Gary R, Gary F, List,
What are the different options open for interpreting the "could ever be" part of "Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron"? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Gary Richmond <[email protected]> Sent: Saturday, April 6, 2019 11:14:43 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic Gary f, List, You wrote: [Peirce] also wrote in CP 1.286 [. . .\ c. 1904): [[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody [. . .] ]] Then in one of his drafts for the 1906 “Prolegomena” we find: [[ Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside Thought proper) will be a Constituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. ] “PAP”, R 293 (NEM4:320) ] Gf: Can the Phaneron be both “directly open to observation” and “far too elusive for direct observation”? Or is this a case of Peirce contradicting himself? Or did he change his mind about the nature of the Phaneron? Perhaps the very concept of the Phaneron is so vague (like the concept of God) that the principle of contradiction does not apply to it; Peirce indeed offered that as a “scientific definition” of vagueness (CP 5.448, EP2:351). Just a thought: That which Peirce says in 1904 is "directly open to observation" are "phanerons." Notice the plural; directly afterwards he writes of "those" phanerons "familiar to everybody." Again, plural, suggesting that here he is not talking about the phaneron tout court, but "those. . . familiar to everybody." In 1906 he refers to the "collective whole" as the "phaneron," singular. If "The Phaneron [. . .] is far too elusive for direct observation," while "the substance of every Thought (and of much beside Thought proper) will be a Constituent of the Phaneron," perhaps what can be studied "through the Diagram of it which the System of Existential Graphs" are exactly the Constituents of it. If this is so, than phaneron (singular) may refer to the whole of any phaneroscopic observation, while phanerons (plural) refers to each "Constituent of the Phaneron," which, through some form of abstraction, can now be made an element of and studied via EGs. Analogously, we can observe the sky generally and vaguely, but then begin to single out elements of it, describe them, name them, etc. Again, just a quick thought. Best, Gary R On Sat, Apr 6, 2019 at 11:51 AM <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, list, I think I’m with you on all of this. I hesitated over your statement that “a definition can only serve as an Immediate Interpretant,” because I don’t think that applies to a term defined for use in pure mathematics; but maybe such a term is not a Seme, because it does not serve as a substitute for an object which existed before the definition. Still, I would want to emphasize that definition is pragmatically a recursive process. The more a term has been used in any given discourse, the more “real” its meaning is, prior to any explicit definition of it. Peirce the lexicographer certainly did not define terms in the same way as Peirce the pure mathematician. Yet even the pure mathematician, when he gives a verbal definition, has to use words with which the interpreter is already familiar. One of the loose ends I wanted to address in this thread is a problem of definition. Peirce defined his new term “phaneron” as follows: [[ The word φανερόν is next to the simplest expression in Greek for manifest.… There can be no question that φανερός means primarily brought to light, open to public expression throughout.… I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. ] R 337:4-5, 7, 1904 ] He also wrote in CP 1.286 (R 336, “Logic viewed as Semeiotics, Introduction Number 2, Phaneroscopy,” c. 1904): [[ There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic decoration to a man congenitally blind. ]] Then in one of his drafts for the 1906 “Prolegomena” we find: [[ Let us call the collective whole of all that could ever be present to the mind in any way or in any sense, the Phaneron. Then the substance of every Thought (and of much beside Thought proper) will be a Constituent of the Phaneron. The Phaneron being itself far too elusive for direct observation, there can be no better method of studying it than through the Diagram of it which the System of Existential Graphs puts at our disposition. ] “PAP”, R 293 (NEM4:320) ] Can the Phaneron be both “directly open to observation” and “far too elusive for direct observation”? Or is this a case of Peirce contradicting himself? Or did he change his mind about the nature of the Phaneron? Perhaps the very concept of the Phaneron is so vague (like the concept of God) that the principle of contradiction does not apply to it; Peirce indeed offered that as a “scientific definition” of vagueness (CP 5.448, EP2:351). Another loose end is related to a quote you posted from R 284, and I’ll try to take that one up next time. (But then, as Peirce seems to be telling us, there’s no end to loose ends!) Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: 5-Apr-19 12:39 To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy and logic Gary F., List: For me, that little living mouse is the residue of indeterminacy possessed by every Sign, as well as by every Object of a Sign. Applied to a Seme, it is why a definition can only serve as an Immediate Interpretant that corresponds to an Immediate Object--a finite and somewhat arbitrary collection of characters that vaguely delimit what the Seme possibly could denote when serving as a subject of a Proposition expressed within a particular Sign System. The continuous predicate that marries multiple Semes into a Proposition--including any definition of any one of them--mutually determines all of them with respect to each other. Applied to any Object of a Sign, it is the basis for Peirce's extreme scholastic realism. "The Object of every Sign is an Individual, usually an Individual Collection of Individuals" (CP 8.181, EP 2:494; 1909); nevertheless, all individuals, including all Objects of Signs, are indeterminate and thus general to some degree--like the indefinite subject denoted by a Line of Identity, which always has room for more Spots of Teridentity to attach additional Spots for Semes. However, some Objects of Signs are real--"that which is such as it is whatever you or I or any generation of men may opine or otherwise think that it is" (R 498:32; 1906). Therefore, some generals are real. Applied to the Universe as a semeiosic continuum, an Argument consisting of true Propositions (facts) married by leading principles (logic of events), it reflects how Creation as "the development of Reason ... is going on today and never will be done" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). "If we are to explain the universe, we must assume that there was in the beginning a state of things in which there was nothing ... Utter indetermination" (EP 2:322; 1904). As "a vast representamen ... working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193; 1903), the Universe continues being made more determinate by its Object; and as a "perfect sign," it "is perpetually being acted upon by its object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it already had, but which had lain dormant" (EP 2:545n25; 1906). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
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