Jon S, List,

Consider the following sort of sign:


Imagine that upon the soil of a country, that has a single boundary line … [and 
on the ground] there lies a map of that same country. This map may distort the 
different provinces of the country to any extent. But I shall suppose that it 
represents every part of the country that has a single boundary, by a part of 
the map that has a single boundary, that every part is represented as bounded 
by such parts as it really is bounded by, that every point of the country is 
represented by a single point of the map, and that every point of the map 
represents a single point in the country. Let us further suppose that this map 
is infinitely minute in its representation so that there is no speck on any 
grain of sand in the country that could not be seen represented upon the map if 
we were to examine it under a sufficiently high magnifying power. Since, then, 
everything on the soil of the country is shown on the map, and since the map 
lies on the soil of the country, the map itself will be portrayed in the map, 
and in this map of the map everything on the soil of the country can be 
discerned, including the map itself with the map of the map within its 
boundary. Thus there will be within the map, a map of the map, and within that, 
a map of the map of the map, and so on ad infinitum. These maps being each 
within the preceding ones of the series, there will be a point contained in all 
of them, and this will be the map of itself. Each map which directly or 
indirectly represents the country is itself mapped in the next; i.e., in the 
next [it] is represented to be a map of the country. In other words each map is 
interpreted as such in the next. We may therefore say that each is a 
representation of the country to the next map; and that point that is in all 
the maps is in itself the representation of nothing but itself and to nothing 
but itself. [CP 5.71]


In addition to representing each part of the country, the map seems to 
represents itself. As such, a part of the map is the object of the map, 
considered as a sign. What is more, the map appears to contain an 
interpretation of itself, and endlessly so. Insofar as the map lies on the 
ground of the country, it is a part of that country.


How might we analyze the relations between the objects, signs, and 
interpretants involved in this sort of self-referential case? Does it make any 
difference as to whether we focus on the iconic, indexical or symbolic 
functions of the map in its relation to itself?


Yours,


Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


________________________________
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2019 11:04 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity of Semeiosis Revisited

John, List:

JAS:  I did not claim that my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of God is 
unavoidable; I said that it furnishes what seems to me to be the unavoidable 
answer to the specific question that I had just posed--if the entire Universe 
is a Sign, then what is its Object?

JFS:  The clearest and most obvious answer is that the universe is a sign of 
itself -- it's a sinsign.  That observation ties up the loose ends.  To go 
further is an unjustified assumption.

No, that answer is obviously incorrect, since every Sign--including every 
Sinsign or Token--is determined by an Object other than itself.  I already 
acknowledged that every Sign is its own Object in a trivial sense, but if it 
has no other Object, then it does not represent anything or mediate between two 
other correlates in a genuine triadic relation--i.e., it is not a Sign at all.

JFS:  Peirce merely said "ens necessarium and creator of the three universes".  
That definition is consistent with many hypotheses, and there is no clear 
reason for choosing any one:  (1) Pantheism, God = Universe.  (2) God is 
transcendent -- outside of the universe.  (3) God is inside (a part of) the 
universe.  (4) God is ineffable, and wherever or whatever God may be, no sign 
can describe God.  (5) God does not exist -- as Peirce himself said, all 
theories are fallible.

Again, (1) and (3) are ruled out by classifying the Universe as a Sign, as well 
as by the designation of God as "creator of all three Universes of Experience," 
since the creator of X obviously cannot be X itself, let alone merely part of 
X.  Moreover, as I apparently have to keep repeating and will finally here 
quote, Peirce explicitly denied that God is "immanent in" nature or the three 
Universes in four different drafts of "A Neglected Argument."

CSP:  I do not mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is 
"immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, of 
matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them. (R 843:11)

CSP:  Indeed, meaning by "God," throughout this paper will be meant, the Being 
whose attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, omniscience, 
omnipotence, infinite benignity, and a Being not immanent in the Universes of 
Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of them without 
exception. (R 843:15)

CSP:  Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, the 
Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, 
Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being not "immanent in" the 
Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of 
them without exception (R 843:19&21)

CSP:  But I had better add that I do not mean by God a being merely "immanent 
in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content of the world of 
ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and the world of all 
minds, without any exception whatever. (R 843:26)

In each case, the emphasis on the word "not" is Peirce's own--it is underlined 
in the manuscripts--while the all-encompassing scope of "everything in them" 
and "every content of them without exception" is unambiguous.  (4) and (5) are 
obviously inconsistent with Peirce's definition, since any definition of an 
ineffable or unreal God would be false.  (Note that Peirce quite deliberately 
argued for the Reality of God, not His existence.)  That leaves (2) as the only 
remaining option, and there could be no clearer reason for choosing it.  The 
alternative is simply rejecting altogether not only Peirce's definition of God, 
but also his definition of a Sign as requiring an Object other than itself 
and/or his characterization of the entire Universe as a Sign.

JFS:  In fact, today's society is becoming so badly fragmented that there is a 
desperate need for more dot connecting.  Instead of making dubious connections 
in Peirce's philosophy, a far more valuable project would be to apply his 
theories to connecting the many fragmented dots today.

Indeed, and one example of "the many fragmented dots today" is the divide 
between science and religion, which Peirce himself conscientiously sought to 
bridge.  I suspect that he would heartily endorse efforts to develop and apply 
his ideas further toward that end.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 11:04 AM John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
Jon and Edwina,

JAS
> Peirce wrote that "the Universe is a vast representamen", which
> "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs"
> (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).
>
> That sounds to me like "the aggregate formed by a sign and all
> the signs which its occurrence carries with it,"

Neither quotation implies the other.

JAS
> this particular way is my own interpretation, but I consider it
> to be fully consistent with the texts themselves.

To say that A is consistent with B is much weaker than saying that
A is implied by B.  You can add all sorts of statements that Peirce
had never intended and still be consistent with what he said.

JAS
> the unavoidable answer to the specific question that I had just
> posed--if the entire Universe is a Sign, then what is its Object?

The clearest and most obvious answer is that the universe is
a sign of itself -- it's a sinsign.  That observation ties up
the loose ends.  To go further is an unjustified assumption.

ET
> the definition of 'God' is ambiguous and even, missing...

Peirce merely said "ens necessarium and creator of the three universes".
That definition is consistent with many hypotheses, and there is no
clear reason for choosing any one:

(1) Pantheism, God = Universe.  (2) God is transcendent -- outside
of the universe.  (3) God is inside (a part of) the universe.
(4) God is ineffable, and wherever or whatever God may be, no sign
can describe God.  (5) God does not exist -- as Peirce himself said,
all theories are fallible.

Definitions #1 and #5, by the way, are closely related.  When
asked whether he believed in God, Einstein sometimes said no. But
he sometimes replied "I believe in the God of Spinoza."  However,
Spinoza equated God with Nature.  That is a version of pantheism,
which in those days was considered the equivalent of atheism.

JAS
> It goes without saying that connecting the dots in this particular
> way is my own interpretation, but I consider it to be fully
> consistent with the texts themselves.

But "consistent with" is much weaker than "implied by".

Peirce was a master of "connecting dots" among the theories
of philosophy, science, and engineering of his day.  Look at
his classification of the sciences in 1903.  I would be very
cautious about making any claims about unconnected dots in
his writings.

In fact, today's society is becoming so badly fragmented that
there is a desperate need for more dot connecting.   Instead
of making dubious connections in Peirce's philosophy, a far
more valuable project would be to apply his theories to
connecting the many fragmented dots today.

John
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