Jon, John, List, Jon quoted John, then wrote:
JFS: The clearest and most obvious answer is that the universe is a sign of itself -- it's a sinsign. That observation ties up the loose ends. To go further is an unjustified assumption. JAS: No, that answer is obviously *incorrect*, since every Sign--including every Sinsign or Token--is determined by an Object *other than itself*. I do not see how Jon's conclusion can be avoided: *Every* Sign *must* have an Object *other than itself*. JAS: "That leaves (2) ["God is transcendent -- outside of the universe" JS] as the only remaining option, and there could be no clearer reason for choosing it. The alternative is simply rejecting altogether not only Peirce's definition of God, but also his definition of a Sign as requiring an Object other than itself and/or his characterization of the entire Universe as a Sign. I have been following this discussion closely, finding your 'Semeiotic Argumentation' quite convincing, Jon. It seems that those who are arguing *contra* your conclusions will eventually either have to accept them as following from Peirce's own clear analyses, or they will have to admit that they disagree with Peirce not only on the Reality of God, but on the matter of a Sign requiring an Object other than itself. And, as you've argued, that would include the entire Universe seen as a Sign as Peirce did (one could, I suppose, disagree with that as well, but then one is once again disagreeing with Peirce's own clearly stated view). So, in short, Peirce was clearly a theist who argued that *if *one accepted that (1) the Universe is a Sign, and that (2) a Sign must have an Object other than itself, then one is driven to the conclusion that God is transcendent, outside the Universe and, indeed, the Creator of that Sign which is the Universe. Your Semeiotic Argumentation seems to me to bring together facets of his semeiotic and religious metaphysic to show that this was indeed Peirce's view (whether or not one agrees with it is another matter altogether). Meanwhile, Peirce's clearly stated definition of 'God' at the top of "A Neglected Argument" has never been refuted by those scholars who have looked much into it--such as Raposa, Orange, Nubiola, Potter, T.S. Short and others--as evidence, along with many other statements by Peirce--that he was a theist (perhaps of a "peculiar stripe"). Jon concluded: JAS: ". . .one example of "the many fragmented dots today" '[JS] is the divide between science and religion, which Peirce himself conscientiously sought to bridge. I suspect that he would heartily endorse efforts to develop and apply his ideas further toward that end. I would eagerly look forward to a discussion on the list of that 'hope' of Peirce that his semeiotic and metaphysic might contribute to bridging that "divide between science and religion." I am working on a draft of a post on 'trinity' which I'll post soon and which may possibly serve as a preamble to such a discussion. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 2:10 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > John, List: > > JAS: I did not claim that my Semeiotic Argumentation for the Reality of > God is unavoidable; I said that it furnishes what seems to me to be the > unavoidable *answer *to the specific *question *that I had just posed--if > the entire Universe is a Sign, then what is its Object? > > > JFS: The clearest and most obvious answer is that the universe is a sign > of itself -- it's a sinsign. That observation ties up the loose ends. To > go further is an unjustified assumption. > > > No, that answer is obviously *incorrect*, since every Sign--including > every Sinsign or Token--is determined by an Object *other than itself*. > I already acknowledged that every Sign is its own Object in a *trivial *sense, > but if it has no *other *Object, then it does not *represent *anything or > *mediate > *between two other correlates in a genuine triadic relation--i.e., it is > not a *Sign *at all. > > JFS: Peirce merely said "ens necessarium and creator of the three > universes". That definition is consistent with many hypotheses, and there > is no clear reason for choosing any one: (1) Pantheism, God = Universe. > (2) God is transcendent -- outside of the universe. (3) God is inside (a > part of) the universe. (4) God is ineffable, and wherever or whatever God > may be, no sign can describe God. (5) God does not exist -- as Peirce > himself said, all theories are fallible. > > > Again, (1) and (3) are ruled out by classifying the Universe as a Sign, as > well as by the designation of God as "creator of all three Universes of > Experience," since the *creator *of X obviously cannot be X *itself*, let > alone merely *part* of X. Moreover, as I apparently have to keep > repeating and will finally here quote, Peirce *explicitly denied* that > God is "immanent in" nature or the three Universes in *four different* drafts > of "A Neglected Argument." > > CSP: I do *not* mean, then, a "soul of the World" or an intelligence is > "immanent" in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, > of matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them. (R 843:11) > > CSP: Indeed, meaning by "God," throughout this paper