BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen, list
My view is that - If by 'sign', you mean the triad [O-R-I] - then,
this interaction necessarily requires 'observation' or rather,
interaction. So, a plant 'exists' when it is in interaction with its
environment and interprets that environment [i.e., when its material
nature, via its Representamen habits, interacts with the soil and
transforms the nutrients in the soil into its seeds].
This does not need our human observation - the triad itself is made
up of relations or interactions.
So, the Object [O] does not exist per se; the Representamen [R] does
not exist per se; the Interpretant [I] does not exist per se. All
three are formed, so to speak, within a triadic interaction - and the
result of this interaction is an 'existential thing' whether that be a
word, an image, a thought, a feeling or an insect.
Edwina
On Tue 22/01/19 4:36 PM , Stephen Curtiss Rose [email protected]
sent:
Would it help to say signs are real to us when they are observed? At
which point they become whatever they turn out to be. If an act,
thought, feeling or expression, then real.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]
On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 3:43 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary R, list:
With regard to your comment:
"I think that the continuing and, perhaps, principal communicational
problem here--which perhaps will need more explication--may be
connected to the notion that a sign is not a real thing (you've
previously discussed this at some length on the list, and it is
clearly Peirce's view, unless one chooses to ignore what he
explicitly argued). In this context Peirce mean that a sign is not an
actual/existential thing), that it exists only in instances/tokens.
It's reality is other than that. It is, for semiosis, rather, a
virtual reality, not an actual existential thing (its instantiations,
on the other hand, are actual, existential, hic et nunc, etc.) The
word 'rose' is not a rose but merely stands for the reality which is
some rose, perhaps even all roses"
ET: I disagree; however, this might be a problem of semantics.
a] If we consider that the Sign is a triadic process [O-R-I], then
it is a 'real thing' in the sense that the results of this triadic
interaction are existent in space-time - as a token.
The word 'rose' is most certainly a 'real thing', a singular word
is an 'actual existential thing'. . And, the plant that is named as a
'rose' is also a 'real thing'.
However, b] if we consider the sign or representamen just in itself,
then it is not a 'real thing' but an action of transformative
mediation - which action does function in space-time but not as a
'thing'.
Edwina
On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 10:54 PM Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon, Jerry C, list.
I think that the continuing and, perhaps, principal communicational
problem here--which perhaps will need more explication--may be
connected to the notion that a sign is not a real thing (you've
previously discussed this at some length on the list, and it is
clearly Peirce's view, unless one chooses to ignore what he
explicitly argued). In this context Peirce mean that a sign is not an
actual/existential thing), that it exists only in instances/tokens.
It's reality is other than that. It is, for semiosis, rather, a
virtual reality, not an actual existential thing (its instantiations,
on the other hand, are actual, existential, hic et nunc, etc.) The
word 'rose' is not a rose but merely stands for the reality which is
some rose, perhaps even all roses.
As soon as that is understood and accepted (which may be somewhat
easier to do in anthroposemiotic than in biosemiotic, while it ought
to apply to semiosis in any sphere), then confusion in this matter
ought to begin to clear up. If that were to happen, your imaginary
geometrical diagram of seme/pheme/delome, including the idea that
"any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete
point where those lines intersect," would seem completely logical. So
it does now to me.
Although I've had some difficulty following your logic in this
matter even recently, I now see that the language of
seme/pheme/delome pertains to discussions of the sign as such, while
term/proposition/argument ought be limited to discussions involving
instances/tokens.
If I'm mistaken in any of this, Jon, I'm certain you'll soon correct
me.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 7:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jerry C., List:
JLRC: Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric
terms, point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic
conclusions?
The subject matter here is broadly semiotic, rather than narrowly
linguistic. Immediately after the statement of mine that prompted
this request, I noted that a point is discrete rather than
continuous, and then suggested accordingly the alternative of
conceiving a Seme as a line, a Pheme as a plane, and a Delome as a
space. In doing so, I was proposing an imaginative diagram
representing the significant relations among each of these kinds of
Signs as Types--at least two Semes are connected by a continuous
predicate in a Pheme, and at least three Semes and three Phemes are
connected by a logical leading principle in a Delome. Points are
then discrete Instances (Tokens) of Signs--anywhere on the line for a
Seme, at the intersection of Seme lines in the plane for a Pheme, and
at the intersection of Seme lines and Pheme planes in the space for a
Delome.
As an example, consider the familiar Delome, "Every man is mortal;
Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." In accordance
with a logical leading principle, this Delome connects three
Phemes--"every man is mortal," "Socrates is a man," and "Socrates is
mortal." In accordance with a continuous predicate, each of those
Phemes connects two of three Semes--"man," "mortal," and "Socrates."
As a Sign (Type), each of these Semes is analogous to a continuous
line, and any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to a
discrete point that we arbitrarily mark on the corresponding line.
As a Sign (Type), each of the Phemes is analogous to a continuous
plane defined by the two lines for the Semes that it involves, and
any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete
point where those lines intersect. As a Sign (Type), the Delome is
analogous to a continuous space defined by the three planes for the
Phemes that it involves and the three lines for the Semes that they
involve, and any isolated Instance (Token) of it is analogous to the
discrete point where those planes and lines intersect.
Is that any more perspicuous?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 6:05 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
List, Jon:On Jan 19, 2019, at 8:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
This initially suggests a Seme as a point, a Pheme as a line defined
by two points, and a Delome as a plane defined by three points that
also define three lines. It is of interest recall the CSP definitions
of the terms Seme, Pheme, and Delome. From the Commens dictionary:
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538
A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order
to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to
be much widened. By a Seme, I shall mean anything which serves for
any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some
sense, a representative or Sign. The logical Term, which is a
class-name, is a Seme. Thus, the term “The mortality of man” is a
Seme.
