List, GaryF, Jon, John, Steven, Joseph S.: > On Mar 2, 2019, at 7:07 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose <[email protected]> wrote: > > "But this is not what I mean, nor what is generally meant, by a collection of > absolutely independent members. What I mean by that expression is that every > member is distinguished from every other by possessing some one or another > elementary and definite non-relative character which that other does not > possess" Thanks Gary. Thus are we. > amazon.com/author/stephenrose <http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose> > >
>From a logical point of view, this quote is absolutely critical to >understanding the mathematical ground of CSP’s writings. Although this >concept is already present and / or inferred in many, many other places, >particularly graph theoretic assertions, it is pleasing to see it is pleasing >to see it clearly and unambiguously asserted. CSP had made numerous references to role of chemistry in his thinking and even drafted a table of elements. This quote refers to the mathematical nature of the relational logic among the chemical elements, chemical molecules, cells, organisms, and human beings. Each name of a “sin-sign”, that is a legisign with and index, is related to all other sin-signs. Thus, the reference is respect to the “difference that makes a difference” between objects. J S Mills recognized, roughly speaking, this distinction between forms of matter with the terms “heteropathy and homeopathy. Leibniz recognized, roughly speaking, this distinction with his definition of predicates; every predicate is either implicitly or explicitly contained in the subject. In this instance, The subject is the table of elements and the predicates are all the chemical elements. Another predicate of the table of elements is that the is organized into rows and columns; these rows and columns demonstrate the interdependence of the identity of each element, linguistically, physically, chemically and implicitly biologically. The list of CSP’s assertions that chemical logic is at the root of his bedrock beliefs continues to growth in number, in breadth, and in comprehension. John S. : Can you construct a narrative that makes the individual elements of the continuous line representing the set theoretical construct of "Universal Quantifiers” logically consistent with this quote? If such an argument is true, would your conjecture be the same notion of continuity that CSP notion of continuity, e.g., as “welded together” or an unmarked line? Joseph, thank you for your recent remarks about the meaning of an equivalence relation. I presume these remarks are not persuasive to you, but, at least the assertions relating the critical logical triad, independence, interdependence and dependence may be of interest to you and your assertions about triadic cubism and the prose that that seeks to construct a 27-term logic. Cheers Jerry > On Sat, Mar 2, 2019 at 5:05 PM <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > List, > > I finally found (just as I was on the point of giving up) a text in which > Peirce explains the relationship between his Existential Graphs and his > phenomenological “categories” (or experiential Universes, as he calls them > there). It’s one of the incomplete drafts included in R 300, which Peirce > entitled “The Bed-rock Beneath Pragmaticism.” I’ve been busy transcribing > this from the manuscript images at the Peirce Archive > https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php > <https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/home.php>, and although my > transcript is incomplete, I decided to put it up on my website, because parts > of it relate to several of the current threads on this list. > > R 300 is a very interesting document, partly because it appears to be his > very last attempt to complete the Monist series on pragmatism which had > occupied him for over three years. The first two articles in the series > (Selections 24 and 25 in EP2) appeared in 1905, followed by the “Prolegomena > to an Apology for Pragmaticism” in 1906. In the “Bedrock” MS, Peirce says > that there would be two more articles in the Monist series to complete his > “proof” of Pragmaticism — and this was apparently written after Selection 28 > in EP2 (R 318, 1907), where “Peirce comes closer than in any other to fully > expressing his brand of pragmatism and to giving a clearly articulated > proof,” according to the editors (EP2:398). Don Roberts dates R 300 “about > March of 1908,” which is consistent with the time spans mentioned by Peirce > in the MS itself. > > The main part of “Bedrock” consists of 65 manuscript pages numbered by > Peirce. Much of it is about Existential Graphs, identity and teridentity, > etc., and may be of interest to John S. and Jon A.S. (Jon has posted some > quotes from it already). Jerry C. should be interested in the part where > Peirce says that the “most interesting term of comparison for Existential > Graphs is the system of ‘rational formulae,’ or graphs, that are used in > Organic Chemistry.” Helmut R. should be interested in Peirce’s argument that > the concept of Sequence (which does indeed involve time) is logically simpler > than the concept of negation. As for the partial draft relating EGs to > phenomenology, I think it might give some clues as to why Peirce abandoned > the project of using EGs for his proof of pragmaticism. Any of this and a lot > more can be found by searching for the right keywords in the page on my > website, http://gnusystems.ca/Bedrock.htm <http://gnusystems.ca/Bedrock.htm>. > > Comments or questions on this text can be posted here with the subject line > above. > > Gary f. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> with the > line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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