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}The outline by JAS is indeed, an outline of the basic infrastructure
of Peircean semiosis - in its reality as a continuous process of
'formation' and 'interpretation. I have a problem, however, with the
notion of Truth as outlined by JAS.
1] My understanding of Truth refers to the Interpretant functioning
as an attempt to be a 'perfect' interpretation of a Dynamic Object.
In this sense, we could expand this to: the Truth 'Is the ultimate
interpretant of every sign' { EP2.304]. But is there such a state as
this 'Truth'?
JAS writes:" I now suggest that Truth is the "one general law" or
"one Idea" to which the Universe as a Sign and all of its material
parts conform, such that it is a perfect continuum."
I have a problem with this because it suggests that the correlation
of the Interpretant[s] with the Objects - is the 'one general law' of
the universe. I think that such a goal of such a bond nullifies the
reality of our universe as a complex adaptive system, of a continuous
semiosis process; and therefore, it nullified all three categorical
modes. It nullifies the spontaneity and deviations of Firstness; it
nullifies the 'hard knock' deviations of Secondness and it nullifies
the generalization 'fuzziness' and openness to diversity of
Thiridness'.
JAS refers to this in the following comment:
2] JAS " Left to themselves, the universes of matter (2ns) and mind
(3ns) would indeed eventually grind to a halt; but instead, the
ongoing actions of their Creator and Object, as well as the reality
of spontaneity (1ns), "perpetually" renew, refresh, reinvigorate, and
revise them.
Exactly - the functionality of Firstness rejects a perfect
correlation of Object and Interpretant [Note: I add the actions of
2ns and 3ns to this process of a rejection of a perfect correlation].
And of course, I reject the theistic determinism of 'the ongoing
actions of their Creator and Object', a theory held by JAS.
Therefore - I consider that 'Truth' is a goal that attempts to
connect the DO and the Interpretants, BUT - it is also a reality that
it not only cannot but must never be achieved in any perfect state.
Edwina
On Sun 21/07/19 8:11 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt [email protected]
sent:
Gary R., List:
GR: And so, say, a book hidden away for hundreds of years in some
European monastery may contain thoughts which, when the content of it
is brought to light, translated, etc. we may now think about. In
short, and while it seems obvious once stated, we can only then begin
to think the thoughts in the volume once hidden in obscurity. So, we
can now, individually and in communities of common interest, read and
write about them, agree/disagree regarding their meanings, develop
these thoughts, perhaps create experiments to test hypotheses
suggested by the ideas contained in the book, etc.
Indeed, and we can say the same about manuscripts hidden away for a
hundred years or so in an American university library; bringing their
contents to light enables our community of common interest to think
Peirce's thoughts with him, although our different collateral
experiences result in different Dynamic Interpretants when we do so.
GR: In considering exactly what this thinking/thought distinction
entails, you offered one of my favorite Peirce quotations of which,
in my opinion, the underlying idea can't be repeated often enough:
That quotation (R 295:117-118[102-103]; 1906) is a good example of
what I just described, since it comes from a discarded draft of
"Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" and draws the analogy
between motion and thought much more clearly and completely than the
published version (CP 4.572). In fact, comparing it with another
manuscript passage from the same year makes the similarity even more
striking.
CSP: Now no perfect sign is in a statical condition: you might as
well suppose a portion of matter to remain at rest during a
thousandth of a second, or any other long interval of time. The only
signs which are tolerably fixed are non-existent abstractions. We
cannot deny that such a sign is real; only its mode of reality is not
that active kind which we call existence. The existent acts, and
whatsoever acts changes. Perhaps the reader may demur to this, saying
that the earth acts to press him against the floor, but does not
thereby undergo any change. But the floor is elastic, and his weight
[missing text] never lasts. He vibrates up and down; and action and
reaction being equal, the centre of gravity of the earth reciprocally
vibrates up and down. It is abstractly conceivable that a particle
should remain at rest; but in fact, it never does so. (EP 2:545n25, R
283:259-260[115-116]; 1906)
The physical universe consists of matter in constant motion
according to the laws of nature, commonly expressed as subjunctive
conditionals. The material parts of this true continuum are
positions, which we artificially create for the purpose of describing
hypothetical instantaneous states of the real dynamic process,
employing variables and equations within an arbitrary system of
coordinates.
The psychical universe consists of mind in constant thought
according to the laws of logic, commonly expressed as leading
principles. The material parts of this true continuum are
propositions, which we artificially create for the purpose of
describing hypothetical instantaneous states of the real inferential
process, employing subjects and predicates within an arbitrary system
of signs.
This parallelism reflects Peirce's objective idealism, according to
which "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical
laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293; 1891). Motion and thought are both
examples of semeiosis, since "physical events are but degraded or
undeveloped forms of psychical events" and "the phenomena of matter
are but the result of the sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind"
(CP 6.264, EP 1:348; 1892). Ultimately, "dead matter would be merely
the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the
free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to
complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898)--i.e., the cessation of all
semeiosis, including both motion and thought. What prevents this
outcome?
