as the subject of attribution or characters; and a hypostatized relation is one treated as having relations to other relations.’ For instance, ‘If we can hypostatize the community, and treat it as an individual with magnified but human wants and satisfactions..’ that is, “given any individual there exists a class having that individual as its only member”, ‘then, for this leviathan, the ethical end will correspond to what is called Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism.’ Alternatively, ‘then for this community of inquirers, the ethical end will correspond to what is called Pragmaticism or growth of concrete reasonableness.’ So, as I see it, the continuity for the community is a possibility that may or may not be like the operation of destiny. It is destined to be an asymptote to which is approached up there with the community of inquirers and not down there with this leviathan. This is a possibility that is up there and not down there. I believe that makes an actual difference, but of course, we’re free to choose what we believe. Best, Jerry R On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 3:28 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Helmut, list, > > Please explain why you define continuity as possibility. > > As for the Final Interpretent, it is not some actual act, but how "every > mind would act." "No event that occurs to any mind, no action of any mind > can constitute the truth of that conditional proposition." > > The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind does > act but in the way in which every mind would act. That is, it consists in > a truth which might be expressed in a conditional proposition of this type: > “If so and so were to happen to any mind this sign would determine that > mind to such and such *conduct*.” By “conduct” I mean *action* under an > intention of self-control. No event that occurs to any mind, no action of > any mind can constitute the truth of that conditional proposition (Letter > to William James, 1909; CP 8.315). > > > As for 'actuality' in this matter, the movement towards a Final > Interpretent is but asymptotic; it is never actually arrived at. It is > "that toward which the actual tends," and that is all. > > > My Final Interpretant is […] the effect the Sign *would* produce upon any > mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full > effect. [—] …the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to > which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently > considered. [—] The Final Interpretant is that toward which the > actual tends (Letter to Lady Welby; 1909; SS 110-1) (Both quotes in > Commens Dictionary). > > > Best, > > > Gary R > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > *718 482-5690* > > > On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 3:56 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary, list, >> if semiosis was continuous with continuity defined as possibility, like >> interpolability of events due to their embeddedness in continuous time, it >> (semiosis) neither would be continuous in every theoretical aspect, >> otherwise it would not contain final interpretants, or how could finality >> and continuity be not a contradiction. >> Helmut >> 14. Januar 2019 um 20:32 Uhr >> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" <[email protected]> >> >> Jeff, list, >> >> For me this has been a valuable discussion, but at the moment I haven't >> much more to offer to it than what has already been said (unless, of >> course, the matter is take up in terms of the four stages of Peirce's >> thinking about continuity which Potter and Shields analyze). Meanwhile, I >> hope that there may be some value in posting this message which I began a >> few days ago, if only to emphasize a few pertinent points (at least for me) >> which have been made in the last few days. >> >> Again, I like the idea of your basing a discussion of continuity as it >> pertains to semiosis on (a) the Peirce quotation (CP 1.339) in >> consideration of "endless series" and (b) the Potter/Shields article which >> imo is excellent in several respects including its succinctness and it's >> outlining four periods of Peirce's thinking about continuity (which they >> refer as 1) the pre-Cantorian, 2) the Cantorian, 3) the Kantistic, and 4), >> the post-Cantorian periods). >> >> While Potter and Shields place both the CP 1.339 and the 1898 lectures in >> Peirce's penultimate period (from ca. 1895 to 1907) of his thinking about >> continua, it seems potentially useful to look at this somewhat earlier work >> in the light of that final period (1908 to his death) in considering >> semiosis and continuity. >> >> You extracted these "three different sorts of endless series" from CP >> 1.339. >> >> >> 1) "an endless series of representations, each representing the one >> behind it." >> >> 2) "The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. >> In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as >> stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely >> stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So >> there is an infinite regression here." >> >> 3) "Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which >> the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its >> interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series." >> >> >> >> And ask: >> >> >> >> JD: How might we use Peirce's later mathematical conception of >> continuity--as is clarified in the essay by Potter and Shields--for the >> sake of explaining what is endless in each of three cases? My assumption is >> that some of these endless series are infinite in a manner that involves >> real continuity. As such, getting clearer on the endless character of each >> sort of series might help us understand the kind of continuity that is >> involved in each of these three cases. >> >> >> >> Grading them in order of difficulty, I would say that the endless series >> that goes back in time to earlier interpretations is probably the easiest >> of the three. The case that involves future possible interpretations seems >> harder. The case that involves the diaphanous character of what one has >> after removing the "irrelevant clothing from a given" representation seems >> most puzzling--at least to me. Perhaps we should work on them one at a >> time--starting with the easiest case. >> >> >> Again, I think this might prove to be a valuable and quasi-systematic >> approach to continuing the discussion of the topic, in light of both the >> Cantorian and the Post-Cantorian periods (and one can see that there is >> lots of Cantor in even the 3rd, the Kantistic, period. But for now, >> returning to a quotation from that 4th and last period of Peirce's >> thinking, he wrote: >> >> >> I begin by defining these thus: The *material parts* of a thing or other >> object, *W*, that is composed of such parts, are whatever things are, >> firstly, each and every one of them, other than *W*; secondly are all of >> some one internal nature (for example, are all places, or all spatial >> realities, or all spiritual realities, or are all ideas, or are all >> characters, or are all relations, or are all external representations, >> etc.); thirdly, form together a collection of objects in which no one >> occurs twice over and, fourthly, are such that the Being of each of them >> together with the modes of connexion between all subcollections of them, >> constitute the being of *W*. >> >> >> In a recent response to JS you commented: >> >> >> JD: It looks to me like the semiotic processes involved in cognition that >> Peirce describes. . . have material parts, and those parts consist of >> an infinite series of inductive and abductive inferences. In turn, the >> inferences have material parts, and those parts consist of the propositions >> that function as premisses and conclusions. In turn, the propositions have >> material parts, and those parts consist of the terms that function as >> subjects and predicates. >> >> >> >> Let us ask: do the propositions that serve as premisses and conclusions >> of inferences have material parts (i.e., the terms) in the same sense in >> which the inferences have parts (i.e., the propositions)? The answer, I >> think, is "yes". >> >> >> I do too. And I find it particularly relevant that the "material parts" >> which Peirce refers to "consist of an infinite series of inductive and >> abductive inferences." At first I was a bit surprised to see him include >> *abductive* inferences as these have been considered by some scholars as >> perhaps breaks in continuity, categorially closer to 1ns than to 3ns, but >> upon reflection it now makes perfect sense to me. >> >> I have found the list discussion both interesting and valuable, and I'd >> like to thank Jon AS for starting it. While some questions remain to be >> further explored--for example, Gary f's question as to whether semiosis is >> continuous *because* it occurs in time, and while John S's >> terminological concerns seem valid enough, it would appear that all (or, >> perhaps, most all) the participants in this list discussion are in >> agreement to some extent (Gf also suggested some restrictions on the >> extent) and in some ways, that semiosis is continuous. Or am I mistaken in >> that assumption? >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *718 482-5690* >> >> >> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 6:14 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Gary R, Jon S, Helmut, List, >>> >>> >>> >>> As Peirce points out in the last lecture in Reasoning and the Logic of >>> Things, clarifying the mathematical conception of continuity is quite >>> difficult. Putting that mathematical conception to work for the sake of >>> clarifying a philosophical conception of continuity is significantly more >>> difficult. >>> >>> >>> >>> Having re-read the really nice article by Potter and Shields on the >>> development of Peirce's understanding of the mathematical conception, I'd >>> like to put some of those ideas to work for the sake of addressing a >>> philosophical question. Let's focus on some questions that surface in the >>> semiotic theory about the "endless" character of the process of semiosis. >>> Here is a passage where Peirce seems to characterize different ways in >>> which the process is endless. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The easiest of those which are of philosophical interest is the idea of a >>> sign, >>> or representation. A sign stands *for *something *to *the idea which it >>> produces, or modifies. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind >>> something from without. That for which it stands is called its *object; >>> *that which it conveys, its *meaning; *and the idea to which it gives >>> rise, its *interpretant. *The object of representation can be nothing >>> but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant. >>> But an endless series of representations, each representing the one >>> behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. >>> The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In >>> fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped >>> of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped >>> off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an >>> infinite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but >>> another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and >>> as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite >>> series. (1.339) >>> >>> >>> >>> If my memory serves me right, this passage is from an unpublished >>> manuscript written a little before "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to >>> develop my categories from within" (1896). As such, I am trying to >>> interpret what he is saying in light of his account of the role of >>> geniune triadic relations in the growth of the meaning of signs. >>> >>> >>> >>> As far as I can tell, there appear to be three different sorts of >>> endless series that are being described: >>> >>> >>> >>> 1) "an endless series of representations, each representing the one >>> behind it." >>> >>> 2) "The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a >>> representation. In fact, it is nothing but the representation itself >>> conceived >>> as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be >>> completely stripped off; it is only changed for something more >>> diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here." >>> >>> 3) "Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which >>> the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its >>> interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series." >>> >>> >>> >>> How might we use Peirce's later mathematical conception of >>> continuity--as is clarified in the essay by Potter and Shields--for the >>> sake of explaining what is endless in each of three cases? My assumption is >>> that some of these endless series are infinite in a manner that involves >>> real continuity. As such, getting clearer on the endless character of each >>> sort of series might help us understand the kind of continuity that is >>> involved in each of these three cases. >>> >>> >>> >>> Grading them in order of difficulty, I would say that the endless series >>> that goes back in time to earlier interpretations is probably the easiest >>> of the three. The case that involves future possible interpretations seems >>> harder. The case that involves the diaphanous character of what one has >>> after removing the "irrelevant clothing from a given" representation seems >>> most puzzling--at least to me. Perhaps we should work on them one at a >>> time--starting with the easiest case. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> ------------------------------ >>> *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Friday, January 11, 2019 2:14:56 PM >>> *To:* Peirce-L >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Continuity of Semiosis >>> >>> Helmut, list, >>> >>> If you desire to think deeply about Peirce's conception of continuity, >>> Helmut, I can recommend no better book than Fernando Zalamea's *Peirce's >>> Logic of Continuity: A Conceptual and Mathematical Approach*. >>> >>> https://www.amazon.com/Peirces-Logic-Continuity-Conceptual-Mathematical/dp/0983700494 >>> >>> Here's an editor's blurb about it: >>> >>> >>> Peirce’s logic of continuity is explored from a double perspective: (i) >>> Peirce’s original understanding of the continuum, alternative to Cantor’s >>> analytical Real line, (ii) Peirce’s original construction of a topological >>> logic –- the existential graphs -– alternative to the algebraic >>> presentation of propositional and first-order calculi. Peirce’s general >>> architectonics, oriented to back-and-forth hierarchical crossings between >>> the global and the local, is reflected with great care both in the >>> continuum and the existential graphs. >>> >>> >>> Or you could start here with "Peirce's Continuum: A Methodological and >>> Mathematical