Helmut, list
I think it's right to use the term 'function' with regard to the
semiosic triadic process. The 'function' shows that the mediative
process of the Representamen is not a static action of passively
moving raw data, but a generalizing act that actually changes the raw
data. This also means that the rules embodied within the Representamen
can change; they can evolve and adapt.
Without such an acknowledgement that the mediative process of the
Semiosic triad is a generative rather than static action, then,
adaptation and evolution - whether it be of language or of biological
organisms, would be impossible.
Therefore your knife, as an object, can have multiple Interpretants,
via the mediative functional relation of the Representamen. That
object is able to function within a diversity of interactions and
this enables diversity of existence and thought.
Biologically, an object with only ONE Interpretant is the least
capable of preserving matter/energy on this planet. That is, an
object with multiple Interpretants contributes to a rich and diverse
domain. A fish, as a material object, has the Interpretant result of
producing many more fish. It also has the Interpretant result of
eating the plankton and bacteria and cleaning the water. And also, of
providing food for the predator objects that eat it.
A meadow, which has a huge number of biological objects networked
with each other is far richer and more powerful in maintaining matter
- than a peat bog with its few limited species.
The point of defining the semiosic triadic process as a function, is
to explain, in a non-verbal example, how this process is not one that
simply moves data from one site to another site [O->R->I] but
actually, at the nodal site of the Representamen, actually changes
this raw data into information by adding, changing, transforming it
within its stored laws. That is a powerful process.
So- I will maintain my view that explaining the semiosic triad as a
function of f[x]=y is a valid examination.
Edwina
On Fri 19/04/19 8:28 AM , "Helmut Raulien" [email protected] sent:
Jon, list, Thank you for clarifying! I admit having made
mistakes. I think to say a thing consists of matter, form, function
means, that the function it has is a function for the reality as a
whole, like with a knife it is for cutting. If somebody uses a knife
for driving a screw, it is a two-purpose-tool, but only for this
person, and not for the reality as a whole. I guess a type-sign´s
function is for reality as whole, and a token-sign´s for the
commens. Regarding my term "functional composition", I think it is
better, or only that way correct, to always speak of the "sign´s
function", or of the "function for the sign´s function" (and not of
the "sign"), to avoid the discussion whether the sign is, or merely
has or involves a function. Mathematically, as I´ve understood it, a
function is a relation between two sets in which each element of one
set affects only one other element in the other set, but one element
from the other set may affect more than one element in the first set.
I guess it is problematic to transfer this mathematical meaning to
semiotics. Best regards, Helmut 18. April 2019 um 17:27 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:
Helmut, List: Your suspicion of a "creationist" agenda is
unfounded--"involution" is Peirce's own logical term for the sequence
from 3ns to 2ns to 1ns, which is also the order of analysis. As the
different prefixes indicate, it is simply the opposite of the order
of evolution, which is from 1ns to 2ns to 3ns. CSP: According
to the path here pursued from monad to triad, from monadic triads to
triadic triads, etc., we do not progress by logical involution--we do
not say the monad involves a dyad--but we pursue a path of evolution.
(CP 1.490; c. 1896) A triad involves dyads, but it is false to
say that a triad is a dyad; and a dyad involves monads, but it is
false to say that a dyad is a monad. In Peirce's Semeiotic,
involution primarily applies across a given trichotomy as a division
of Signs, most notably those for the relation to the (Dynamic) Object
and (Final) Interpretant. Symbols involve Indices, which involve
Icons; but it is false to say that a Symbol is an Index, or that an
Index is an Icon. Arguments involve Propositions, which involve
Semes; but it is false to say that an Argument is a Proposition, or
that a Proposition is a Seme. Now, when we say that a flower is
blue, I agree that we are not claiming that a flower is identical to
blueness; instead, we are saying that a flower possesses the
character of blueness. Likewise, there is a sense in which we can
say that a Symbol is indexical or iconic, in that it has parts that
possess these characters. On the other hand, I think that it would
be misleading to say that an Argument is propositional or "semic,"
even though it has parts that possess these "characters." The
question, then, is whether saying that a Sign is triadic is more like
saying that a Symbol is indexical/iconic or that an Argument is
propositional/semic; I lean strongly toward the latter, because
"triadicity" is properly a character of relations, not of correlates.
