Would it help to say signs are real to us when they are observed? At which point they become whatever they turn out to be. If an act, thought, feeling or expression, then real.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 3:43 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gary R, list: > > With regard to your comment: > > > "I think that the continuing and, perhaps, principal communicational > problem here--which perhaps will need more explication--may be connected > to the notion that a sign is not a real thing (you've previously > discussed this at some length on the list, and it is clearly Peirce's view, > unless one chooses to ignore what he explicitly argued). In this context > Peirce mean that a sign is not an actual/existential thing), that it > exists only in instances/tokens. It's reality is other than that. It is, > for semiosis, rather, a virtual reality, not an actual existential thing (its > instantiations, on the other hand, are actual, existential, hic et nunc, > etc.) The word 'rose' is not a rose but merely stands for the reality > which is some rose, perhaps even all roses" > > ET: I disagree; however, this might be a problem of semantics. > > a] If we consider that the Sign is a triadic process [O-R-I], then it is a > 'real thing' in the sense that the results of this triadic interaction are > existent in space-time - as a token. > > The word 'rose' is most certainly a 'real thing', a singular word is an > 'actual existential thing'. . And, the plant that is named as a 'rose' is > also a 'real thing'. > > However, b] if we consider the sign or representamen just in itself, then > it is not a 'real thing' but an action of transformative mediation - which > action does function in space-time but not as a 'thing'. > > Edwina > > > > On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 10:54 PM Gary Richmond < [email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, Jerry C, list. >> >> I think that the continuing and, perhaps, principal communicational >> problem here--which perhaps will need more explication--may be connected >> to the notion that a sign is not a real thing (you've previously >> discussed this at some length on the list, and it is clearly Peirce's view, >> unless one chooses to ignore what he explicitly argued). In this context >> Peirce mean that a sign is not an actual/existential thing), that it >> exists only in instances/tokens. It's reality is other than that. It is, >> for semiosis, rather, a virtual reality, not an actual existential thing (its >> instantiations, on the other hand, are actual, existential, hic et nunc, >> etc.) The word 'rose' is not a rose but merely stands for the reality >> which is some rose, perhaps even all roses. >> >> As soon as that is understood and accepted (which may be somewhat >> easier to do in anthroposemiotic than in biosemiotic, while it ought to >> apply to semiosis in any sphere), then confusion in this matter ought to >> begin to clear up. If that were to happen, your imaginary geometrical >> diagram of seme/pheme/delome, including the idea that "any isolated >> Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete point where those >> lines intersect," would seem completely logical. So it does now to me. >> >> Although I've had some difficulty following your logic in this matter >> even recently, I now see that the language of seme/pheme/delome pertains to >> discussions of the sign as such, while term/proposition/argument ought be >> limited to discussions involving instances/tokens. >> >> If I'm mistaken in any of this, Jon, I'm certain you'll soon correct me. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 >> >> On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 7:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jerry C., List: >>> >>> JLRC: Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric >>> terms, point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic >>> conclusions? >>> >>> >>> The subject matter here is broadly semiotic, rather than narrowly >>> linguistic. Immediately after the statement of mine that prompted this >>> request, I noted that a point is discrete rather than continuous, and then >>> suggested accordingly the alternative of conceiving a Seme as a line, a >>> Pheme as a plane, and a Delome as a space. In doing so, I was proposing an >>> imaginative diagram representing the significant relations among each >>> of these kinds of Signs as Types--at least two Semes are connected by a >>> continuous predicate in a Pheme, and at least three Semes and three Phemes >>> are connected by a logical leading principle in a Delome. Points are then >>> discrete Instances (Tokens) of Signs--anywhere on the line for a Seme, >>> at the intersection of Seme lines in the plane for a Pheme, and at the >>> intersection of Seme lines and Pheme planes in the space for a Delome. >>> >>> As an example, consider the familiar Delome, "Every man is mortal; >>> Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." In accordance with a >>> logical leading principle, this Delome connects three Phemes--"every man is >>> mortal," "Socrates is a man," and "Socrates is mortal." In accordance with >>> a continuous predicate, each of those Phemes connects