Approach," in a paper from which the book was developed as I >>> recall Fernando saying. >>> >>> https://uberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Zalamea-Peirces-Continuum.pdf >>> >>> Indeed, as I recall (although I haven't his book in front of me at the >>> moment), the chapters of this paper constitute much of the first part of >>> the full book. On the other hand, both the article and the book are quite >>> 'difficult' as they require considerable advanced mathematical preparation >>> which I, for one, must admit I don't possess. And yet I gained much about >>> continuity from reading Zalamea, hearing him lecture, reviewing his slide >>> shows, etc. For me Zalamea is *the* contemporary master of thinking on >>> mathematical and, in fact, all forms of continuity; so, of course, his >>> thinking goes well beyond Peirce's and into the 20th/21st centuries. >>> >>> >>> A considerably more accessible approach to Peirce's understanding >>> continuity is Kelly Parker's, *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought * >>> >>> https://www.amazon.com/Continuity-Peirces-Vanderbilt-American-Philosophy/dp/0826512968 >>> >>> which, however, doesn't take up the mathematical aspect of continuity in >>> anything approaching the considerable depth that Zalamea does. Parker's >>> book does, however, have the virtue of emphasizing continuity as a key >>> principle in much of Peirce's mathematical, scientific, >>> logical/semeiotical, and philosophical work. >>> >>> Turning to source material, Peirce's Cambridge Conference Lectures >>> (1898), published as *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* (with an >>> excellent introduction by Hillary Putnam and Ken Ketner) >>> https://www.jstor.org/stable/3885818?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents >>> offers, especially in the last two lectures, as clear, exciting and >>> valuable an introduction to Peirce's thought on continuity as you'll find >>> in his work imo. >>> >>> There are others on this list, such as Gary Fuhrman, who in his book, >>> *Turning >>> Signs* http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm >>> takes up Peirce's continuity in various contexts. See, for example: >>> https://www.jstor.org/stable/3885818?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents >>> >>> John Sowa has also discussed Peirce's notions of continuity in >>> connection with Existential Graphs, but being no expert on EGs I hesitate >>> to suggest a paper of his for you to read. >>> >>> You might also benefit from reading Vincent Potter and Paul Shields >>> excellent brief article on the various stages of Peirce's thinking on >>> continuity which first appeared as an article in *Transactions of the >>> Charles S. Peirce Society*. >>> http://www.arisbe.com/detached/?p=9969 >>> >>> Perhaps reading some of this material might help clarify Peirce's >>> understanding of continuity for you, especially mathematical continuity. >>> Jerome Havenel's paper, "Clarification of Continuity" is, as I recall >>> (although I haven't read it in a decade), especially helpful as Potter and >>> Shields note in the paper mentioned just above. >>> >>> As for time and continuity, I conclude with a Peirce quotation on that >>> topic from the Potter/Shields paper. >>> >>> >>> In endeavoring to explicate “immediate connection,” I seem driven to >>> introduce the idea of time. Now if my definition involves the notion of >>> immediate connection, and my definition of immediate connection involves >>> the notion of time; and the notion of time involves that of continuity, I >>> am falling into a *circulus in definiendo*. But on analyzing carefully >>> the idea of time, I find that to say it is continuous is just like saying >>> that the atomic weight of oxygen is 16, meaning that that shall be the >>> standard for all other atomic weights. The one asserts no more of time >>> than the other asserts concerning the atomic weight of oxygen; that is, >>> nothing at all (CP 4.642). >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690* >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:30 PM Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Edwina, I was talking about continuity as a travel in a (mathematical, >>>> Kantian, Aristotelean) continuum. I did not introduce it, Jon too wrote >>>> about Zenon. A process may be saltatory or continuous, or both due to the >>>> observed scale. About type and token I dont talk. I dont like the >>>> type-token-distinction, I think it is metaphysical in the bad meaning of >>>> metaphysics. I even think it is platonian, and has to do with Platons >>>> "idea". >>>> >>>> 11. Januar 2019 um 18:04 Uhr >>>> *Von:* "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> >>>> >>>> >>>> Helmut - sorry but I don't get your point. >>>> >>>> We can, I suggest, speak of 'continuity' of 'Type' - where elephants, >>>> regardless of colour, will reproduce as the species of elephant. We can >>>> speak of continuity of colours - where a species can manifest itself in >>>> various colours. This is the continuity of Type, functioning within >>>> Thirdness. >>>> >>>> We can also, I suggest, speak of continuity of 'Process' where Energy, >>>> so to speak, is continuously transforming itself into discrete particular >>>> forms of Matter and - these discrete material/conceptual forms are also >>>> dissipating into Energy and yet again, transforming into discrete >>>> particular forms of Matter. This is the continuity of semiosis where all >>>> three categorical modes function in interactional relations. