Gary F., List: Thank you for further clarifying your objection. Initially it was that God is completely separated from His creation, and thus absent from the Universes of Experience. When I disputed this, it was that our acquaintance with God must be entirely mediated by Signs. Since I pointed out that we are in the same situation with respect to anyone who lived or anything that happened before we were born, you noted that those people and events *existed*, but God *did not* and *does not*--as Peirce himself explicitly affirmed, which is why he specifically argued for the *Reality *of God instead.
Please do not misinterpret this as an accusation of moving the goalposts; I am simply explaining the progression of my own understanding of your position during the course of our exchange so far. Am I correct that the *non-existence* of God is what you find problematic for our ability to acquire knowledge of Him? If so, then one possible response from me would be to invoke the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation; however, I will respect your preference not to delve any further into theology at this point. Instead, I will stick to relevant Peircean concepts and texts. In thinking about all of this over the last couple of days, I noticed the same thing that you did about the first sentence of "A Neglected Argument" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908)--Peirce considered "God" to be "*the *definable proper name" (emphasis in original), implying that it is the *only *such case; and he then specified what it *signifies*, not what it *denotes*. In other words, the *Immediate Interpretant* of "God" (so capitalized) is "*Ens necessarium*, in my [Peirce's] belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience"; and my current understanding of Speculative Grammar is that the *Immediate Object* of "God" is whatever it *possibly could* denote in English accordingly. What you seem to be questioning is how we can *know* that "God" *actually does* denote something as its *Dynamic Object*--i.e., how it can serve as a *subject* of a Proposition that we are able to evaluate as either true or false, which would require previous Collateral Experience or current Collateral Observation in order to be understood at all. According to Peirce, if God is *Real* then He has "Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not" (CP 6.453, EP 2:434; 1908). However, he already expressed dissatisfaction with that particular formulation in his Logic Notebook the month *before* it appeared in print. CSP: As to the Real, I have decided within the last few days that my definition in The Hibbert Journal was not advisable, since it gives rise to a multitude of perplexing problems of little or no meaning. It is better to say that that which truly possesses an attribute independently of the latter being attributed to the former by any single finite mind or single group of such minds is, in so far, *Real*, thus avoiding those insoluble & nonsensical problems. (R 339:476[322r]; 1908 Sep 9) It is thus *possessing* characters independently of them being *attributed* to it, rather than the *sufficiency* of those characters to *identify* it, that makes something *Real*. In other words, whether or not we are able to *identify* God by His attributes has no bearing on His Reality; only that He *possesses* those attributes regardless of what anyone thinks about them. As I have noted previously, this is a *verbal* definition of Reality, at the *second* grade of clarity; the *pragmaticistic* definition, at the *third* grade of clarity, is "the state of things which [would] be believed in that ultimate opinion" (CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343; 1905) after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. Consequently, if anything is *Real*--even it does not now, never has, and never will *exist*--then it must be *knowable*; and presumably you will agree that we *do* have knowledge of *some* non-existent Realities. Again, how is that possible? And why would God be any different? Are you perhaps suggesting that *entia rationis* are the *only *non-existent Realities that are knowable? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 11:55 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary R, > > Jon, you wrote, “I am hoping that Gary F. will explain why he finds it > problematic that our acquaintance with God is entirely mediated by Signs, > even though that is just as true of our acquaintance with Peirce or just > about anything else.” > > I will try to keep this concise, because it’s really nothing but an > attempt to explain what “collateral experience” means in this context. > > The evidence for Peirce’s having lived in Lowell and Milford, published a > number of papers in various journals, having written the hundreds of > manuscript pages you and I have transcribed, etc., puts the fact of his > existence (1839-1914) beyond any reasonable doubt; and this puts his > *reality* beyond any reasonable doubt. > > The psychophysical universe which, by hypothesis, was and is being created > by God, contains no evidence of God’s *existence*. “Since God, in His > essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit,” any > claim of acquaintance with Him must rest on a very different basis from our > acquaintance with Peirce (or my acquaintance with you, for that matter). > Moreover, any *knowledge* that any mind can have of God must consist of > predicates attributed to the real Subject we call “God” — which name, says > Peirce, is different from all other proper names because it is *definable*. > Every other proper name is an *index* of an entity who, at some time in > some universe of discourse, has existed in some embodied form, and the > *prerequisite* for knowledge of that subject is collateral experience of > it. A definable term, on the other hand, is necessarily a *symbol* (CP > 4.544) which may have little or no indexical value or grounding in > collateral experience. > > After defining his terms, Peirce begins his NA by saying “If God Really > be, and be benign, then, in view of the generally conceded truth that > religion, were it but proved, would be a good outweighing all others, we > should naturally expect …” Peirce does not *assert* that God is benign, > but he does make the value of his argument conditional on God’s > benevolence. Now, what reason do we have for attributing benevolence to the > Creator of the psychophysical Universe? Any predicate we attribute to > *any* agency is generalized from our experience of that quality being > operative in the observable universe. If God created it *all*, why should > we cherry-pick some qualities of Creation and attribute them to God while > ignoring other qualities? What evidence is there that the Creator is more > benevolent than malevolent, or indifferent? If there is no evidence, no > means of testing a hypothesis inductively, there is no *knowledge*, no > matter how fallible or provisional we take it to be. > > Based on my own observations of the observable, I think it most likely > that God is an *ens rationis* whose reality consists of our willingness > to live up the the ideal characteristics which we attribute to Him. As > Peirce put it, the Argument for His reality “should present its conclusion, > not as a proposition of metaphysical theology, but in a form directly > applicable to the conduct of life, and full of nutrition for man's highest > growth.” God is a Real Ideal to Whom a pragmatic monotheist attributes all > good. But this attribution runs into logical problems as soon as it tries > to elevate itself as a metaphysical theology. If the Creator is benevolent, > what accounts for our collateral experience of malevolence and rampant > suffering of the innocent in His Creation? Well, one explanation is to say > that God is good *by definition*, and we simply don’t really understand > His transcendent and ultimate goodness. Almighty God can do no wrong. The > ethical principle behind this belief is essentially “Might makes Right,” > which I don’t consider to be a principle “full of nutrition for man's > highest growth.” > > I hope that will suffice, and is sufficiently focused on the > semiotic/logical/cognitive issues, because I’d rather not go any further > into theology than I have here. > > Gary f. >
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