Gary F., List: Upon further consideration, I would like to make two related amendments to the latter part of my earlier post.
- The Phemic Sheet represents the Universe of *Truth*, which need not be the Universe of *Actuality*; it "denote[s] that object ... which the Graphs, from their very first, find to have been settled upon, by a *previous understanding* between the Graphist and the Interpreter, as that to which all their significations must refer" (R 300:71-72[36-37]). - Accordingly, two- or even three-dimensional EGs can only denote Objects that exist (or not) in *that *Universe, which consists of everything that is *already *known to *both *the Graphist and the Interpreter by virtue of Collateral Experience--what Peirce elsewhere called the *commens *(EP 2:478; 1906)--regardless of which *modal *Universe it might inhabit. Thanks, Jon S. On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 11:54 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > I agree that Peirce ultimately gave up on iconizing modality in > two-dimensional Gamma EGs, instead settling for the R 514 tutorial that > only covers Alpha and Beta. A three-dimensional implementation might be > more successful in that regard, consistent with his description of the > Universes as "so utterly different that we may well liken them to a set of > three mutually perpendicular directions from which any object may be > viewed" (R 300:72[37]) and as "different dimensions of the logical > Universe" (R 300:80[37]) whose "mutual relations,--imaged by > perpendicularities in sets of three,--are relations between different > Modalities" (R 300:76[38]). I wonder if he was hinting at this further in > the following passage from a different manuscript, which I came across > yesterday. > > CSP: But in one respect at any rate [the system of] Existential Graphs is > essentially different from language. Namely, instead of being merely > protracted in time, its expressions are diagrams upon a surface, and indeed > must be regarded as only a projection upon that surface of a sign extended > in three dimensions. Three dimensions are necessary and sufficient for the > expression of all assertions; so that, if man's reason was originally > limited to the line of speech, (which I do not affirm,) it has now outgrown > the limitation. (R 654:6-7; 1910 Aug 19) > > > I now see even more clearly what you meant about our different > "approach[es] to Peircean studies" and the danger of "sink[ing] into purely > terminological issues," so I will not belabor my points about "Universe" > and "Experience" any further. > > I was not "ignoring Peirce’s careful distinction between the [polyadic] > continuity of the two-dimensional sheet and that [linear continuity] of the > one-dimensional line," I was commenting on it. I assume that Peirce was > quite intentional about specifying that a Line of Identity is *heavily* > drawn, such that it has a very visible *width *to it, while a Cut is *thinly > *drawn. After all, he wrote that the Phemic Sheet represents "the field > of attention," including "those places where, nothing being scribed, no > particular attention is paid"; while the Line of Identity, which is > "generated by the continuity of the different places of a heavy dot," > represents "the continuity in attentive observation of an individual > object" (R 300:39-41[39-40]). Again, the Line of Identity for an > individual is *only *continuous because the Phemic Sheet for the Universe > of Actuality, which underlies it, is *also *(and more fundamentally) > continuous--except where a Cut creates a *discontinuity*. > > I was also not ignoring Peirce's "statement that the three Universes > cannot be represented by the icons which make up the Graphs, and can only > be represented by differentiation of the surfaces on which those icons are > drawn." I was simply noting his other statement that the differences of > the three Universes correspond *only *to differences of the *Objects *to > which the Graphs refer, *not *the propositions as a whole or their > predicates. Two-dimensional EGs can only denote Objects that *exist *(or > not) in the Universe of Actuality. > > I look forward to reading what you have to say about Cuts, especially > given your claim that it "spells trouble for the whole system of EGs." Are > you perhaps referring to Peirce's remarks in R 300 about the inadequacy of > representing "the concept of *Sequence*" as "a composite of two > Negations"? > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 7:35 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, my responses inserted. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* 4-Mar-19 18:05 >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism >> >> >> >> Gary F., List: >> >> GF: Is it not remarkable that after working with EGs for over 10 years, >> including lecturing and publishing about them, he should be so unsure of >> his ability to describe the System or even state its purpose? >> >> JAS: I suspect that it was quite clear in his own mind, >> >> GF: Peirce was quite capable of saying what was clear to him and what >> wasn’t. Your suspicion in this case directly contradicts what Peirce >> actually says on that point in the sentence I quoted. >> >> and the struggle was primarily with how to explain it to others in a way >> that they could easily understand. It seems plausible that he felt like he >> had failed to do so in all of that previous lecturing and publishing. As >> John Sowa has repeatedly pointed out, he finally came up with a