Gary F., List: Your previous message came through to me as plain text, rather than HTML; and my reply went out as HTML, rather than plain text; so I guess that we will just have to chalk up those formatting issues to cyber-gremlins. :-)
GF: Essentially it is the distinction between (1) what can be conveyed by a sign (i.e. a symbol) and (2) what cannot be conveyed by the sign because the interpreter must already have it in mind in order for the sign to “tell about it.” Thank you for clarifying this. Rather than knowledge vs. acquaintance, I associate it with (1) the *Interpretant *that a Sign *signifies *and (2) the *Object *that a Sign *denotes*. In a Proposition, these are represented by (1) the continuous predicate, expressing the *relation *among the subjects, which is all that the Proposition *itself *conveys; and (2) the subjects *themselves*, which require previous Collateral Experience or current Collateral Observation in order to be understood by an interpreter. What remains unclear to me is why you seem to think that such Collateral Experience/Observation cannot be *entirely *mediated by *other *Signs. If even a Percept is a Seme (Sign) that Retroductively produces a Perceptual Judgment, which is a Proposition (Sign), how can we gain acquaintance with *anything *in a way that is *not *entirely mediated by Signs? GF: ... *knowledge *is the goal of the positive sciences which practice inductive hypothesis-testing, while *belief *is defined pragmatically as a cognitive habit which guides actual conduct. I do not agree with this restriction of knowledge, nor its sharp differentiation from belief; after all, its standard modern philosophical definition is *justified true belief*. For Peirce, a *true* belief is one that *would* be maintained in the Ultimate Opinion, as a result of infinite inquiry by an infinite community; and a *justified* belief is one that is affirmed *because* it is the conclusion of a valid Argument--whether Deductive (certain), Inductive (probable), or Retroductive (plausible)--whose premisses one *already* believes. Put another way, a belief is justified as long as one has no good reason for genuinely doubting it. From this standpoint, knowledge consists of *deliberately adopted* Propositions whose corresponding habits of conduct *would* never be confounded by *any* future experience. GF: So I can say that I *believe* these things, meaning that I accept Bahá'í teachings generally as guiding principles for my own conduct. But I do not claim to *know* these things ... I assume that this is *not* because you do not believe those teachings to be *true*, but because you do not believe that you are adequately *justified* in believing them, since you apparently insist on "inductive hypothesis-testing" for that. As you seem to acknowledge, Peirce did not impose such a limitation; again, for him, it was sufficient that the Reality of God (for example) is the conclusion of a valid *Retroductive* Argument. GF: I’m sure you are aware that for Peirce, an “individual” *person *is not an individual in the strict logical sense. Indeed, every "individual" person is a *real general*; so even if God is an "individual" person, He is still a *real general*. Moreover, we can have no knowledge of *any *"individual in the strict logical sense," because that would require it to be *completely determinate*; even less so for God, since (*ex hypothesi*) He is "infinitely incomprehensible" (CP 6.466, EP 2:439; 1908). In fact, this limitation serves as a basis for Peirce's "extreme scholastic realism"--all Objects of knowledge are general, and some Objects of knowledge are real; therefore, some generals are real. CSP: The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any time, however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time it will undergo some change in its relations. But what does not exist for any time, however short, does not exist at all. All, therefore, that we perceive or think, or that exists, is general. So far there is truth in the doctrine of scholastic realism. But all that exists is infinitely determinate, and the infinitely determinate is the absolutely individual. This seems paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That which exists is the object of a true conception. This conception may be made more determinate than any assignable conception; and therefore it is never so determinate that it is capable of no further determination. (CP 3.93n; 1870) That which exists *would *be infinitely determinate at any *hypothetical *instant in time, but it is *really *undergoing continuous change in its relations, such that every true conception of it--i.e., every Sign for which it serves as the Dynamic Object, including all our *knowledge *of it--is always capable of *further determination*; even more so for God, since (*ex hypothesi*) He is real but does not exist. GF: You are also familiar with the difference between *common nouns*, which are names of generals, and *proper nouns* or names, which designate individuals such as persons. Yes, they are *grammatically* different--but are they *logically *different? Both are represented in EGs by labeled Spots, and therefore correspond to *general concepts*; while *indefinite individuals* are represented by *continuous *Lines, each of which has an inexhaustible supply of *potential* branches to accommodate *further determination*. "Every Dicisign, as the system of Existential Graphs fully recognizes, is a further determination of an already known sign of the same object" (CP 2.320; 1903). GF: When I first heard the proper name “Peirce”, I already had collateral experience of such names designating individuals who have written books, and of such names being