Jon, Gary f, list, I have nothing at present to add to what Jon has written and only wish to note that I am in full agreement with him.
Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 11:38 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > GF: A *normative *science for Peirce (and as far as I know, for anyone > who uses the word regularly) is one whose essence is to *make dualistic > judgments* distinguishing good from bad, true from false, right from > wrong, etc. > > > Peirce quite explicitly *did not* define "normative science" so narrowly; > again, for him, it "treats of the laws of the relation of phenomena to > ends" (CP 5.123, EP 2:197; 1903). If that were not clear enough, he went > on to add that one of the "widely spread misconceptions of the nature of > normative science ... is that the chief, if not the only problem of > normative science is to say what is good and what bad, logically, > ethically, and esthetically; or what degree of goodness a given description > of phenomenon attains" (CP 5.127, EP 2:199; 1903). > > GF: Thus it is quite misleading to claim that in Peirce’s classification, > Semeiotic replaces Logic as a normative science. > > > I was referring specifically to John Sowa's diagram that incorrectly shows > "Formal Semeiotic," whatever that means, as a branch of Phenomenology. > Semeiotic, with *all three* of its branches, is the third Normative > Science, where John currently shows "Logic." Therefore, "Semeiotic" should > replace "Logic" *in that diagram*. > > GF: So in that sense normative logic is a prerequisite for all inquiries > other than mathematics and phaneroscopy. > > > I will make the same request of you that Gary R. and I both already made > of John--please provide specific citations or quotations of passages where > you interpret Peirce as somehow endorsing this notion. On the contrary, as > far as I can tell, he consistently maintained that the other two Normative > Sciences--Esthetics and Ethics--are prerequisites for Logic as Semeiotic. > > The formal logic of Mathematics, Phaneroscopy, Esthetics, and Ethics is a > *logica > utens*, not a *logica docens*. Peirce even spelled out "three excellent > reasons" why it is a mistake when "some students of exact logic rank *that > *normative science, at least, *too high*, by virtually treating it as on > a par with pure mathematics." > > CSP: In the first place, the hypotheses from which the deductions of > normative science proceed are *intended to conform* to positive truth of > fact and those deductions derive their interest from that circumstance > almost exclusively; while the hypotheses of pure mathematics are purely > ideal in intention, and their interest is purely intellectual. But in the > second place, the procedure of the normative sciences is *not purely > deductive*, as that of mathematics is, nor even principally so. Their > peculiar analyses of familiar phenomena, analyses which ought to be guided > by the facts of phenomenology in a manner in which mathematics is not at > all guided, separate Normative Science from mathematics quite radically. In > the third place, there is a most intimate and essential element of > Normative Science which is still *more *proper to it, and that is its > *peculiar > appreciations*, to which nothing at all in the phenomena, in themselves, > corresponds. These appreciations relate to the conformity of phenomena to > *ends > *which are not immanent within those phenomena. (CP 5.126, EP 2:198-199; > 1903) > > > Phaneroscopy is a *positive *science, but it is not a *normative *science. > There are "facts of phenomenology," but as soon as we begin *analyzing *these > "familiar phenomena"--especially with respect to their "conformity ... to > *ends > *which are not immanent within" them--we are engaging in Normative > Science, not Phaneroscopy. That is why *all *Semeiotic, *including > *Speculative > Grammar, is a branch of the former, not the latter. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 9:53 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Sorry about the typo I missed (“meniotics”, fixed below). >> >> I should also add that normative logic (*not* formal logic) must be >> deployed by *all* sciences (including semeiotic) in the stage of their >> inquiry where they are obliged to test the truth of the inferences they >> make against their observations — also, I think, in the abductive stage >> where they have to decide whether a hypothesis is worth testing or not. So >> in that sense normative logic is a prerequisite for all inquiries other >> than mathematics and phaneroscopy. When we focus too much on Peirce’s >> top-down classification of sciences, we sometimes forget the >> *circularity* of the inquiry process. >> >> Gary f. >> >> *From:* [email protected] <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* 9-Mar-19 10:31 >> >> Jon, Gary R, John, list, >> >> JAS: … Semeiotic as a generalization of normative logic to encompass *all >> *kinds of Signs, not just Symbols; i.e., Speculative Grammar. Again, it >> is *normative *because it studies "what *must be* the characters of all >> signs used by a 'scientific' intelligence, that is to say, by an >> intelligence capable of learning by experience" (CP 2.227; c. 1897, >> emphasis in original). >> >> Peirce emphasized “must be,” but he does *not* refer to “normative” >> science at all in the passage you quote. You put the “normative” label on >> what Peirce says here, and when you do that — especially in the phrase >> “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” — you water down the signification of the >> word to the point where it almost evaporates. A *normative* science for >> Peirce (and as far as I know, for anyone who uses the word regularly) is >> one whose essence is to *make dualistic judgments* distinguishing good >> from bad, true from false, right from wrong, etc. What Peirce is referring >> to here is not normative science but, more broadly, *positive* science >> (as opposed to mathematics, which deals with hypothetical objects and thus >> does not learn from experience of the actual world). Here’s the context: >> >> [[ Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only >> another name for *semiotic* (σημειωτικη), the quasi-necessary, or >> formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” >> or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, >> and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to >> naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and >> therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what *must be* the >> characters of all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to >> say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. ] CP 2.227] >> >> *Logic as Semeiotic* is Logic in this *broad* sense. Logic as *normative* >> , i.e. logical Critic, is one of three branches of that, as Peirce explains: >> >> [[ The speculative rhetoric that we are speaking of is a branch of the >> analytical study of the essential conditions to which all signs are >> subject,— a science named *semeiotics*, though identified by many >> thinkers with logic. In the Roman schools, grammar, logic, and rhetoric >> were felt to be akin and to make up a rounded whole called the *trivium*. >> This feeling was just; for the three disciplines named correspond to the >> three essential branches of semeiotics, of which the first, called >> *speculative >> grammar* by Duns Scotus, studies the ways in which an object can be a >> sign; the second, the leading part of logic, best termed *speculative >> critic*, studies the ways in which a sign can be related to the object >> independent of it that it represents; while the third is the *speculative >> rhetoric* just mentioned. ] EP2:326 ] >> >> Belluci quotes a similar passage in which logic (in the narrow sense) is >> named as a “department” of semeiotic: >> >> [[ it will be necessary for the present and for a long time to come to >> regard logic, not as a distinct science, but as only a department of the >> science of the general constitution of signs,— the physiology of signs,— >> cenoscopic semeiotics. For if we roughly define a sign as a medium of >> communication, a piece of concerted music is a sign, and so is a word or >> signal of command. Now logic has no positive concern with either of these >> kinds of signs, but it must concern itself with them negatively in defining >> the kind of signs it does deal with; and it is not likely that in our time >> there will be anybody to study the general physiology of the non-logical >> signs except the logician, who is obliged to do so, in some measure. ] R >> 499 ISP 17-19, 1906 ] >> >> Peirce says here that it is up to logicians to study cenoscopic semeiotics >> — not that semeiotics *replaces* logic, but that it supervenes on logic. >> Thus it is quite misleading to claim that in Peirce’s classification, >> Semeiotic *replaces* Logic as a normative science. It is more accurate >> to say that Logic in the broad or “general” sense is coterminous with >> Semeiotic, and Logic in the narrow sense (Critic) is the normative part of >> that. None of the passages that you have quoted in defense of that claim >> even *mention* “semeiotic”, or any variant spelling of it, or any >> equivalent term such as “theory of signs,” in connection with Logic as a >> normative science. “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” is a chimera of your own >> invention, Jon. >> >> Gary f. >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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