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538
A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order
to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be
much widened. [—] By a Pheme I mean a Sign which is equivalent to a
grammatical sentence, whether it be Interrogative, Imperative, or
Assertory. In any case, such a Sign is intended to have some sort of
compulsive effect on the Interpreter of it.
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538
A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order
to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be
much widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes
use the word Delome […], though Argument would answer well enough.
It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter
through his own self-control, representing a process of change in
thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter.
From the Commens dictionary definitions, the challenge appears to be
to widen the meaning of the words, “term” and “proposition”
and concomitantly, assign a new word, Delome, as a synonym for
argument.
A principle constraint of meaning of these terms, as well as his
previously introduced terms, Rhema, and Dicisign, is to form a
conclusion from the argument.
At first glance, one might consider the notions of point, line and
plane as predicates in the sense first order logic, but this is a
very thin linkage.
Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric terms,
point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic
conclusions?
CheersJerry
On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 10:54 PM Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon, Jerry C, list.
I think that the continuing and, perhaps, principal communicational
problem here--which perhaps will need more explication--may be
connected to the notion that a sign is not a real thing (you've
previously discussed this at some length on the list, and it is
clearly Peirce's view, unless one chooses to ignore what he
explicitly argued). In this context Peirce mean that a sign is not an
actual/existential thing), that it exists only in instances/tokens.
It's reality is other than that. It is, for semiosis, rather, a
virtual reality, not an actual existential thing (its instantiations,
on the other hand, are actual, existential, hic et nunc, etc.) The
word 'rose' is not a rose but merely stands for the reality which is
some rose, perhaps even all roses.
As soon as that is understood and accepted (which may be somewhat
easier to do in anthroposemiotic than in biosemiotic, while it ought
to apply to semiosis in any sphere), then confusion in this matter
ought to begin to clear up. If that were to happen, your imaginary
geometrical diagram of seme/pheme/delome, including the idea that
"any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete
point where those lines intersect," would seem completely logical.
So it does now to me.
Although I've had some difficulty following your logic in this
matter even recently, I now see that the language of
seme/pheme/delome pertains to discussions of the sign as such, while
term/proposition/argument ought be limited to discussions involving
instances/tokens.
If I'm mistaken in any of this, Jon, I'm certain you'll soon correct
me.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 7:55 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jerry C., List:
JLRC: Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric
terms, point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic
conclusions?
The subject matter here is broadly semiotic, rather than narrowly
linguistic. Immediately after the statement of mine that prompted
this request, I noted that a point is discrete rather than
continuous, and then suggested accordingly the alternative of
conceiving a Seme as a line, a Pheme as a plane, and a Delome as a
space. In doing so, I was proposing an imaginative diagram
representing the significant relations among each of these kinds of
Signs as Types--at least two Semes are connected by a continuous
predicate in a Pheme, and at least three Semes and three Phemes are
connected by a logical leading principle in a Delome. Points are
then discrete Instances (Tokens) of Signs--anywhere on the line for a
Seme, at the intersection of Seme lines in the plane for a Pheme, and
at the intersection of Seme lines and Pheme planes in the space for a
Delome.
As an example, consider the familiar Delome, "Every man is mortal;
Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." In accordance
with a logical leading principle, this Delome connects three
Phemes--"every man is mortal," "Socrates is a man," and "Socrates is
mortal." In accordance with a continuous predicate, each of those
Phemes connects two of three Semes--"man," "mortal," and "Socrates."
As a Sign (Type), each of these Semes is analogous to a continuous
line, and any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to a
discrete point that we arbitrarily mark on the corresponding line.
As a Sign (Type), each of the Phemes is analogous to a continuous
plane defined by the two lines for the Semes that it involves, and
any isolated Instance (Token) of each is analogous to the discrete
point where those lines intersect. As a Sign (Type), the Delome is
analogous to a continuous space defined by the three planes for the
Phemes that it involves and the three lines for the Semes that they
involve, and any isolated Instance (Token) of it is analogous to the
discrete point where those planes and lines intersect.
Is that any more perspicuous?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [5] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [6]
On Sun, Jan 20, 2019 at 6:05 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
List, Jon:On Jan 19, 2019, at 8:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
This initially suggests a Seme as a point, a Pheme as a line defined
by two points, and a Delome as a plane defined by three points that
also define three lines. It is of interest recall the CSP definitions
of the terms Seme, Pheme, and Delome. From the Commens dictionary:
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538
A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order
to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to
be much widened. By a Seme, I shall mean anything which serves for
any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some
sense, a representative or Sign. The logical Term, which is a
class-name, is a Seme. Thus, the term “The mortality of man” is a
Seme.
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538
A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order
to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to
be much widened. [—] By a Pheme I mean a Sign which is equivalent
to a grammatical sentence, whether it be Interrogative, Imperative,
or Assertory. In any case, such a Sign is intended to have some sort
of compulsive effect on the Interpreter of it.
1906 | Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism | CP 4.538
A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order
to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to
be much widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I
sometimes use the word Delome […], though Argument would answer
well enough. It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon
the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process
of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the
Interpreter.
From the Commens dictionary definitions, the challenge appears to be
to widen the meaning of the words, “term” and “proposition”
and concomitantly, assign a new word, Delome, as a synonym for
argument.
A principle constraint of meaning of these terms, as well as his
previously introduced terms, Rhema, and Dicisign, is to form a
conclusion from the argument.
At first glance, one might consider the notions of point, line and
plane as predicates in the sense first order logic, but this is a
very thin linkage.
Can you explain the gap between the meanings of the geometric terms,
point, line and plane, such that they generalize to linguistic
conclusions?
CheersJerry
Links:
------
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[5] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[6] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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