mentioned by other writers in my experience of reading; also the experience of searching for replicas of that name in the reasonable expectation that I could find indices of something he had written, and thus eventually acquire a replica of such a text by means of which I also had collateral experience. Okay, but what was the *nature *of that previous Collateral Experience? Again, was it somehow not *entirely *mediated by other Signs? Consider a more remote example--Socrates apparently did not write anything *himself*, so everything that we know about him and his philosophy comes from the testimony of *others*. How can we nevertheless have acquaintance (in your technical sense) with Socrates? Again, why would God be any different? GF: I cannot honestly claim to recognize God’s handwriting; nor do I recognize the content of the Bible as written by anyone other than human beings. Even if we set aside the theological doctrine of special revelation, I (and many others) *do *"claim to recognize God's handwriting" all over "the physico-psychical universe." I am disappointed that you did not specifically address my comments (and Peirce's) about *direct perception* of God and *personal communication* with Him as candidates for the kind of Collateral Experience/Observation that would straightforwardly enable Him to be an Object of Propositions, and therefore an Object of knowledge. Here are a few other relevant passages. CSP: We have a direct knowledge of real objects in every experiential reaction, whether of *Perception* or of *Exertion* (the one theoretical, the other practical). These are directly *hic et nunc*. But we extend the category, and speak of numberless real objects with which we are not in direct reaction. We have also direct knowledge of qualities in feeling, peripheral and visceral. But we extend this category to numberless characters of which we have no immediate consciousness. (EP 2:304; 1904) Direct *perception* results in direct *knowledge*, and we can even "extend the category" to include "real objects with which we are not in direct reaction" and "characters of which we have no immediate consciousness." CSP: There is in the dictionary a word, *solipsism*, meaning the belief that the believer is the only existing person. Were anybody to adopt such a belief, it might be difficult to argue him out of it. But when a person finds himself in the society of others, he is just as sure of their existence as of his own, though he may entertain a metaphysical theory that they are all hypostatically the same *ego*. In like manner, when a man has that experience with which religion sets out, he has as good reason--putting aside metaphysical subtilties--to believe in the living personality of God as he has to believe in his own. Indeed, *belief* is a word inappropriate to such direct perception. (CP 6.436; 1893) If our social encounters with other people warrant our believing in their existence--even warrant our being quite *sure *of it--then direct perception of God warrants believing in His Reality. In fact, according to the last sentence, we need to substitute a different word for *belief*—knowledge, based on the previous excerpt? Or acquaintance, perhaps? CSP: [We] can know nothing except what we *directly* experience. So all that we can anyway know relates to experience. All the creations of our mind are but patchworks from experience. So that all our ideas are but ideas of real or transposed experiences. A word can mean nothing except the idea it calls up. So that we cannot even *talk* about anything but a knowable object. The unknowable about which Hamilton and the agnostics talk can be nothing but an Unknowable Knowable. The absolutely unknowable is a non-existent existence. The Unknowable is a nominalistic heresy ... Where would such an idea, say as that of God, come from, if not from direct experience? Would you make it a result of some kind of reasoning, good or bad? Why, reasoning can supply the mind with nothing in the world except an estimate of the value of a statistical ratio, that is, how often certain kinds of things are found in certain combinations in the ordinary course of experience ... No: as to God, open your eyes--and your heart, which is also a perceptive organ--and you see him. (CP 6.492-493; c. 1896) Here Peirce required *direct *experience for *all *knowledge, perhaps foreshadowing his famous statement, "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason" (CP 5.212, EP 2:241; 1903). He also denied that there is anything "absolutely unknowable," which seems to me to be another way of saying that whatever is real *is *knowable. He then suggested the mere *idea *of God as something that we could *only *obtain from such experience, since (inductive) reasoning can only "estimate the value of a statistical ratio." Finally, similar to what I quoted last time, he asserted that *anyone *is capable of directly perceiving God upon opening one's eyes and heart. Apparently you disagree with him (and me) about all of this, so we may just have to leave it at that. GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious discussion” must employ an *experimental* logic which relies on *experiential evidence*. Now, the psychophysical Universe *as Sign* can afford us neither acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential evidence that the Creator is really the subject of any particular predicate, for the simple reason that no such hypothesis is testable by observation. Thanks for re-posting the quote from Peirce with your bold added. Again, I do not think that he was as strict as you seem to be about what counts as "experimental logic," "experiential evidence," and "testable by observation." After all, he explicitly considered his (Retroductive) Neglected Argument for the Reality of God to be "the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie in its value in the self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life" (CP 6.480, EP 2:446; 1908). