Jon, Jeff, list,

Many thanks for all this, Jon! I find it very helpful in sorting out the many 
concepts (and analyses of the composition of concepts) which inhabit Peirce’s 
“Prolegomena” and the many unpublished drafts that he wrote before and after 
its publication. Digging through all this, I personally feel that I need all 
the help I can get ­— rather like a paleontologist who has come across a site 
littered with scattered bones of what may (or may not) belong to an entirely 
new species, but will have to spend months and years trying to figure out how 
the pieces fit together. And the challenge is even greater because the pieces 
are not physical artifacts but entia rationis, as Peirce would say. They are in 
themselves concepts, which are signs, which entails that the names of these 
concepts are signs of signs. This brings to mind Peirce’s onion metaphor, which 
is a sign of signs of signs:

[[ Now what is Logic? I early remarked that it is quite indifferent whether it 
be regarded as having to do with thought or with language, the wrapping of 
thought, since thought, like an onion, is composed of nothing but wrappings. ] 
EP2:460; see also CP 4.87, R403:11, EP2:392, CP 4.6 (R298). ]

This exegetical process wouldn’t be so complex if Peirce (and the caretakers of 
his writings) hadn’t kept so many of his drafts. But the bright side of this is 
that it preserves a record of his writing process — which, as he said himself, 
was also his thinking process — rather than just the end products of that 
process. When we look at his manuscripts it’s obvious that he revised as he 
wrote, crossing out words and making insertions between the lines, but also 
that he frequently started over instead of continuing the draft he was working 
on. We get the distinct impression that he is viewing his subject matter from 
slightly different angles in each draft, and this is a great help in building 
up the collateral experience which indicates what the symbols of his finished 
and published works actually refer to. Each draft is another “skin” of the same 
onion.

All right, enough of these metasemiotic remarks, I wanted to take up the 
composition of concepts, which was one of the major problems Peirce was dealing 
with in the Prolegomena and the draft material around it. But now I have an 
appointment to get to, and will have to pick up this thread a bit later. There 
are still many pieces to be fit into our model of this prehistoric and living 
creature, semiosis.

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> 
Sent: 3-Apr-19 21:10
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic

 

List:

 

I should have checked the Pietarinen transcriptions before posting.

 

CSP:  The nature of the universe or universes of discourse (for several may be 
referred to in a single assertion) in the rather unusual cases in which such 
precision is required, is denoted either by using modifications of the heraldic 
tinctures, marked in something like the usual manner in pale ink upon the 
surface, or by scribing the graphs in colored inks. In the former method it is 
usual to employ the different metals (or, argent, fur, and plomb) to mark the 
different kinds of existence or actuality, the different colours (azure, gules, 
vert, purpur) for the different kinds of possibility,—possibility consisting of 
ignorance, of variety, of power, of futurity; and the furs (sable, ermine, 
vair, potent), for the different kinds of intention. (R 670:19-20[18-19]; 1911 
June 12-13)

 

This confirms that according to Peirce, there are exactly four different kinds 
of actuality, possibility, and intention; but he only names them in the case of 
possibility, and does not elaborate on exactly what ignorance, variety, power 
and futurity mean in this context.  I also just discovered that Don Roberts, on 
page 93 of The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce, quotes the following 
explanation.

 

CSP:  Different states of things may all be Actual and yet not Actual together; 
and the same is true of the Possible and the Destined. Two graphs in the same 
Province, i.e. on the same continuously tinctured surface will be asserted, not 
merely as True, but as True together. Hence, since four tinctures are necessary 
to break the continuity between any two parts of any ordinary surface, four 
metals, four colors, and four furs will be required. (R 295:44; 1906)

 

It seems that the basis for providing four tinctures within each mode was 
primarily practical, rather than theoretical.  On page 94, Roberts offers his 
guess as to what Peirce might have intended each tincture to represent, along 
with a suggested color as an alternative.

*       Metal (Actuality)

*       Argent (white) - "The actual or true in a general or ordinary sense."
*       Or (cream) - "The actual or true in some special sense."
*       Fer - not used
*       Plomb - not used

*       Color (Possibility)

*       Azure (blue) - "Dark blue: logical possibility. Light blue: subjective 
possibility."
*       Gules (red) - "Objective possibility."
*       Vert (green) - "What is in the interrogative mood."
*       Purpure (purple) - "Freedom or ability."

*       Fur (Intention)

*       Sable (gray) - "The metaphysically, or rationally, or secondarily 
necessitated."
*       Ermine (yellow) - "Purpose or intention."
*       Vair (brown) - "The commanded."
*       Potent (orange) - "The compelled."

Regards,

 

Jon S.

 

On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 6:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

Jeff, Gary F., List:

 

The footnote quoted by Jeff about "the quaternion of metals" is from 
"Prolegomena" (1906), while the comment quoted by Gary F. about "different 
dimensions of the logical Universe" is from "Bedrock" (1908).  (This is not 
obvious in the electronic version of CP, where all of the footnotes--both 
Peirce's own and those provided by the editors--are jumbled together; I had to 
look at the original published version 
<http://www.pragmaticism.net/works/csp_ms/P01128.pdf>  of "Prolegomena" in 
order to disentangle them.)  Consequently, it seems quite tenuous to link the 
two concepts, such that "the quaternion of metals" somehow corresponds to "four 
dimensions--one real and three imaginary."

 

In fact, Peirce wrote that all four Metal tinctures correspond to Actuality, 
while Color is used for Possibility and Fur is used for Intention (CP 4.554).  
However, he did not spell out in "Prolegomena" why there are exactly four 
tinctures for each Mode of Being.  On the other hand, in "Bedrock" he referred 
to "the different tints representing different kinds of possibility" (CP 
4.578).  Can we perhaps infer from this that there are exactly four different 
kinds of Possibility, as well as exactly four different kinds of Actuality and 
exactly four different kinds of Intention?  If so, what are they?

 

As for the "different dimensions of the logical Universe," Peirce explicitly 
attributed this concept to his former student, O. H. Mitchell; and in two 
alternative drafts of "Bedrock," he stated the following.

 

CSP:  Yet since the Universe, which force[s] upon us all those enduring 
thoughts that we call truths, makes its power felt in three ways so utterly 
different that we may well liken them to a set of three mutually perpendicular 
directions from which any object may be viewed, we must distinguish, Firstly 
... the Universe of Real Capacities; then, Secondly ... the Universe of Actual 
Fact; and Thirdly ... the Universe of Tendencies ... I have suggested [in 
"Prolegomena"] that we resort to the heraldic tinctures; to wit, to color for 
the Universe of Capacities, to metal for the Universe of actuality, and to fur 
for the universe of tendencies ... (R 300:72-75[37-40])

 

CSP:  As to the Mitchellian Dimensions of the Universe, it is easy to see that 
their mutual relations,--imaged by perpendicularities in sets of three,--are 
relations between different Modalities. (R 300:76[38])

 

Hence there are only three such dimensions, not four; and they correspond 
directly to the three Universes of Capacities, Actualities, and 
Tendencies--i.e., the three Modes of Tincture, not the four different tinctures 
within any one of them.  It thus seems clear to me that in the "Prolegomena" 
footnote, Peirce intended only the first sense of "quaternion," and not also 
the third sense as Jeff conjectured.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

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