Jeff, List,

 

JD: Is there some textual reason to give priority to the analysis of the 
proposition in the argument for the categories?

GF: Well, there is a historical priority, in that Peirce’s “New List of 
Categories” (1867) was explicitly based on analysis of the proposition. But I’m 
not sure what you are referring to as “the argument for the categories.” You 
mean an argument that the analysis that produces the three categories is 
logically valid? I think Peirce’s argument for that is inductive rather than 
deductive, i.e. a demonstration that the categories are useful as heuristic 
tools for analysis and classification of phenomena, especially semiosic 
phenomena — including, of course, arguments as well as propositions and terms 
(or whatever we call them).

I’m also not sure what to make of the concept of “material relations.” I see 
the logic of relations as formal and not material, and I don’t think what 
Peirce had to say about material categories is based on the logic of relations, 
although there may be some kind of correspondence between the formal and 
material categories.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> 
Sent: 9-Feb-19 16:08
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] EGs and phaneroscopy

 

Gary F, Jon S, List,

 

Is there some textual reason to give priority to the analysis of the 
proposition in the argument for the categories?

 

For my part, I take the logical arguments for the categories to be based on the 
requirements for having valid arguments as well as meaningful propositions and 
terms. The question that he articulates in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an 
attempt to develop my categories from within" is:  what are the elemental kinds 
of relations--both formal and material--that are necessary for logic? The 
question of what is necessary for each of the three main classes of argument to 
be valid seems to be at least as important--if not more--than the question of 
what is necessary for a proposition to represent a fact in the effort to 
provide an internal grounding for the claim that there must be three elemental 
formal relations:  monadic, dyadic and triadic.

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to