two of three >>> Semes--"man," "mortal," and "Socrates." As a Sign (Type), each of these >>> Semes is analogous to a continuous line, and any isolated Instance (Token) >>> of each is analogous to a discrete point that we arbitrarily mark on the >>> corresponding line. As a Sign (Type), each of the Phemes is analogous to a >>> continuous plane defined by the two lines for the Semes that it involves, >>> and any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete >>> point where those lines intersect. As a Sign (Type), the Delome is >>> analogous to a continuous space defined by the three planes for the Phemes >>> that it involves and the three lines for the Semes that they involve, and >>> any isolated Instance (Token) of it is analogous to the discrete point >>> where those planes and lines intersect. >>> >>> Is that any more perspicuous? >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 6:05 PM Jerry LR Chandler < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> List, Jon: >>>> >>>> On Jan 19, 2019, at 8:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> This initially suggests a Seme as a point, a Pheme as a line defined by >>>> two points, and a Delome as a plane defined by three points that also >>>> define three lines. >>>> >>>> It is of interest recall the CSP definitions of the terms Seme, Pheme, >>>> and Delome. >>>> From the Commens dictionary: >>>> >>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>> >>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>> widened. By a Seme, I shall mean anything which serves for any >>>> purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a >>>> representative or Sign. The logical Term, which is a class-name, is a >>>> Seme. Thus, the term “The mortality of man” is a Seme. >>>> >>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>> >>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>> widened. [—] By a Pheme I mean a Sign which is equivalent to a >>>> grammatical sentence, whether it be Interrogative, Imperative, or >>>> Assertory. In any case, such a Sign is intended to have some sort of >>>> compulsive effect on the Interpreter of it. >>>> >>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>> >>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>> widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes use the word >>>> Delome […], though Argument would answer well enough. It is a Sign >>>> which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own >>>> self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if >>>> to induce this change in the Interpreter. >>>> >>>> From the Commens dictionary definitions, the challenge appears to be to >>>> widen the meaning of the words, “term” and “proposition” and concomitantly, >>>> assign a new word, Delome, as a synonym for argument. >>>> >>>> A principle constraint of meaning of these terms, as well as his >>>> previously introduced terms, Rhema, and Dicisign, is to form a conclusion >>>> from the argument. >>>> >>>> At first glance, one might consider the notions of point, line and >>>> plane as predicates in the sense first order logic, but this is a very thin >>>> linkage. >>>> >>>> Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric terms, >>>> point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic conclusions? >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> Jerry >>>> >>> > On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 10:54 PM Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, Jerry C, list. >> >> I think that the continuing and, perhaps, principal communicational >> problem here--which perhaps will need more explication--may be connected >> to the notion that a sign is not a real thing (you've previously >> discussed this at some length on the list, and it is clearly Peirce's view, >> unless one chooses to ignore what he explicitly argued). In this context >> Peirce mean that a sign is not an actual/existential thing), that it >> exists only in instances/tokens. It's reality is other than that. It is, >> for semiosis, rather, a virtual reality, not an actual existential thing (its >> instantiations, on the other hand, are actual, existential, hic et nunc, >> etc.) The word 'rose' is not a rose but merely stands for the reality >> which is some rose, perhaps even all roses. >> >> As soon as that is understood and accepted (which may be somewhat >> easier to do in anthroposemiotic than in biosemiotic, while it ought to >> apply to semiosis in any sphere), then confusion in this matter ought to >> begin to clear up. If that were to happen, your imaginary geometrical >> diagram of seme/pheme/delome, including the idea that "any isolated >> Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete point where those >> lines intersect," would seem completely logical. So it does now to me. >> >> Although I've had some difficulty following your logic in this matter >> even recently, I now see that the language of seme/pheme/delome pertains to >> discussions of the sign as such, while term/proposition/argument ought be >> limited to discussions involving instances/tokens. >> >> If I'm mistaken in any of this, Jon, I'm certain you'll soon correct me. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> Gary Richmond >> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >> Communication Studies >> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >> 718 482-5690 >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 7:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jerry C., List: >>> >>> JLRC: Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric >>> terms, point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic >>> conclusions? >>> >>> >>> The subject matter here is broadly semiotic, rather than narrowly >>> linguistic. Immediately after the statement of mine that prompted this >>> request, I noted that a point is discrete rather than continuous, and then >>> suggested accordingly the alternative of conceiving a Seme as a line, a >>> Pheme as a plane, and a Delome as a space. In doing so, I was proposing an >>> imaginative diagram representing the significant relations among each >>> of these kinds of Signs as Types--at least two Semes are connected by a >>> continuous predicate in a Pheme, and at least three Semes and three Phemes >>> are connected by a logical leading principle in a Delome. Points are then >>> discrete Instances (Tokens) of Signs--anywhere on the line for a Seme, >>> at the intersection of Seme lines in the plane for a Pheme, and at the >>> intersection of Seme lines and Pheme planes in the space for a Delome. >>> >>> As an example, consider the familiar Delome, "Every man is mortal; >>> Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." In accordance with a >>> logical leading principle, this Delome connects three Phemes--"every man is >>> mortal," "Socrates is a man," and "Socrates is mortal." In accordance with >>> a continuous predicate, each of those Phemes connects two of three >>> Semes--"man," "mortal," and "Socrates." As a Sign (Type), each of these >>> Semes is analogous to a continuous line, and any isolated Instance (Token) >>> of each is analogous to a discrete point that we arbitrarily mark on the >>> corresponding line. As a Sign (Type), each of the Phemes is analogous to a >>> continuous plane defined by the two lines for the Semes that it involves, >>> and any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete >>> point where those lines intersect. As a Sign (Type), the Delome is >>> analogous to a continuous space defined by the three planes for the Phemes >>> that it involves and the three lines for the Semes that they involve, and >>> any isolated Instance (Token) of it is analogous to the discrete point >>> where those planes and lines intersect. >>> >>> Is that any more perspicuous? >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 6:05 PM Jerry LR Chandler < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> List, Jon: >>>> >>>> On Jan 19, 2019, at 8:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> This initially suggests a Seme as a point, a Pheme as a line defined by >>>> two points, and a Delome as a plane defined by three points that also >>>> define three lines. >>>> >>>> It is of interest recall the CSP definitions of the terms Seme, Pheme, >>>> and Delome. >>>> From the Commens dictionary: >>>> >>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>> >>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>> widened. By a Seme, I shall mean anything which serves for any >>>> purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a >>>> representative or Sign. The logical Term, which is a class-name, is a >>>> Seme. Thus, the term “The mortality of man” is a Seme. >>>> >>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>> >>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>> widened. [—] By a Pheme I mean a Sign which is equivalent to a >>>> grammatical sentence, whether it be Interrogative, Imperative, or >>>> Assertory. In any case, such a Sign is intended to have some sort of >>>> compulsive effect on the Interpreter of it. >>>> >>>> 1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538 >>>> >>>> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to >>>> make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much >>>> widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes use the word >>>> Delome […], though Argument would answer well enough. It is a Sign >>>> which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own >>>> self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if >>>> to induce this change in the Interpreter. >>>> >>>> From the Commens dictionary definitions, the challenge appears to be to >>>> widen the meaning of the words, “term” and “proposition” and concomitantly, >>>> assign a new word, Delome, as a synonym for argument. >>>> >>>> A principle constraint of meaning of these terms, as well as his >>>> previously introduced terms, Rhema, and Dicisign, is to form a conclusion >>>> from the argument. >>>> >>>> At first glance, one might consider the notions of point, line and >>>> plane as predicates in the sense first order logic, but this is a very thin >>>> linkage. >>>> >>>> Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric terms, >>>> point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic conclusions? >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> Jerry >>>> >>> >
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