CSP: Every real ingredient of the perfect sign is aging, its
energy of action upon the interpretant is running low, its sharp
edges are wearing down, its outlines becoming more indefinite.On the
other hand, the perfect sign is perpetually being acted upon by its
object, from which it is perpetually receiving the accretions of new
signs, which bring it fresh energy, and also kindle energy that it
already had, but which had lain dormant.
In addition, the perfect sign never ceases to undergo changes of the
kind we rather drolly call spontaneous, that is, they happen sua
sponte but not by its will. They are phenomena of growth. (EP
2:545n25, R 283:260-261[116-117]; 1906)
Left to themselves, the universes of matter (2ns) and mind (3ns)
would indeed eventually grind to a halt; but instead, the ongoing
actions of their Creator and Object, as well as the reality of
spontaneity (1ns), "perpetually" renew, refresh, reinvigorate, and
revise them.
GR: The next distinction discussed, namely, semiosis being a
top-down rather than a bottom-up process, seems to represent a
significant change in your thinking in the matter.
Yes, and I acknowledged as much in my post; in fact, that quotation
from R 295 was instrumental in helping me to see things differently.
Of course, this is an example of how I do not approach such topics
with my mind dogmatically made up, but remain open to persuasion.
GR: I'm quite in agreement on how this helps explain how languages
and various sign systems evolve, but I'm not at all clear on how it
explains how they come into being. Would you explain what you mean by
that?
I only mean that if propositions themselves --along with their
constituent subjects and predicates (including syntax)--are arbitrary
inventions, then the same is presumably true of the languages and
other sign systems in which we express them.
GR: Finally, what seems to be the conception that you've been
leading up to, what may at first appear to be a rather audacious
'suggestion', does, it seems to me, follow directly from your
argumentation; and now, especially, in light of the quotation just
above (EP 2:304).
JAS: I now suggest that Truth is the "one general law" or "one Idea"
to which the Universe as a Sign and all of its material parts conform,
such that it is a perfect continuum.
To be honest, this conclusion--whose implications I am still
contemplating, including the unification of Peirce's late definitions
of continuity, with semeiosis as the paradigmatic example--only
occurred to me after I had drafted the rest of the post; in
particular, the restatement of my previous suggestion that Truth is
the Final Interpretant of any Sign whose Dynamic Object is Reality,
followed by its application to Propositions and then to the entire
Universe as an Argument. That earlier hypothesis was directly
prompted by Lane's "dual-aspect account of truth" (chapter 1), in
which a true belief (1) represents reality and (2) would be
permanently settled by infinite inquiry; as I see it, (1) and (2)
correspond to the Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant,
respectively.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 4:37 PM Gary Richmond wrote:
Jon, List,
Thanks for this post which, including your remarks on some passages
from Robert Lane's book, helped me better grasp some of the ideas
you've recently been developing in this thread and elsewhere. Lane's
book and your posts are, in my view, exceedingly helpful in
clarifying Peirce's conceptions of realism and idealism, especially
in their relation to each other.
You noted that once one adopts the external/internal distinction
Peirce makes and Lane explicates, it becomes clear that ". . .
anything external is necessarily real, but it is also possible for
something internal to be real--like the fact of having a dream,
though not its content (cf. CP 8.191; c. 1904), and, further, and
importantly, "that prescission and abstraction are internal. . ."
From this follows this often quoted passage on Truth:
CSP: Truth belongs exclusively to propositions. A proposition has a
subject (or set of subjects) and a predicate. The subject is a sign;
the predicate is a sign; and the proposition is a sign that the
predicate is a sign of that of which the subject is a sign. If it be
so, it is true. (CP 5.553, EP 2:379; 1906) (Boldface added GR}
Lane reminds us of Peirce's important distinction between
'thinking' and 'thought':
RL: ... recall [Peirce's] distinction between thinking, which is a
mental process in which each person engages on her own, and thought,
which is, at least in part, a content that can be shared by multiple
thinkers and the character of which does not depend on anyone
actually thinking it ... Thoughts, unlike thinking, are external. (p.
109).
And so, say, a book hidden away for hundreds of years in some
European monastery may contain thoughts which, when the content of it
is brought to light, translated, etc. we may now think about. In
short, and while it seems obvious once stated, we can only then
begin to think the thoughts in the volume once hidden in obscurity.
So, we can now, individually and in communities of common interest,
read and write about them, agree/disagree regarding their meanings,
develop these thoughts, perhaps create experiments to test hypotheses
suggested by the ideas contained in the book, etc.
