John S., List: Taking to heart my own final comment below, after further consideration--including sleeping on it--I am feeling more receptive to the idea of using Term/Proposition/Argument in lieu of Seme/Pheme/Delome. One qualification is that I would adhere to Peirce's practice of capitalizing the words "when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908); and those "much widened" definitions would be as follows (CP 4.538; 1906).
- Term - "anything which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign." - Proposition - "a Sign which is equivalent to a grammatical sentence, whether it be Interrogative, Imperative, or Assertory." - Argument - "a Sign ... representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter." In the quoted passage, Peirce added that a Proposition "is intended to have some sort of compulsive effect on the Interpreter of it," while an Argument "has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control." However, his later taxonomies included Temperative Terms and Propositions that are intended to produce self-control; Imperative Arguments that are urged, rather than submitted; and Suggestive Propositions and Arguments that are presented, rather than urged or submitted. Again, the equivalence of Argument and Delome was never in dispute; and although the intent of introducing "Pheme" was evidently to encompass questions and commands, Peirce had previously stated that "Proposition" is not strictly limited to assertions. CSP: One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for, effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby become a different proposition. (EP 2:312; 1904) Hence my remaining reservations are primarily with "Term." It still seems odd to use that label for an Icon, such as a painting without a legend; or an Index, such as a pointing finger; or a Percept (CP 5.439) or the blank Sheet of Assertion (CP 4.553), both of which Peirce explicitly classified as Semes. Did Peirce ever refer to these sorts of Signs as "Terms"? Moreover, I would not strictly equate a Term--or a Seme, for that matter--with a Rheme, since the latter is an incomplete Proposition that includes the continuous predicate, corresponding to blanks and copulas or unattached Lines of Identity. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 3:36 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > John S., List: > > JFS: I agree with Peirce: "the first two members have to be much > widened." Therefore, take Peirce's advice: Widen the senses of those two > words. Then you can discard the triad seme/pheme/delome as superfluous. > > > But that was clearly *not *Peirce's own solution at all; instead, he > *immediately > *supplied the new words (Seme, Pheme, Delome) with their "much widened" > denotations. > > JFS: There are others, but this selection is enough to show that Peirce > did not need the words seme/pheme/delome to talk about reasoning with and > about images. > > > He did not use the words term/proposition/argument in those quotes, > either; except that "proposition" appears in the very first one, published > in 1901. Sincere question--*after *introducing Seme/Pheme/Delome in > 1906, did Peirce ever use term/proposition/argument when referring to > non-Symbols? What about when referring to Existential Graphs? > > I understand your point about how language evolves, and I strongly > sympathize with your (and others') desire to make Peirce's ideas more > accessible to people today. However, his ethics of terminology seems > contrary to such an approach. > > CSP: It is good economy for philosophy to provide itself with a > vocabulary so outlandish that loose thinkers shall not be tempted to borrow > its words ... to avoid using words and phrases of vernacular origin as > technical terms of philosophy ... for philosophical conceptions which vary > by a hair's breadth from those for which suitable terms exist, to invent > terms with a due regard for the usages of philosophical terminology and > those of the English language, but yet with a distinctly technical > appearance. (CP 2.223-226, EP 2:265-266; 1903) > > > Of course, we do not necessarily have to agree with him about this or be > rigidly constrained by it; but it is something that I think we should keep > in mind. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Jan 23, 2019 at 2:42 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon AS and Jerry LRC, >> >> JAS >> >> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order >> >> to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have >> >> to be much widened. (CP 4.538; 1906) >> > >> > If term and proposition were likewise synonymous with Seme and Pheme, >> > respectively, then why did Peirce state plainly that the latter >> > require a "much widened" denotation? >> >> I agree with Peirce: "the first two members have to be much widened." >> >> Therefore, take Peirce's advice: Widen the senses of those two words. >> Then you can discard the triad seme/pheme/delome as superfluous. >> >> That is the normal way that language develops. As science, >> technology, and culture change, people take the old words, >> and broaden them to include the new options. >> >> Just look at the they way Newton's words mass, energy, momentum, >> space, and time changed during the past two centuries. >> >> Today, most phones don't look like the telephones of the 1970s, and >> they have more computer power than the supercomputers of those days. >> >> JLRC >> >> [JFS] Peirce explicitly said that an icon plus one or more indices >> >> can be used to state a proposition. An icon with N-points (pegs) >> >> where an index may be attached represents an N-adic relation. >> > >> > The source of this assertion would be appreciated. >> >> See below for some related quotations. There are others, but this >> selection is enough to show that Peirce did not need the words >> seme/pheme/delome to talk about reasoning with and about images. >> >> Basic principle: I hope that we can make Peirce's ideas more widely >> known and used in the 21st c. Unusual words that Peirce rarely used >> himself are not likely to attract new readers. I believe that it's >> not useful to revive those words for any purpose other than making >> a scholarly comment about a particular MS in which they occur. >> >> John >> ____________________________________________________________________ >> >> A proposition is a sign which separately indicates its object. Thus, >> a portrait with the name of the original below it is a proposition. >> It asserts that if anybody looks at it, he can form a reasonably >> correct idea of how the original looked. (CP 5.569) >> >> All necessary reasoning without exception is diagrammatic. That is, >> we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed >> to observe it. This observation leads us to suspect that something is >> true, which we may or may not be able to formulate with precision, >> and we proceed to inquire whether it is true or not. For this purpose >> it is necessary to form a plan of investigation, and this is the most >> difficult part of the whole operation. We not only have to select the >> features of the diagram which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, >> but it is also of great importance to return again and again to certain >> features. (EP 2:212) >> >> A Diagram is mainly an Icon, and an Icon of intelligible relations... >> Now since a diagram, though it will ordinarily have Symbolide Features, >> as well as features approaching the nature of Indices, is nevertheless >> in the main an Icon of the forms of relations in the constitution of >> its Object, the appropriateness of it for the representation of >> necessary inference is easily seen. [CP 4.531] >> >> all deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves an element >> of observation; namely deduction consists in constructing an icon >> or diagram the relation of whose parts shall present a complete analogy >> with those of the parts of the object of reasoning, of experimenting >> upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the result so as >> to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. [CP 3.363] >> >> The word diagram is here used in the peculiar sense of a concrete, but >> possibly changing, mental image of such a thing as it represents. A >> drawing or model may be employed to aid the imagination; but the >> essential thing to be performed is the act of imagining. Mathematical >> diagrams are of two kinds; 1st, the geometrical, which are composed of >> lines (for even the image of a body having a curved surface without >> edges, what is mainly seen by the mind’s eye as it is turned about, is >> its generating lines, such as its varying outline); and 2nd, the >> algebraical, which are arrays of letters and other characters whose >> interrelations are represented partly by their arrangement and partly by >> repetitions. If these change, it is by instantaneous metamorphosis. >> (NEM 4:219) >> >> We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, >> representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression >> of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a >> visual image, or mixed visual and muscular... This diagram, which has >> been constructed to represent intuitively or semi-intuitively the same >> relations which are abstractly expressed in the premisses, is then >> observed, and a hypothesis suggests itself that there is a certain >> relation between some of its parts — or perhaps this hypothesis had >> already been suggested. In order to test this, various experiments are >> made upon the diagram, which is changed in various ways. (CP 2.778) >> >> Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning. If >> logicians would only embrace this method, we should no longer see >> attempts to base their science on the fragile foundations of metaphysics >> or a psychology not based on logical theory. (CP 4.571) >> >
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