John, List: JFS: But I can't recall any case where Peirce used the word 'part' to talk about the meaning of a symbol. Do you know of any examples?
Of course--for one thing, he held that *every Proposition* has parts. CSP: But the only kind of sign whose object is necessarily existent is the genuine Index. This Index might, indeed, be a *part of a Symbol* ... every proposition contains a *Subject *and a *Predicate*, the former representing (or being) an Index of the Primary Object, or Correlate of the relation represented, the latter representing (or being) an Icon of the Dicisign in some respect ... [a Dicisign] must, in order to be understood, be considered as *containing two parts*. Of these, the one, *which may be called the Subject*, is or represents an Index of a Second existing independently of its being represented, while the other, *which may be called the Predicate*, is or represents an Icon of a Firstness (CP 2.310-312; 1903, bold added) CSP: Every proposition has one predicate and one only. But what that predicate is considered to be depends upon how we choose to analyze it ... Every proposition has an *ultimate predicate*, produced by putting a blank in every place where a blank can be placed, without substituting for some word its definition ... Each *part of a proposition* which might be replaced by a proper name, and still leave the proposition a proposition is a *subject *of the proposition. (CP 4.438; c. 1903, bold added) The indexical parts of a Proposition are the Semes that serve as its subjects, which denote its Objects; and the iconic part of a Proposition is its predicate, which signifies its Interpretant. As we have discussed at length recently, I prefer Peirce's analysis in which everything that must *already *be known to an interpreting Quasi-mind from previous Collateral Experience or current Collateral Observation in order to be understood--including any *existential *predicates--is treated as a *subject*, leaving only the continuous/logical/pure/ultimate predicate, which is all that the Proposition *itself *can convey. CSP: Now every proposition has its predicate which expresses *what *is believed, and its subjects which express *of what* it is believed ... A proposition, then, has one predicate and any number of subjects. The subjects are either names of objects well known to the utterer and to the interpreter of the proposition (otherwise he could not interpret it) or they are virtually almost directions how to proceed to gain acquaintance with what is referred to. (CP 5.542; c. 1902) CSP: ... I regard everything to which the assertion relates and to which reference can be removed from the predicate, although what is referred to be a quality, relation, state of things, etc. as a Subject ... The Predicate is that part of the assertion which is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects. (R 611:9-10[14-15]; 1908 Oct 28) CSP: A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one. But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is requisite ... The result is that everything in a proposition that possibly can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the *pure *predicate a mere form of connection. (NEM 3:885; 1908 Dec 5) CSP: The subject of a pure symbolic proposition, i.e. one in which no diagram is involved, but only conventional signs, such as words, might be defined as that with which some collateral acquaintance is requisite to the interpretation (the understanding,) of the proposition ... When we have analyzed a proposition so as to throw into the subject everything that can be removed from the predicate, all that it remains for the predicate to represent is the form of connection between the different subjects as expressed in the propositional *form* ... when we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements. (SS 70-72; 1908 Dec 14) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 3:14 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > On 4/18/2019 11:27 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Now, when we say that a flower /is /blue, I agree that we are not > > claiming that a flower /is identical to/ blueness; instead, we are > > saying that a flower /possesses the character of/ blueness. Likewise, > > there is a sense in which we can say that a Symbol /is /indexical or > > iconic, in that it has /parts /that possess these characters. > > I agree with everything up to the last line. > > The word 'part' is much more precise than the word 'involve'. > > A formal theory about parts and wholes (mereology) is very precise. > Informal language about parts and wholes is almost as precise, and > it can usually be mapped to and from whatever version of mereology > is appropriate. > > As Peirce said (CP 4.237), > > It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme. Only, one > > must commonly surrender all ambition to be certain. It is equally > > easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague. It is > > not so difficult to be pretty precise and fairly certain at once > > about a very narrow subject. > > If we translate talk about mapping signs to existential graphs, > then we have "a very narrow subject" about which we can be "pretty > precise and fairly certain at once." > > But when we're talking "upon a general theme" about signs and > their application to a continuous world with a continuous range > of perception and action, we "must commonly surrender all ambition > to be certain." > > It's possible to talk about parts of an icon, because it has > a physical extension. An EG, as a diagram, is an icon that > has parts. Peirce talked about those parts in detail. > > Since symbols are derived, by habit or convention, from icons, > the mark that is interpreted as a symbol could have parts -- > for example, parts of a traffic light or letters of a word. > But those parts, by themselves, have no independent meaning. > > But I can't recall any case where Peirce used the word 'part' to > talk about the meaning of a symbol. Do you know of any examples? > > When extending Peirce's terminology to new areas, his work on EGs > is sufficiently narrow to support precise applications. But even > as late as 1907, he considered "semeotic" to be "too vast, the > labor too great, for a first-comer". > > I think we should be cautious about extending his terminology to > areas where he didn't go. See below for the quotations from the end > of my note with the subject line "Peirce was fallible, and so are we". > > John > ___________________________________________________________________ > > I am, as far as I know, a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the > work of clearing and opening up what I call semeotic, that is, the > doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible > [semeosis]; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a > first-comer. [MS 318:96; CP 5.488 (1905); EP 2:413 (1907); note date > discrepancies because of many variants of this MS] > > What has chiefly prevented my publishing much has been, first, that > my desire to teach has not been so strong as my desire to learn, and > secondly, that so far from there being any demand for papers by me, I > have found considerable difficulty in getting them printed as a favor > to myself. [L75 (1902)] > > The truth is that I am far too well acquainted with the depths of my > own stupidity to know what it is to be satisfied with any product of > my mind. [MS 316a] > > I have always been so ardently bent upon correcting and improving my > own opinions and conceptions that before I would reach the later > chapters of a long book, those that I had written earliest would > appear to me poor, and the whole plan of the work, which, of course, > had been laid out first of all, to be unenlightened. [MS 694, 1902] > > When I first got the general algebra of logic into smooth running order > [in 1884], by a method that has lain nearly twenty years in manuscript > and which I have lately concluded is so impossible to get printed that > it had better be burned, — when I first found myself in possession of > this machinery I promised myself that I should see the whole working > of the mathematical reason unveiled directly. [MS 303] > > For years in the course of this ripening process, I used for myself > to collect my ideas under the designation fallibilism; and indeed > the first step toward finding out is to acknowledge you do not > satisfactorily know already; so that no blight can so surely arrest > all intellectual growth as the blight of cocksureness; and ninety- > nine out of every hundred good heads are reduced to impotence by > that malady — of whose inroads they are most strangely unaware! > [fragment, c. 1897] > > All that you can find in print of my work on logic are simply > scattered outcroppings here and there of a rich vein which remains > unpublished. Most of it I suppose has been written down; but no human > being could ever put together the fragments. I could not myself do so. > [MS 302, 1903] >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