will be meant, the > Being whose attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, > omniscience, omnipotence, infinite benignity, and a Being *not *immanent > in the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every > content of them without exception. (R 843:15) > > CSP: Indeed, meaning by "God," as throughout this paper will be meant, > the Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, > Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being *not *"immanent in" > the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every > content of them without exception (R 843:19&21) > > CSP: But I had better add that I do *not *mean by God a being merely > "immanent in Nature," but I mean that Being who has created every content > of the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and > the world of all minds, without any exception whatever. (R 843:26) > > > In each case, the emphasis on the word "not" is Peirce's own--it is > underlined in the manuscripts--while the all-encompassing scope of > "everything in them" and "every content of them without exception" is > unambiguous. (4) and (5) are obviously *inconsistent *with Peirce's > definition, since *any *definition of an ineffable or unreal God would be > *false*. (Note that Peirce quite deliberately argued for the *Reality *of > God, not His *existence*.) That leaves (2) as the only remaining option, > and there could be no clearer reason for choosing it. The alternative is > simply rejecting altogether not only Peirce's definition of God, but also > his definition of a Sign as requiring an Object other than itself and/or > his characterization of the entire Universe as a Sign. > > JFS: In fact, today's society is becoming so badly fragmented that there > is a desperate need for more dot connecting. Instead of making dubious > connections in Peirce's philosophy, a far more valuable project would be to > apply his theories to connecting the many fragmented dots today. > > > Indeed, and one example of "the many fragmented dots today" is the divide > between science and religion, which Peirce himself conscientiously sought > to bridge. I suspect that he would heartily endorse efforts to develop and > apply his ideas further toward that end. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 11:04 AM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon and Edwina, >> >> JAS >> > Peirce wrote that "the Universe is a vast representamen", which >> > "is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" >> > (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906). >> > >> > That sounds to me like "the aggregate formed by a sign and all >> > the signs which its occurrence carries with it," >> >> Neither quotation implies the other. >> >> JAS >> > this particular way is my own interpretation, but I consider it >> > to be fully consistent with the texts themselves. >> >> To say that A is consistent with B is much weaker than saying that >> A is implied by B. You can add all sorts of statements that Peirce >> had never intended and still be consistent with what he said. >> >> JAS >> > the unavoidable answer to the specific question that I had just >> > posed--if the entire Universe is a Sign, then what is its Object? >> >> The clearest and most obvious answer is that the universe is >> a sign of itself -- it's a sinsign. That observation ties up >> the loose ends. To go further is an unjustified assumption. >> >> ET >> > the definition of 'God' is ambiguous and even, missing... >> >> Peirce merely said "ens necessarium and creator of the three universes". >> That definition is consistent with many hypotheses, and there is no >> clear reason for choosing any one: >> >> (1) Pantheism, God = Universe. (2) God is transcendent -- outside >> of the universe. (3) God is inside (a part of) the universe. >> (4) God is ineffable, and wherever or whatever God may be, no sign >> can describe God. (5) God does not exist -- as Peirce himself said, >> all theories are fallible. >> >> Definitions #1 and #5, by the way, are closely related. When >> asked whether he believed in God, Einstein sometimes said no. But >> he sometimes replied "I believe in the God of Spinoza." However, >> Spinoza equated God with Nature. That is a version of pantheism, >> which in those days was considered the equivalent of atheism. >> >> JAS >> > It goes without saying that connecting the dots in this particular >> > way is my own interpretation, but I consider it to be fully >> > consistent with the texts themselves. >> >> But "consistent with" is much weaker than "implied by". >> >> Peirce was a master of "connecting dots" among the theories >> of philosophy, science, and engineering of his day. Look at >> his classification of the sciences in 1903. I would be very >> cautious about making any claims about unconnected dots in >> his writings. >> >> In fact, today's society is becoming so badly fragmented that >> there is a desperate need for more dot connecting. Instead >> of making dubious connections in Peirce's philosophy, a far >> more valuable project would be to apply his theories to >> connecting the many fragmented dots today. >> >> John >> >
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