As such, I stand by the implication that it is false to say that a
thing is a relation or function; rather, a thing has relations (to
other things) and functions (final causes). My heart possesses the
function of pumping blood, and when it is actually doing so it stands
in the relation of pumping to blood, but it is never the pumping of
blood itself. The vagueness of the copula in English allows me to
say, "My heart is pumping blood," and be properly understood; but the
thing (my heart) is still not the relation or function (pumping
blood). That is one reason why I have suggested using different
colors in EGs for Spots that denote Objects in different
Universes--my heart as a thing is an Actuality/Existent, pumping
blood as a relation is a Capacity/Possible, and pumping blood as a
function is a Tendency/Necessitant. Moreover, the ontology of
functions is a matter of considerable controversy among philosophers
these days, especially with respect to artifacts. Does a knife, as a
thing, consist of not only its Form and Matter, but also its function
of cutting? If so, does it somehow become a different thing--really
different, not just differently named--when someone employs it
instead for the function of turning a screw? I would not think
so--that new function simply becomes another predicate that we can
truthfully ascribe to it; it is not a different thing, but it is a
more determinate thing. In fact, this is precisely what Peirce
identified as the function of both the creation and knowledge of
reality--or rather, their Entelechy, his preferred counterpart term
to Form and Matter. CSP: The mode of being of the
composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the
attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence
which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the
knowledge of such reality. It is the entelechy, or perfection of
being. (CP 6.341; 1908) Likewise, in Peirce's Semeiotic
there is an important distinction between a Sign, which "is not a
real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904), and a Replica or Instance of that Sign,
which is a thing that is determined by a Dynamic Object to determine a
Dynamic Interpretant. At that moment, the Token does not become a
different thing, but it does perform a different function; namely,
semeiosis--making something else, a Quasi-mind, more determinate .
Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 11:49 PM Helmut Raulien
wrote: Supplement: But I still have the following suspicion: To
involve means to contain, the noun is involvement, and not
involution, which I suspect to be a creationist antithesis to
evolution. So, if a sign involves the triadic relation, it "is" it in
the sense of adjective, like to say a flower is blue, which does not
mean blue is a flower (not identity). To say that a sign is merely a
"thing", but not a relaition or function, implies, that a thing is
not a relation or function. But that is not so. A thing is only a
thing through its function, there is no thing-in-itself. A thing
consists (composition) of matter, form, and function. Jon, list,
Ok then, I guess, to "involve" does not mean to "contain" in the sense
of composition, as I had thought. Best regards, Helmut 16. April
2019 um 23:05 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: On the contrary, the first
quote below does not corroborate the view that the Sign itself is a
triad; i.e., a triadic relation--especially once we examine the
entire passage. CSP: Conversely, every thought proper involves
the idea of a triadic relation. For every thought proper involves
the idea of a sign. Now a sign is a thing related to an object and
determining in the interpreter an interpreting sign of the same
object. It involves the relation between sign, interpreting sign,
and object. (R 462:40[74]; 1903) In other words, every thought
proper involves the idea of a triadic relation between sign,
interpreting sign, and object. The sign itself is a thing, a
correlate of that relation, not the relation itself. As Gary R. and
I have both pointed out, Peirce explicitly called it a medium of
communication, not the relation of mediating or communicating.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional
Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 3:42 PM Helmut Raulien wrote:
Edwina, Gary, list: Here are (from Commens Dictionary) two quotes,
the first corrobates Edwinas view, and the second Garys. In the first
quote the sign involves the relation, in the second not ("for the
purpose", not "with the purpose"). ---------------------- 1903 |
C.S.P.'s Lowell Lectures of 1903 2nd Draught of 3rd Lecture | MS [R]
462:74
…a sign is a thing related to an object and determining in the
interpreter an interpreting sign of the same object. It involves the
relation between sign, interpreting sign, and object.
---------------------- 1899-1900 [c.] | Notes on
Topical Geometry | MS [R] 142:3
A sign is a thing which is a representative, or deputy, of another
thing for the purpose of affecting mind.
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