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri 11/01/19 10:49 AM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, list, >>>> Are we talking about two different meanings of "continuity"? In >>>> semiosis, thirdness provides continuity in the sense that it makes the >>>> semiosis go on, but a semiosis is not continuous in the (mathematical) >>>> sense of continuum, because there may be two signs following each other, in >>>> between whom there is not a third one. Like, if you first imagine a white >>>> elephant, and next a red one, without having imagined a pink one in >>>> between. >>>> Best, Helmut >>>> >>>> 11. Januar 2019 um 15:01 Uhr >>>> "Edwina Taborsky" >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> List >>>> >>>> I don't see the paradox. It's a basic axiom in Peirce that semiosis >>>> is continuous. And also, that matter is discrete and finite. That's why his >>>> three categories are a foundation of his semiosic theory. Thirdness >>>> provides continuity of Type - which is then articulated, continuously, >>>> into the discrete finite Token instantiations of Secondness - and both are >>>> linked to Firstness, which provides a continuous entropic dissipation and >>>> the possibility of differentiation and novelty. I'm not going to provide >>>> quotes since this analysis is found all through his work. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri 11/01/19 7:12 AM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent: >>>> >>>> Gary, Jon, list, >>>> I dont think that space and time are continuous, because in quantum >>>> scale there are steps, e.g. each single graviton providing a certain amount >>>> of acceleration. This is not observable in the scale of our perception, so >>>> our representation of acceleration is one of continuity. But this >>>> representaion is not continuous itself, but a discrete state of >>>> consciousness. Discretenesss of states of consciousness: See Edelman/Tononi >>>> "A Universe of Consciousness", 2000. >>>> An animal with smaller brain, a coot, moves its head foward and back >>>> when swimming, so while it is moving back, the head stands still relatively >>>> to the environment to provide not-blurred picture processing. >>>> I guess that semiosis and mind are not happening like one of them in >>>> the other, but are the same, like mind being a process too. Edelman/Tononi >>>> write that consciousness is a process, so maybe mind is too. But to avoid >>>> Zenions paradoxon to say that a process always is continuous would be >>>> jumping to a conclusion, I think. I guess, there just is some unsolved >>>> question existing about the nature of discrete states or discontinuity. >>>> Best, Helmut >>>> >>>> 10. Januar 2019 um 22:38 Uhr >>>> "Gary Richmond" >>>> wrote: >>>> Jon, list, >>>> >>>> I've been studying your post for the past couple of days and find your >>>> suggestion that, just as time and space are continuous, so is semiosis, >>>> most interesting. I have a slight bit of unease with your substitution of >>>> Peirce's comment that we ought to say that "we are in thought, and not >>>> thoughts are in us" (JAS: "we ought to say that our individual >>>> (Quasi-)minds are in semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual >>>> (Quasi-)minds"). A more exact substitution would be that "our >>>> Quasi-minds are in semiosis and not that semiosis (i.e., the activity of >>>> signs) is in our Quasi-minds." >>>> >>>> Reflecting on this reminded me that Peirce wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further >>>> be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at >>>> least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and >>>> although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they >>>> must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, >>>> welded ( Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism, 1906, CP 4.551). >>>> >>>> >>>> I wonder how Peirce's remark that signs requiring "at least two >>>> Quasi-minds" which "are. . .welded" "in the sign itself, yet must >>>> nevertheless be distinct" (emphasis added) affects your theory. That >>>> is, does this distinction between "Quasi-utterer" and "Quasi-interpreter" >>>> add a problematic element to your suggestions of the continuous character >>>> of semiosis and that of our Quasi-minds being more in semiosis than the >>>> other way around? Perhaps your unpacking the Peirce quotation above would >>>> help me in this matter. >>>> >>>> But