tutorial on >> EGs that successfully accomplished this objective the following year >> (1909), in R 514. >> >> GF: Neither in MS 514 nor in any later presentation that I’ve seen does >> Peirce make any attempt to iconize the three Universes of Capacities, >> Actualities and Tendencies (by using different surfaces and “provinces”). >> He explains in the draft of MS 300 what motivated his 1906 attempt to do >> that (in the “Prolegomena”) and why that attempt is clearly inadequate, >> especially in its iconicity. That’s why I say that Peirce abandoned the >> gamma graphs — which he had said in 1903 were far more important than the >> alpha and beta. That leaves us with a system which, as John S. has pointed >> out repeatedly, is logically equivalent to his earlier algebraic notation, >> rather than being a major improvement on it as Peirce had hoped (until >> 1908). This could also explain why Peirce abandoned the attempt to base his >> proof of pragmaticism on EGs. >> >> GF: This is what the Graphs and their transformations are about: the >> Universe of Discourse, or simply the Universe. This Universe is to >> discourse as the phaneron is to experience. >> >> JAS:I agree with the first statement, but not the second; as I already >> stated, I believe instead that the three Universes are to Experience as the >> three Categories are to the Phaneron. >> >> GF: You are trying to regularize Peirce’s usage of the term “Universe” by >> ignoring its actual context in MS 300. When in doubt about what a term >> *denotes >> *(as we usually are with common nouns), the context is the main clue for >> directing our attention, as Peirce himself points out. >> >> The Phaneron consists of whatever could be *presented *to the mind, >> while Experience consists of whatever is *urged *to the mind; in other >> words, there is a *compulsive *aspect of the latter that is lacking, or >> at least less prominent, in the former. >> >> GF: Now you are ignoring the contextual use of the term “Experience” in >> this part of MS 300. I see this as a recurring problem with your attempt to >> regularize Peirce’s terminology, especially in respect to terms which were >> *not* neologisms but common philosophical terms. >> >> GF: I call this triad of Universes (or subuniverses of the one Universe) >> phenomenological because they are different ways in which the Universe >> “makes its power felt” experientially. >> >> Again, I worry that this conflates phenomena in their 1ns (Phaneron) with >> phenomena in their 2ns (Experience), since I associate such forcefulness >> primarily with the latter--although reaction as 2ns is obviously one of the >> irreducible elements that we directly observe in the former. The "Outward >> Clash" that ultimately leads us to the hypothesis of Reality (cf. CP 8.41; >> 1885) is a matter of *actual *Experience, not just *possible >> *"seeming"--which >> is why it is studied in Normative Logic as Semeiotic, rather than >> Phaneroscopy. At least, that is how I see it right now. >> >> GF: The three Universes correspond in logic to the modalities of the >> propositions represented by the Graphs. >> >> JAS: That is not what Peirce wrote in the quoted passage. >> >> GF: No, it is an inference from what Peirce wrote, based on his writings >> about EGs and modality in 1906-08. >> >> CSP: It is clear that their differences are not differences of the >> predicates, or significations, of the graphs, but of the predetermined >> objects to which the graphs are intended to refer. (R 300:38-39) >> >> The different Universes do not correspond to the modalities of the >> *propositions >> *represented, nor their Interpretants as signified by their *predicates*, >> but rather their Objects as denoted by their *subjects*--which, as you >> noted, must already be known to both Graphist and Interpreter from previous >> Collateral Experience. In EGs, these subjects are represented by the >> *heavily >> *drawn Lines of Identity, whose continuity is derived from that of the >> underlying surface of the Sheet of Assertion, >> >> GF: Here you are ignoring Peirce’s careful distinction between the >> continuity of the two-dimensional sheet and that of the one-dimensional >> line, which makes a difference in what they can represent iconically; also >> his statement that the three Universes cannot be represented by the icons >> which make up the Graphs, and can only be represented by differentiation of >> the surfaces on which those icons are drawn. >> >> which represents the Universe--just like the continuity of a white chalk >> line is derived from that of the clean blackboard on which it is marked >> (cf. CP 6:203; 1898). The *thinly *drawn line of a Cut is then a >> *discontinuity >> *between the Universe of Truth (*recto*) and the Universe of Falsity ( >> *verso*), which is why in a Ligature the Line of Identity *inside *a Cut >> must be understood as distinct from the one *outside *it. >> >> GF: Peirce does not deal with the cuts in the text I quoted, but he does >> in other parts of the “Bedrock,” in a way that spells trouble for the whole >> system of EGs. I’ll have to deal with that in a separate post. >> >> GF: Jon, since I think your approach to Peircean studies is rather >> different from mine, I haven’t responded to your post in detail, lest we >> sink into purely terminological issues. >> >> Understood, although I hope that this post helps clarify the relevance of >> my previous one. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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