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 9:20 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list, > > My previous message, like all of my posts, was formatted in HTML, so I > think the formatting must have been lost at your end, Jon. I notice that > your latest message also seems to be in plain text. You should check the > settings of whatever software you use for email to make sure it properly > displays HTML-formatted messages instead of converting them to plain text. > > The Peircean distinction I have referred to in this thread is a conceptual > one, not merely a verbal one, and Peirce expresses it in various ways. > Essentially it is the distinction between (1) what can be conveyed by a > sign (i.e. a symbol) and (2) what cannot be conveyed by the sign because > the interpreter must already have it in mind in order for the sign to “tell > about it.” I’m sure you are familiar with the distinction, as you have > mentioned it yourself in previous posts to the list. In my statement of the > distinction I used the word “acquaintance” for (2) because that is the term > for it most often used by Peirce, and I chose “knowledge” for (1) because > your claim is that *knowledge* of God is conveyed by the Universe as > Sign. The fact that Peirce sometimes uses the more technical term > “information” for (1), and sometimes used “acquaintance” in reference to a > kind of knowledge, has no bearing on the validity of the distinction. You > can find most (but not all) of the texts where Peirce makes the distinction > by searching for the word “collateral”, but I see no need to copy them all > here. > > JAS: If "God" is indeed "*the *definable proper name," then might it not > also be *the *exception to the rule that acquaintance with the Object of > a Sign requires Collateral Experience/Observation? > > GF: Quite possibly; and that would explain why “knowledge of God” is > indeed exceptional, and not at all like our knowledge of Peirce or any > person who has *existed*. But that would not be what I call *positive* > knowledge, in the usual Peircean sense of “positive,” the sense in which > mathematics is *not* a positive science but logic and semiotics *are* > positive sciences. As I mentioned earlier, I distinguish between *knowing* > and *believing*, not on the basis of one being more “certain” than the > other, but in the sense that *knowledge* is the goal of the positive > sciences which practice inductive hypothesis-testing, while *belief* is > defined pragmatically as a cognitive habit which guides actual conduct. The > essential difference between science and religion, as I use those words, is > that science aims at theoretical *knowledge* in the sense I’m using here, > while religion aims at guiding the practical conduct of its *believers*. > Looking at them this way, religion and science are not opposed but > complementary. Scientists have a core *belief* that the universe is > intelligible, which guides their practice of science; religious believers > cannot actually conduct themselves in the real world or live up to their > religious ideals without applying some factual *knowledge* which is not > given by revelation. As Einstein put it, religion without science is blind, > and science without religion is lame. > > JAS: I guess we disagree on whether God has left such traces [in the > observable Universe]; I see His "fingerprints" all over the Universe, and I > also consider certain writings to be revelations from God Himself. Perhaps > this is where *faith *comes into play, another theological rather than > philosophical issue. > > GF: As I explained a few messages back, God being the Creator of the > *whole* Universe means that it’s not honest to claim *some* aspects of > the Universe (and *not* others) as reflecting the attributes of God. To > believe that God is benign is indeed a matter of *faith*. The religion I > subscribe to, which we call “the Bahá'í Faith”, likewise sees all created > things as signs of a benign God, and considers certain scriptures to be > specially “revealed” by God through individuals singled out to serve that > purpose. So I can say that I *believe* these things, meaning that I > accept Bahá'í teachings generally as guiding principles for my own conduct. > But I do not claim to *know* these things — except in a Bahá'í context, > where the verb “know” often means “have faith in”. (I have occasionally > seen scriptures that use the word “Know” in the imperative, which would be > nonsense in a non-religious context, because you can’t *order* someone > (or *will* yourself) to have *factual* knowledge.) In every other > context, including the Peirce list, I use the words “know” and “knowledge” > only in reference to factual and fallible cognition. It is in this sense > that I pronounce the Creator to be unknowable. By the way, I can also > affirm the unknowability of God in a Bahá'í context, but not in the same > sense, because Bahá'í belief is that He is unknowable “in His Essence”, > which leaves a loophole for revelation. But I promised not to say anything > about theology, and I hope this will suffice to illustrate my rather strict > distinction between *belief* and *knowledge* — a distinction emphasized > more by me than by Peirce. > > GF: No, I think we can acquire knowledge of nonexistent things such as > real generals, if they are embodied or manifested in observable tokens of > Types. But as far as I can tell, for both you and