further, something vague, which has not yet fully taken form as a >>>> question, has been troubling me as regards your suggestion of semiosic >>>> continuity. It has to do with Peirce's famous dictum that 'symbols grow'. >>>> >>>> Now while it is generally agreed that space is expanding, I'm not sure >>>> that one could same the same of time (except in some vague sense in which >>>> the piling on of innumerable discrete instances might represent some >>>> abstract sort of expansion). But while both are continuous, individually at >>>> least, neither can be said, I think, to be growing. >>>> >>>> On the other hand evolution (and, generally, life itself) concerns >>>> growth and, at least in its biological forms, requires both space and >>>> time. Now it seems to me that semiosis is more like evolution than either >>>> space or time taken separately even given Einstein's theory of space-time >>>> or the solution of famous logical paradoxes. >>>> >>>> Well, that's about as far as I've been able to get with this. While the >>>> exact question lies below my own conscious threshold. I'm hoping that >>>> perhaps you'll be able to discern what it is that's troubling me and >>>> address it. And knowing something of your approach to inquiry, I'm hoping >>>> that just taking up my vague not-quite-questions might prove to be of >>>> assistance in honing your novel theory. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary >>>> >>>> >>>> Gary Richmond >>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>> Communication Studies >>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 11:01 AM Jon Alan Schmidt < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> List: >>>>> >>>>> I have been musing recently on the well-known remark by Peirce that >>>>> "just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a >>>>> body, >>>>> we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" >>>>> (CP 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868). He also asserted in the same series of >>>>> articles that "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24; 1868), so by >>>>> substitution we ought to say that our individual (Quasi-)minds are in >>>>> semiosis, and not that signs are in our individual (Quasi-)minds. >>>>> >>>>> As Peirce recognized, despite not having the benefit of Einstein's >>>>> insights, Zeno's famous paradoxes are dissolved by understanding >>>>> continuous >>>>> motion through space-time as a more fundamental reality than discrete >>>>> positions >>>>> in space and/or moments in time. We arbitrarily mark the latter to >>>>> facilitate measurement and calculation for particular purposes, but space >>>>> is not composed of points and time is not composed of instants. >>>>> >>>>> Likewise, I suggest that semiosis is continuous, and we arbitrarily >>>>> isolate discrete signs--or rather, Instances of Signs--to facilitate >>>>> analysis for particular purposes. We can say that a Dynamic Object >>>>> determines a Token of a Type to determine a Dynamic Interpretant in an >>>>> individual (Quasi-)mind, treating this as an actual event "occurring just >>>>> when and where it does" (CP 4.537; 1906). Nevertheless, the Type is not >>>>> composed >>>>> of its Tokens. >>>>> >>>>> Moreover, every Instance contributes to the Sign's Informed Breadth >>>>> by adding that Token's Dynamic Object; as Peirce put it, "Breadth >>>>> refers to the Object, which occasions the use of the sign" (R 200:E87; >>>>> 1908). Nevertheless, this collection could never amount to the Sign's >>>>> Substantial >>>>> Breadth, which (I have argued) corresponds to its General Object. In >>>>> other words, the Sign (as a Type) and its General Object are both >>>>> continuous, while each Instance (as a Token) and its Dynamic Object >>>>> (even if it includes multiple items) are both discrete. >>>>> >>>>> In fact, it seems to me that a necessary condition for a Token to be >>>>> an Instance of a Type is that the Token's Dynamic Object must likewise be >>>>> an instantiation of the Type's General Object. When I pick something up >>>>> and say out loud, "This is a vase," the word "vase" that I pronounce is an >>>>> actual constituent of the real continuum of all potential Tokens of >>>>> the corresponding Type, which could be in any spoken or written language >>>>> or >>>>> other Sign System; and I am asserting that what I now hold in my hands is >>>>> an actual constituent of the real continuum of all potential vases. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >>>> should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >>>> not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >>>> should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >>>> not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >>>> should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >>>> not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >> should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >> not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
