John, List: JFS: But the word 'final' is ambiguous. It could mean a completed end, or it could mean a limit that can be approximated but never reached.
Or it could have the sense of "final cause," which is how I understand it in this context. Then it would not mean a *completed *end, or even a limit that is necessarily *approximated*, but simply the *telos*--or as Peirce sometimes called it, the *entelechy*--toward which something tends. It is not *actual*, but nevertheless *real *as a would-be. JFS: Peirce never rejected Cantor's construction. By calling it a pseudo=continuum, he accepted it as a legitimate mathematical construction. But he went farther by claiming that a geometrical line has a superinfinity of possible points. He rejected Cantor's mathematical construction as an inadequate conceptualization of a *true *continuum, and he ultimately also abandoned (or at least adjusted) his "supermultitudinous" definition of the latter. See, for example, Jerome Havenel's 2008 paper <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.473.9336&rep=rep1&type=pdf>, "Peirce's Clarifications of Continuity." This is what I have in mind by contrasting a "bottom-up" approach with a "top-down" one--for any discrete *collection*, including the infinite pseudo-continuum, the parts are real and the whole is an *ens rationis*; but for any true *continuum*, the whole is real and the parts are *entia rationis*. JFS: The phrase "permanently settled" implies a completed endpoint. That is consistent with God "resting on the seventh day", but it is inconsistent with "infinite inquiry by an infinite community". No, it just implies a real would-be--if an infinite community *were *to engage in infinite inquiry, then the Truth is what it *would *permanently come to believe. JFS: [Hartshorne] used the term 'panentheism', which may be translated as "all in God". In other words, God isn't in the universes, but the universes are in God. As I have noted before, Peirce clearly ruled this out by asserting emphatically, in four different manuscript drafts for "A Neglected Argument," that God is *not* immanent in Nature or the three Universes; especially once we take into account his definition of "immanent" for the Century Dictionary, which among other things states, "The doctrine of an immanent deity does not necessarily imply that the world, or the soul of the world, is God, but only that it either is or is in God." Peirce's denial of an immanent deity thus entails the denial that the world *is in *God (panentheism) just as much as the denial that the world *is* God (pantheism). JFS: Karl Krause, a 19th c philosopher who was a student of Schelling, coined the term 'panentheism' for a kind of pantheism with a personal God who created and contained the observable universe(s). In that case, given Peirce's affinity for Schelling, he surely would have used that term to describe his own views, had he considered them to be consistent with it. Instead, he explicitly identified his position as *theism* at least twice. CSP: I look upon creation as going on and I believe that such vague idea as we can have of the power of creation is best identified with the idea of theism. So then the ideal would be to be fulfilling our appropriate offices in the work of creation. Or to come down to the practical, every man sees some task cut out for him. Let him do it, and feel that he is doing what God made him in order that he should do. (CP 8.138n; 1905 July 14) CSP: To Schiller's anthropomorphism I subscribe in the main. And in particular if it implies *theism*, I am an anthropomorphist. But the God of my theism is not finite. That won't do at all. (CP 8.262; 1905 July 23) He also endorsed theism (without using that word) and Schiller's anthropomorphism (explicitly) in conjunction with one of his late definitions of continuity that I have quoted before, calling its *rational *nature a revelation of God. CSP: I conceive that a Continuum has, IN ITSELF, no definite parts, although to endow it with definite parts of no matter what multitude, and even parts of lesser dimensionality down to absolute simplicity, it is only necessary that these should be marked off, and although even the operation of thought suffices to impart an approach to definiteness of parts of any multitude we please.* *This indubitably proves that the possession of parts by a continuum is not a real character of it. For the real is that whose being one way or another does not depend upon how individual persons may imagine it to be. It shows, too, that Continuity is of a Rational nature. But it conveys no gleam of evidence that Continuity itself is Unreal, an opinion against which there rise Alps, and Andes, and heaven-touching Atlases of insuperable objection. To my humble intelligence, the Rationality of Continuity, the chief character of the foundation stones of the real universe, adds another to the hundred already interpretable revelations of our Super-august and Gracious Father. (By "super-august" I mean having the majesty of that silent voice, *sibilus aurae tenuis* [a gentle whisper], that Elijah (I Kings xix.12) heard, too sublimely august for any admixture of the belittling insistence upon recognition that clings to the humanly august, with its comical *Majestäts-beleidigung* [offense against the monarchy].) As for my Anthropomorphism, after what F. C. S. Schiller has written, it is needless for me to say that it belongs to the essence of Pragmatism. (S30 [Copy T:6-7]; c. 1906) Accordingly, I find it untenable to claim that Peirce *himself *was somehow *not *a theist; although non-theists can certainly adopt and fruitfully develop his insights, as many have already done. JFS: The passages Jon quoted (copied below) are closer to Whitehead and Hartshorne than they are to traditional Christian theology. I obviously disagree, or at least see no conflict between those passages and traditional Christian theology. Acknowledging that creation is ongoing does not entail endorsement of modern process theology. Again, Peirce affirmed many of the traditional attributes of God, including omniscience and being outside of time. I am not aware of any text of his that supports Whitehead's claim "that God created the universe in order to understand what would happen." JFS: Peirce emphasized fallibilism about physics. He would be more cautious about metaphysics, even his own. Indeed, we are discussing hypotheses rather than dogmas; and I acknowledge that Peirce characterized the hypothesis of God, in particular, "as vague yet as true so far as it is definite, and as continually tending to define itself more and more, and without limit" (CP 6.466, EP 2:439; 1908). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 1:29 PM John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina and Jon, > > > ET > > This, to me, is the complex semiosic process - and is continuous, open, > > adaptive, evolving...and there is no 'final truth'. > > > > JAS > > On the contrary ... > > CSP: You certainly opine that there is such a thing as Truth. > > Otherwise, reasoning and thought would be without a purpose. > > (CP 2.135; 1902). > > But the word 'final' is ambiguous. It could mean a completed end, > or it could mean a limit that can be approximated but never reached. > > For example, mathematicians talk about π as a real number. But π is > a limit that can only be approximated, never actually written down > or computed: 3.14, 22/7, 3.1416, 3.14159265... > > That means there is no contradiction between Edwina and Jon: there > exists a final interpretant as a limit, but because of the complexity, > it's impossible to state it as a completed assertion. > > In fact, RLT 162-163 (copied below) gives more support for Edwina's > claim than Jon's. As Peirce believes, "all the arbitrary arrangements > which mark actuality ... spring out on every hand and all the time, as > the act of creation goes on, their only value is to be shaped into a > continuous delineation under the creative hand, and at any rate their > only use for us is to hold us down to learning one lesson at a time." > > > JFS: I used an argument based on Cantor's set theory, which Peirce > > knew very well: as the number of elements in a set grows, the number > > of ways of combining them grows exponentially. > > > > JAS: Yes, but Peirce ultimately rejected Cantor's "pseudo-continuum" > > (CP 6.176; 1908). I have been suggesting recently that the entire > > Universe as a vast Argument is instead a "true continuum" (CP 6.170; > > 1902) and a "perfect continuum" (CP 4.642 & 7.535n6; both 1908) > > Peirce never rejected Cantor's construction. By calling it a > pseudo=continuum, he accepted it as a legitimate mathematical > construction. But he went farther by claiming that a geometrical > line has a superinfinity of possible points. > > This adds even more support for Edwina's claim. > > JAS > > As discussed at length by Lane in his book, Peirce's considered view > > was that "ultimate Truth" is whatever would become permanently settled > > belief upon infinite inquiry by an infinite community--a regulative > > hope, the telos of all semeiosis (Final Interpretant), which may or > > may not correspond to any actual effect (Dynamic Interpretant). > > The phrase "permanently settled" implies a completed endpoint. > That is consistent with God "resting on the seventh day", but it > is inconsistent with "infinite inquiry by an infinite community". > > JAS > > if, as Peirce professed to believe, God is "Really creator of all three > > Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2:434; 1908), then He is not > > "any intelligent being in that universe." > > Before saying anything else, I want to emphasize that Hartshorne, > who was the primary editor of CP vol. 6, developed his own version > of process theology that was close to Whitehead than to Peirce. > > He used the term 'panentheism', which may be translated as > "all in God". In other words, God isn't in the universes, but > the universes are in God. > > Karl Krause, a 19th c philosopher who was a student of Schelling, > coined the term 'panentheism' for a kind of pantheism with a personal > God who created and contained the observable universe(s). > > The passages Jon quoted (copied below) are closer to Whitehead and > Hartshorne than they are to traditional Christian theology. Peirce > emphasized fallibilism about physics. He would be more cautious > about metaphysics, even his own. > > John > ______________________________________________________________________ > > CSP: The zero collection is bare, abstract, germinal possibility. > The continuum is concrete, developed possibility. The whole universe of > true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this Universe > of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential Secondness of > Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of > the blackboard. There is room in the world of possibility for any > multitude of such universes of Existence. Even in this transitory life, > the only value of all the arbitrary arrangements which mark actuality, > whether they were introduced once for all "at the end of the sixth day > of creation" or whether as I believe, they spring out on every hand and > all the time, as the act of creation goes on, their only value is to be > shaped into a continuous delineation under the creative hand, and at any > rate their only use for us is to hold us down to learning one lesson at > a time, so that we may make generalizations of intellect and the more > important generalizations of sentiment which make the value of this > world. (RLT 162-163; 1898) > > CSP: The generalization of sentiment can take place on different > sides. Poetry is one sort of generalization of sentiment, and in so far > is the regenerative metamorphosis of sentiment. But poetry remains on > one side ungeneralized, and to that is due its emptiness. The complete > generalization, the complete regeneration of sentiment is religion, > which is poetry, but poetry completed. (CP 1.676; 1898) > > CSP: I hear you say: "All that is not fact; it is poetry." > Nonsense! Bad poetry is false, I grant; but nothing is truer than true > poetry ... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's > purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities … The Universe > as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem,--for > every fine argument is a poem and a symphony,--just as every true poem > is a sound argument. (CP 1.315 & 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903) >
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