Peirce, God the Creator > is the name of an individual, an agent or agency, a person with a proper > name, and not a general. > > JAS: On the contrary, Peirce explicitly stated that "whatever exists is > individual, since existence (not reality) and individuality are essentially > the same thing" (CP 3.613; 1901); and also that "a person is only a > particular kind of general idea" (CP 6.270; 1892). Accordingly, if God is > a real person Who does not exist, then He is not an *individual*, but a > real *general*. > > GF: Here you are equivocating on the use of the term *individual*. I’m > sure you are aware that for Peirce, an “individual” *person* is not an > individual in the strict logical sense. You are also familiar with the > difference between *common nouns*, which are names of generals, and *proper > nouns* or names, which designate individuals such as persons. Since “God” > is, as Peirce says, a proper name, God is an individual person — *unless*, > as per your suggestion above, “God” is an exception to the usual > grammatical rule. Normally a proper name refers to an Individual, as Peirce > affirms in this passage that you yourself quoted: > > CSP: A proper name, when one meets with it for the first time, is > existentially connected with some percept or other equivalent individual > knowledge of the individual it names. It is *then*, and then only, a > genuine Index. The next time one meets with it, one regards it as an Icon > of that Index. The habitual acquaintance with it having been acquired, it > becomes a Symbol whose Interpretant represents it as an Icon of an Index of > the Individual named. (CP 2.329; 1903) > > JAS: What was the "percept or other equivalent individual knowledge" that > was "existentially connected" with Peirce's name in that initial encounter? > > GF: When I first heard the proper name “Peirce”, I already had collateral > experience of such names designating individuals who have written books, > and of such names being mentioned by other writers in my experience of > reading; also the experience of searching for replicas of that name in the > reasonable expectation that I could find indices of something he had > written, and thus eventually acquire a replica of such a text by means of > which I also had collateral experience. Need I go on? or point out that > none of this collateral experience applies to the proper name “God”? Having > seen images of many of his manuscripts, I can honestly say that I recognize > Peirce’s handwriting. I cannot honestly claim to recognize God’s > handwriting; nor do I recognize the content of the Bible as written by > anyone other than human beings. Authors can bear witness to the feeling of > being inspired, I can even say that myself, but I have no experience of > *other* authors being inspired, only of the testimony that *they *choose > to express in that form. > > Here again is the passage of which I highlighted parts in bold which did > not come through to your screen. I hope you can see it this time. > > [CSP:[ As to reality, one finds it defined in various ways; but if that > principle of terminological ethics that was proposed be accepted, the > equivocal language will soon disappear. For *realis* and *realitas* are > not ancient words. They were invented to be terms of philosophy in the > thirteenth century, and the meaning they were intended to express is > perfectly clear. *That is real which has such and such characters, > whether anybody thinks it to have those characters or not. At any rate, > that is the sense in which the pragmaticist uses the word*. Now, just as > conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of > conduct, the nature of which (as to illustrate the meaning, peaceable > habits and not quarrelsome habits) does not depend upon any accidental > circumstances, and *in that sense* may be said to be *destined;* so, > thought, controlled by a rational *experimental* logic, tends to the > fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be > the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations > may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. *If this be so, as > every man of us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the > truth of which he seriously discusses, then*, according to the adopted > definition of “real,” the state of things which will be believed in that > ultimate opinion is real. But, for the most part, such opinions will be > general. Consequently, *some* general objects are real. (Of course, > nobody ever thought that *all* generals were real; but *the scholastics > used to assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite > no, experiential evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay > just there*, and not in holding that generals could be real.) One is > struck with the inexactitude of thought even of analysts of power, when > they touch upon modes of being. One will meet, for example, the virtual > assumption that what is relative to thought cannot be real. But why not, > exactly? *Red* is relative to sight, but the fact that this or that is in > that relation to vision that we call being red is not *itself* relative > to sight; it is a real fact. ] CP 5.430, EP 2:342-343 ] > > GF: From the above it is clear what what Peirce calls a “serious > discussion” must employ an *experimental* logic which relies on *experiential > evidence*. Now, the psychophysical Universe *as Sign* can afford us > neither acquaintance with the Creator nor experiential evidence that the > Creator is really the subject of any particular predicate, for the simple > reason that no such hypothesis is testable by observation. > > Gary f. >
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