Gary F., List: I, for one, am *very *interested in the topic that you are proposing, having recently read Atkins's book myself. In fact, his insights about the correspondence of the forms of propositions to the Categories, especially in Peirce's early writings, prompted some of my own thinking that led to many of my recent posts. Of course, I always welcome your (and others') feedback on those, as well.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 8, 2019 at 9:18 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > John S., you wrote: > > “Everything Peirce wrote about semeiotic, from first to last, was based on > his math and logic. Since math and logic are precise, they can resolve any > doubts or questions about the semeiotic.” > > Given your emphasis on precision, you are apparently referring to *formal* > (i.e. mathematical) logic, and not to logic as semeiotic. That is, you are > talking about *necessary reasoning* — which is able to “resolve any > doubts” because it is not concerned with the experiential basis of its > premisses. In doing so, you seem to have skipped over the science which > comes between mathematics and logic/semeiotic in Peirce’s classification of > the sciences, namely Phenomenology (or Phaneroscopy, his preferred term > after 1904). You’ve also removed the experiential basis of logic/semeiotic, > which according to Peirce is a positive science (unlike mathematics). He > was very clear that logic as semeiotic draws its principles from *both* > mathematics and phenomenology, and involves *inductive* reasoning — hence > its fallibility. > > I think this oversight (or overstatement?) might be rectified by taking a > closer look at the relationship between Existential Graphs and Peircean > phenomenology (hence my new subject line, as this post doesn’t contribute > to the debate between you and JAS). I’ve been thinking about this for some > time, but haven’t found much written about it — until the new Atkins book > on *Charles S. Peirce’s Phenomenology*, which Gary Richmond mentioned a > few days ago. Atkins has quite a lot to say about the overlaps among logic, > semeiotic, EGs and phenomenology, which I haven’t fully digested yet, and I > wondered whether you (as an authority on EGs) might have something to say > on the subject, as I don’t recall reading anything of yours in that > specific connection. > > The main reason I was looking into this connection before the Atkins book > came out is this passage from Peirce’s “PAP” (R 293, a draft leading up to > the 1906 “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism”): > > [[ The System of Existential Graphs the development of which has only > been begun by a solitary student, furnishes already the best diagram of the > contents of the logical Quasi-mind that has ever yet been found and > promises much future perfectionment. Let us call the collective whole of > all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the > *Phaneron*. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside > Thought proper) will be a Consistituent [sic] of the Phaneron. The > Phaneron being itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be > no better method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the > System of Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. We have already > tasted the first-fruits of this method, we shall soon gather more, and I, > for my part, am in confident hope that by-and-by (not in my brief time) a > rich harvest may be garnered by this means. ]] > > This passage (and what follows in PAP) is peculiar in some ways — but I > think I’ll wait to see if other list members are interested in this topic. > > Gary f. > > } The world we are imbedded in is nothing but an ever evolving network of > relationships. [Lee Smolin] { > > http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >
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