In considering exactly what this thinking/thought distinction
entails, you offered one of my favorite Peirce quotations of which,
in my opinion, the underlying idea can't be repeated often enough:
CSP: ... an Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a
motion is built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the
very essence of it ... Just as it is strictly correct to say that
nobody is ever in an exact Position (except instantaneously, and an
Instant is a fiction, or ens rationis), but Positions ... are entia
rationis (i.e. fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer
fictions) invented for the purposes of closer descriptions of states
of motion; so likewise, Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but
Logic, or the essence of Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it,
be at rest, or be anything but inferential process; and propositions
... are artificial creations intended to render the description of
Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order
serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R
295:117-118[102-103]; 1906) (Bold added GR)
(Cf: CP 5.553, EP 2:379; 1906 above.)
The next distinction discussed, namely, semiosis being a top-down
rather than a bottom-up process, seems to represent a significant
change in your thinking in the matter. Not so long ago--a couple of
months back, perhaps?--you seemed to be emphasizing the idea that
"continuous predicates marry subjects into propositions, and leading
principles marry propositions into arguments," that is, aligning
yourself to the bottom-up view. You now are arguing for a different
'marriage':
JAS: Instead, it is a top-down process--one vast argument, the
entire Universe [being] "perfused with signs, if it is not composed
exclusively of signs"[. . .] We invent propositions married by
leading principles as entia rationis for the purpose of describing
external "Thought-motion," which further requires us to invent
subjects married by continuous predicates [. . .] for the purpose of
representing those propositions. The Universe as an argument is thus
a semeiosic continuum whose only parts are material parts (cf. CP
6.174; 1908)--potential and indefinite parts--which we are free to
distinguish in any way that suits our intentions, like marking points
on a line (emphasis added by GR).
JAS: This [i.e. the whole of the top-down argument] helps explain
why different languages and other particular Sign Systems come about
and then evolve over time.
I'm quite in agreement on how this helps explain how languages and
various sign systems evolve, but I'm not at all clear on how it
explains how they come into being. Would you explain what you mean by
that?
The following quotation by Lane on prescission is well worth
repeating, especially since his examples (one taken directly from
Peirce) are so helpful in clarifying his meaning, especially that
"Concepts that result from the process of hypostatic abstraction do
not necessarily add anything to our ontology." :
RL: A specific instance of prescission will yield a general concept
in that inquirer's mind, but it cannot result in a real, external
general. What's more, prescission can yield, not just the general
concepts pear and human, but also vampire, and so it is not
guaranteed to result in a concept that corresponds to a real general
... Concepts that result from the process of hypostatic abstraction
do not necessarily add anything to our ontology. The general sweet is
real, since it is true that honey is sweet. Hypostatic abstraction can
infer from that belief the further belief that honey possesses
sweetness, but this does not necessarily commit us to saying that
there is an entity that the concept of sweetness represents. (pp.
131-132) (Boldface added: GR)
And now it is possible to see how an 'internal concept' via
'representation' can be connected with a real 'external general'--and
even 'Truth' to 'Reality':
JAS: Here we see how an internal concept resulting from prescission
or abstraction can be connected with a real, external general--namely,
by the relation of representation, according to which (as I recently
suggested) Truth is the Final Interpretant of any Sign whose Dynamic
Object is Reality. (Boldface added GR)
This brings us to the concluding section of your argument in this
post. You begin with what I consider an 'essential' quotation from
Peirce on the "Universe qua fact" and the " 'Truth' of being"--"the
fact that is not abstracted but complete":
CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe
itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being
joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to
determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the
absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language)
would be the very Universe. . . . The entelechy of the Universe of
being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe in its
aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is
not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every
sign . (EP 2:304; 1904) (Boldface added GR)
Finally, what seems to be the conception that you've been leading up
to, what may at first appear to be a rather audacious 'suggestion',
does, it seems to me, follow directly from your argumentation; and
now, especially, in light of the quotation just above (EP 2:304). You
wrote:
JAS: I now suggest that Truth is the "one general law" or "one
Idea" to which the Universe as a Sign and all of its material parts
conform, such that it is a perfect continuum (boldface added GR).
CSP: A perfect continuum belongs to the genus, of a whole all
whose parts without any exception whatsoever conform to one general
law to which same law conform likewise all the parts of each single
part. Continuity is thus a special kind of generality, or conformity
to one Idea. (CP 7.535n6, R 204:23-24[15-16]; 1908 May 24) (Boldface
added)
Jon, again, for those folk who, like me, have worked at closely
following your clear, but often subtle and complex, argumentation
(consider just in this last post the several 'distinctions' which had
to be clarified in preparing for your concluding "suggestion"); again,
those who do this, and especially do it in 'dialogue' with Lane's
book and with sincere intellectual generosity will, I believe, gain a
much better, much clearer understanding of the semiosic relationship
holding between the external and the internal, the real and the
ideal, in Peirce.
So, your bold conclusion:
JAS: . . . semeiosis itself is a real general that encompasses both
the internal (thinking) and the external (thought)--which is why,
"just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion is in a
body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts
are in us" (CP 5.289n1, EP 1:42n1; 1868) (boldface added GR).
Thanks again for your challenging yet, ultimately, quite satisfying
and personally rewarding post. I look forward to further discussions
on the subject.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'[email protected]\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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