Gary F., List: GF: A *normative *science for Peirce (and as far as I know, for anyone who uses the word regularly) is one whose essence is to *make dualistic judgments* distinguishing good from bad, true from false, right from wrong, etc.
Peirce quite explicitly *did not* define "normative science" so narrowly; again, for him, it "treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to ends" (CP 5.123, EP 2:197; 1903). If that were not clear enough, he went on to add that one of the "widely spread misconceptions of the nature of normative science ... is that the chief, if not the only problem of normative science is to say what is good and what bad, logically, ethically, and esthetically; or what degree of goodness a given description of phenomenon attains" (CP 5.127, EP 2:199; 1903). GF: Thus it is quite misleading to claim that in Peirce’s classification, Semeiotic replaces Logic as a normative science. I was referring specifically to John Sowa's diagram that incorrectly shows "Formal Semeiotic," whatever that means, as a branch of Phenomenology. Semeiotic, with *all three* of its branches, is the third Normative Science, where John currently shows "Logic." Therefore, "Semeiotic" should replace "Logic" *in that diagram*. GF: So in that sense normative logic is a prerequisite for all inquiries other than mathematics and phaneroscopy. I will make the same request of you that Gary R. and I both already made of John--please provide specific citations or quotations of passages where you interpret Peirce as somehow endorsing this notion. On the contrary, as far as I can tell, he consistently maintained that the other two Normative Sciences--Esthetics and Ethics--are prerequisites for Logic as Semeiotic. The formal logic of Mathematics, Phaneroscopy, Esthetics, and Ethics is a *logica utens*, not a *logica docens*. Peirce even spelled out "three excellent reasons" why it is a mistake when "some students of exact logic rank *that *normative science, at least, *too high*, by virtually treating it as on a par with pure mathematics." CSP: In the first place, the hypotheses from which the deductions of normative science proceed are *intended to conform* to positive truth of fact and those deductions derive their interest from that circumstance almost exclusively; while the hypotheses of pure mathematics are purely ideal in intention, and their interest is purely intellectual. But in the second place, the procedure of the normative sciences is *not purely deductive*, as that of mathematics is, nor even principally so. Their peculiar analyses of familiar phenomena, analyses which ought to be guided by the facts of phenomenology in a manner in which mathematics is not at all guided, separate Normative Science from mathematics quite radically. In the third place, there is a most intimate and essential element of Normative Science which is still *more *proper to it, and that is its *peculiar appreciations*, to which nothing at all in the phenomena, in themselves, corresponds. These appreciations relate to the conformity of phenomena to *ends *which are not immanent within those phenomena. (CP 5.126, EP 2:198-199; 1903) Phaneroscopy is a *positive *science, but it is not a *normative *science. There are "facts of phenomenology," but as soon as we begin *analyzing *these "familiar phenomena"--especially with respect to their "conformity ... to *ends *which are not immanent within" them--we are engaging in Normative Science, not Phaneroscopy. That is why *all *Semeiotic, *including *Speculative Grammar, is a branch of the former, not the latter. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 9:53 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Sorry about the typo I missed (“meniotics”, fixed below). > > I should also add that normative logic (*not* formal logic) must be > deployed by *all* sciences (including semeiotic) in the stage of their > inquiry where they are obliged to test the truth of the inferences they > make against their observations — also, I think, in the abductive stage > where they have to decide whether a hypothesis is worth testing or not. So > in that sense normative logic is a prerequisite for all inquiries other > than mathematics and phaneroscopy. When we focus too much on Peirce’s > top-down classification of sciences, we sometimes forget the *circularity* > of the inquiry process. > > Gary f. > > *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 9-Mar-19 10:31 > > Jon, Gary R, John, list, > > JAS: … Semeiotic as a generalization of normative logic to encompass *all > *kinds of Signs, not just Symbols; i.e., Speculative Grammar. Again, it > is *normative *because it studies "what *must be* the characters of all > signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an > intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897, > emphasis in original). > > Peirce emphasized “must be,” but he does *not* refer to “normative” > science at all in the passage you quote. You put the “normative” label on > what Peirce says here, and when you do that — especially in the phrase > “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” — you water down the signification of the > word to the point where it almost evaporates. A *normative* science for > Peirce (and as far as I know, for anyone who uses the word regularly) is > one whose essence is to *make dualistic judgments* distinguishing good > from bad, true from false, right from wrong, etc. What Peirce is referring > to here is not normative science but, more broadly, *positive* science > (as opposed to mathematics, which deals with hypothetical objects and thus > does not learn from experience of the actual world). Here’s the context: > > [[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only > another name for *semiotic* (σημειωτικη), the quasi-necessary, or formal, > doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” or > formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and > from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming > Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in > one sense by no means necessary, as to what *must be* the characters of > all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say, by an > intelligence capable of learning by experience. ] CP 2.227] > > *Logic as Semeiotic* is Logic in this *broad* sense. Logic as *normative* > , i.e. logical Critic, is one of three branches of that, as Peirce explains: > > [[ The speculative rhetoric that we are speaking of is a branch of the > analytical study of the essential conditions to which all signs are > subject,— a science named *semeiotics*, though identified by many > thinkers with logic. In the Roman schools, grammar, logic, and rhetoric > were felt to be akin and to make up a rounded whole called the *trivium*. > This feeling was just; for the three disciplines named correspond to the > three essential branches of semeiotics, of which the first, called > *speculative > grammar* by Duns Scotus, studies the ways in which an object can be a > sign; the second, the leading part of logic, best termed *speculative > critic*, studies the ways in which a sign can be related to the object > independent of it that it represents; while the third is the *speculative > rhetoric* just mentioned. ] EP2:326 ] > > Belluci quotes a similar passage in which logic (in the narrow sense) is > named as a “department” of semeiotic: > > [[ it will be necessary for the present and for a long time to come to > regard logic, not as a distinct science, but as only a department of the > science of the general constitution of signs,— the physiology of signs,— > cenoscopic semeiotics. For if we roughly define a sign as a medium of > communication, a piece of concerted music is a sign, and so is a word or > signal of command. Now logic has no positive concern with either of these > kinds of signs, but it must concern itself with them negatively in defining > the kind of signs it does deal with; and it is not likely that in our time > there will be anybody to study the general physiology of the non-logical > signs except the logician, who is obliged to do so, in some measure. ] R > 499 ISP 17-19, 1906 ] > > Peirce says here that it is up to logicians to study cenoscopic semeiotics > — not that semeiotics *replaces* logic, but that it supervenes on logic. > Thus it is quite misleading to claim that in Peirce’s classification, > Semeiotic *replaces* Logic as a normative science. It is more accurate to > say that Logic in the broad or “general” sense is coterminous with > Semeiotic, and Logic in the narrow sense (Critic) is the normative part of > that. None of the passages that you have quoted in defense of that claim > even *mention* “semeiotic”, or any variant spelling of it, or any > equivalent term such as “theory of signs,” in connection with Logic as a > normative science. “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” is a chimera of your own > invention, Jon. > > Gary f. >
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